21 research outputs found
Beyond the conflict: religion in the public sphere and deliberative democracy
Traditionally, liberals have confined religion to the sphere of the ‘private’ or
‘non-political’. However, recent debates over the use of religious symbols in public
spaces, state financing of faith schools, and tax relief for religious organisations suggest
that this distinction is not particularly useful in easing the tension between liberal ideas of
equality among citizens and freedom of religion. This article deals with one aspect of this
debate, which concerns whether members of religious communities should receive
exemptions from regulations that place a distinctively heavy burden on them. For
supporters of exemptions, protection for diverse practices and religious beliefs justifies
such a special treatment. For others, this is a form of positive discrimination incompatible
with equal citizenship.
Drawing on Habermas’ understanding of churches as ‘communities of
interpretation’ this article explores possible alternative solutions to both the ‘rule-andexemption’
approach and the ‘neutralist’ approach. Our proposal rests on the idea of
mutual learning between secular and religious perspectives. On this interpretation, what is required is, firstly, generation and maintenance of public spaces in which there could
be discussion and dialogue about particular cases, and, secondly, evaluation of whether
the basic conditions of moral discourse are present in these spaces. Thus deliberation
becomes a touchstone for the building of a shared democratic etho
Gaus on Coercion and Welfare-State Capitalism: A Critique
This article examines a novel line of argument in support of welfare-state capitalism proposed by Gerald Gaus. The novelty of Gaus’ argument lies in its contention that welfare-state capitalism can be justified on the basis of the contractualist mode of justification made famous by Rawls. Gaus argues that economic regimes, such as propertyowning democracy, are more coercive than welfare-state capitalism insofar as they require a greater degree of tax-imposed redistribution among citizens. Given the degree of coercion needed by these regimes, he contends that parties to a contract would not agree to them, whereas they would agree to welfare-state capitalism by virtue of the lesser degree of coercion it needs. It is argued in this article that Gaus fails to show that welfare-state capitalism is less coercive than property-owning democracy. Indeed, once one directs one’s attention towards those with the smallest range of valuable opportunities for action, there is reason to worry more about the coercion imposed by welfare-state capitalism than by property-owning democracy