294 research outputs found
When it pays off to take a look: Infants learn to follow an objectâs motion with their gaze â Especially if it features eyes
Social cues and instrumental learning are two aspects potentially fostering early gaze following. We systematically investigated the influence of social features (schematic eyes vs. reverse-contrast eyes) and gaze-contingent reinforcement (elicited vs. not elicited) on 4-month-olds' learning to attend to gaze-cued objects. In 4 experiments, we tested infants' (N = 74) gaze following of a turning block with schematic or reverse-contrast eyes. In Experiments 1 and 2, infants could elicit an attractive animation in a training phase via interactive eye tracking by following the turning of the block. Experiments 3 and 4 were yoked controls without contingent reinforcement. Infants did not spontaneously follow the motion of the block. Four-month-olds always followed the block after training when it featured schematic eyes. When the block featured reverse-contrast eyes, the training phase only affected infants' looking behavior without reinforcement. While speaking to a certain degree of plasticity, findings stress the importance of eyes for guiding infants' attention
Selbstbestimmung. Freier Wille, Verantwortung und Determinismus
An analysis of our commonsense concept of freedom yields two âminimal criteriaâ: (1) Autonomy distinguishes freedom from compulsion; (2) Authorship distinguishes freedom from chance. Translating freedom into âself-determinationâ can account for both criteria. Self-determination is understood as determination by âpersonal-preferencesâ which are constitutive for a person. Freedom and determinism are therefore compatible; the crucial question is not whether an action is determined at all but, rather, whether it is determined by personal preferences. This account can do justice to the most important intuitions concerning freedom, including the ability to do otherwise. Waiving determination, by contrast, would violate the minimal criteria rather than providing âmoreâ freedom. It is concluded that self-determination provides everything that we can ask for if we ask for freedom.Lâanalyse de la conception commune de la libertĂ© produit deux « critĂšres minimaux » : 1) Lâautonomie distingue la libertĂ© de la contrainte ; 2) La responsabilitĂ© distingue la libertĂ© du hasard. InterprĂ©ter la libertĂ© comme « autodĂ©termination » correspond aux deux critĂšres. LâautodĂ©termination se comprend comme une dĂ©termination par les « prĂ©fĂ©rences personnelles », constitutives de la personne. La libertĂ© et le dĂ©terminisme sont ainsi compatibles. La question essentielle nâest pas de savoir si une action est dĂ©terminĂ©e ou pas, mais plutĂŽt de savoir si elle est dĂ©terminĂ©e par les prĂ©fĂ©rences personnelles. Cette explication est juste Ă lâĂ©gard des intuitions les plus importantes concernant la libertĂ©, y compris le pouvoir dâagir autrement. Abandonner la dĂ©termination, par contraste, violerait les critĂšres minimaux au lieu de procurer « davantage » de libertĂ©. Dans la conclusion, il est indiquĂ© que lâautodĂ©termination procure tout ce quâon peut demander si on demande la libertĂ©.Eine Analyse unseres auf dem gesunden Menschenverstand beruhenden Freiheitskonzeptes ergibt zwei âminimale Kriterienâ: 1) Autonomie bedeutet einen Unterschied zwischen Freiheit und Zwang; 2) Urheberschaft bedeutet einen Unterschied zwischen Freiheit und Zufall. Die Auslegung von Freiheit als âSelbstbestimmungâ kann fĂŒr beide Kriterien in Anspruch genommen werden. âSelbstbestimmungâ wird verstanden als Bestimmung anhand âpersönlicher Vorliebenâ, die fĂŒr die betreffende Person konstituierend sind. Freiheit und Determinismus sind also kompatibel. Die SchlĂŒsselfrage ist nicht, ob unser Handeln ĂŒberhaupt determiniert ist, sondern eher, ob dies durch persönliche Vorlieben geschieht. Diese ErklĂ€rung kann den meisten freiheitsbezogenen Intuitionen gerecht werden, einschlieĂlich der FĂ€higkeit, anders [als gewohnt] zu handeln. Im Gegensatz dazu wĂŒrde der Verzicht auf eine Determinierung eher das genannte Minimalkriterium verletzen, als âmehrâ Freiheit zu ermöglichen. Der Verfasser kommt zum Schluss, dass Selbstbestimmung die Verwirklichung aller unserer AnsprĂŒche ermöglicht, wenn wir Freiheit fordern
Illuminating the dark matter of social neuroscience: Considering the problem of social interaction from philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives
Successful human social interaction depends on our capacity to understand other people's mental states and to anticipate how they will react to our actions. Despite its importance to the human condition, the exact mechanisms underlying our ability to understand another's actions, feelings, and thoughts are still a matter of conjecture. Here, we consider this problem from philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives. In a critical review, we demonstrate that attempts to draw parallels across these complementary disciplines is premature: The second-person perspective does not map directly to Interaction or Simulation theories, online social cognition, or shared neural network accounts underlying action observation or empathy. Nor does the third-person perspective map onto Theory-Theory (TT), offline social cognition, or the neural networks that support Theory of Mind (ToM). Moreover, we argue that important qualities of social interaction emerge through the reciprocal interplay of two independent agents whose unpredictable behavior requires that models of their partner's internal state be continually updated. This analysis draws attention to the need for paradigms in social neuroscience that allow two individuals to interact in a spontaneous and natural manner and to adapt their behavior and cognitions in a response contingent fashion due to the inherent unpredictability in another person's behavior. Even if such paradigms were implemented, it is possible that the specific neural correlates supporting such reciprocal interaction would not reflect computation unique to social interaction but rather the use of basic cognitive and emotional processes combined in a unique manner. Finally, we argue that given the crucial role of social interaction in human evolution, ontogeny, and every-day social life, a more theoretically and methodologically nuanced approach to the study of real social interaction will nevertheless help the field of social cognition to evolve
Effects of reinforcement learning on gaze following of gaze and head direction in early infancy: An interactive eyeâtracking study
The current four experiments investigated gaze following behavior in response to gaze and head turns in 4âmonthâolds and how reinforcement learning influences this behavior (N = 99). Using interactive eye tracking, infantsâ gaze elicited an animation whenever infants followed a personâs head or gaze orientation (Experiment 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2) or looked at the opposite side (Experiment 1.2). Infants spontaneously followed the direction of a turning head with and without simultaneously shifted gaze direction (Cohenâs d: 0.93â1.05) but not the direction of isolated gaze shifts. We only found a weak effect of reinforcement on gaze following in one of the four experiments. Results will be discussed with regard to the impact of reinforcement on the maintenance of already existing gaze following behavior
KONFRONTATION, KONKURRENZ ODER KOOPERATION? ZUM VERHĂLTNIS VON GEISTES- UND NATURWISSENSCHAFTEN
Es vergeht derzeit kaum eine Woche, ohne daĂ wir mit mehr oder minder spektakulĂ€ren Behauptungen ĂŒber bevorstehende VerĂ€nderungen unseres Selbst- oder Menschenbildes konfrontiert wĂŒrden, die angesichts neuer naturwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse oder technischer Entwicklungen unumgĂ€nglich seien: Das Ich sei ein bloĂes Konstrukt, die Willensfreiheit eine blanke Illusion, und frĂŒher oder spĂ€ter mĂŒĂten wir damit rechnen, daĂ Computer alle die Leistungen vollbringen, auf die wir als Menschen so stolz sind â nur etwas schneller, mit weniger Fehlern und selbstredend auch umweltfreundlicher
Maternal self-efficacy development from pregnancy to 3 months after birth
The present study uses a prospective longitudinal study design to investigate the development of maternal self-efficacy in the transition phase to parenthood, drawing on a large sample of socially and/or culturally disadvantaged families (NÂ =Â 292). Parity, maternal education, migration, informal and formal social support are considered as potential predictors. Results indicate that previous birth experience, being born abroad, and higher levels of formal and informal social support during pregnancy jointly predict higher levels of maternal self-efficacy three months after birth. First-time mothers and mothers born in Germany (where the study was conducted) benefit more from formal support than mothers with previous experience and mothers born outside of Germany. Overall, maternal self-efficacy increases significantly. Implications for prenatal maternal care are discussed
Corrigendum: Reduced mu power in response to unusual actions is context-dependent in 1-year-olds
During social interactions infants predict and evaluate other peopleâs actions. Previous behavioral research found that infantsâ imitation of othersâ actions depends on these evaluations and is context-dependent: 1-year-olds predominantly imitated an unusual action (turning on a lamp with oneâs forehead) when the modelâs hands were free compared to when the modelâs hands were occupied or restrained. In the present study, we adapted this behavioral paradigm to a neurophysiological study measuring infantsâ brain activity while observing usual and unusual actions via electroencephalography. In particular, we measured differences in mu power (6 â 8 Hz) associated with motor activation. In a between-subjects design, 12- to 14-month-old infants watched videos of adult models demonstrating that their hands were either free or restrained. Subsequent test frames showed the models turning on a lamp or a soundbox by using their head or their hand. Results in the hands-free condition revealed that 12- to 14-month-olds displayed a reduction of mu power in frontal regions in response to unusual and thus unexpected actions (head touch) compared to usual and expected actions (hand touch). This may be explained by increased motor activation required for updating prior action predictions in response to unusual actions though alternative explanations in terms of general attention or cognitive control processes may also be considered. In the hands-restrained condition, responses in mu frequency band did not differ between action outcomes. This implies that unusual head-touch actions compared to hand-touch actions do not necessarily evoke a reduction of mu power. Thus, we conclude that reduction of mu frequency power is context-dependent during infantsâ action perception. Our results are interpreted in terms of motor system activity measured via changes in mu frequency band as being one important neural mechanism involved in action prediction and evaluation from early on
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