When it pays off to take a look: Infants learn to follow an object’s motion with their gaze — Especially if it features eyes

Social cues and instrumental learning are two aspects potentially fostering early gaze following. We systematically investigated the influence of social features (schematic eyes vs. reverse-contrast eyes) and gaze-contingent reinforcement (elicited vs. not elicited) on 4-month-olds' learning to attend to gaze-cued objects. In 4 experiments, we tested infants' (N = 74) gaze following of a turning block with schematic or reverse-contrast eyes. In Experiments 1 and 2, infants could elicit an attractive animation in a training phase via interactive eye tracking by following the turning of the block. Experiments 3 and 4 were yoked controls without contingent reinforcement. Infants did not spontaneously follow the motion of the block. Four-month-olds always followed the block after training when it featured schematic eyes. When the block featured reverse-contrast eyes, the training phase only affected infants' looking behavior without reinforcement. While speaking to a certain degree of plasticity, findings stress the importance of eyes for guiding infants' attention

Selbstbestimmung. Freier Wille, Verantwortung und Determinismus

An analysis of our commonsense concept of freedom yields two “minimal criteria”: (1) Autonomy distinguishes freedom from compulsion; (2) Authorship distinguishes freedom from chance. Translating freedom into “self-determination” can account for both criteria. Self-determination is understood as determination by “personal-preferences” which are constitutive for a person. Freedom and determinism are therefore compatible; the crucial question is not whether an action is determined at all but, rather, whether it is determined by personal preferences. This account can do justice to the most important intuitions concerning freedom, including the ability to do otherwise. Waiving determination, by contrast, would violate the minimal criteria rather than providing “more” freedom. It is concluded that self-determination provides everything that we can ask for if we ask for freedom.L’analyse de la conception commune de la liberté produit deux « critères minimaux » : 1) L’autonomie distingue la liberté de la contrainte ; 2) La responsabilité distingue la liberté du hasard. Interpréter la liberté comme « autodétermination » correspond aux deux critères. L’autodétermination se comprend comme une détermination par les « préférences personnelles », constitutives de la personne. La liberté et le déterminisme sont ainsi compatibles. La question essentielle n’est pas de savoir si une action est déterminée ou pas, mais plutôt de savoir si elle est déterminée par les préférences personnelles. Cette explication est juste à l’égard des intuitions les plus importantes concernant la liberté, y compris le pouvoir d’agir autrement. Abandonner la détermination, par contraste, violerait les critères minimaux au lieu de procurer « davantage » de liberté. Dans la conclusion, il est indiqué que l’autodétermination procure tout ce qu’on peut demander si on demande la liberté.Eine Analyse unseres auf dem gesunden Menschenverstand beruhenden Freiheitskonzeptes ergibt zwei „minimale Kriterien“: 1) Autonomie bedeutet einen Unterschied zwischen Freiheit und Zwang; 2) Urheberschaft bedeutet einen Unterschied zwischen Freiheit und Zufall. Die Auslegung von Freiheit als „Selbstbestimmung“ kann für beide Kriterien in Anspruch genommen werden. „Selbstbestimmung“ wird verstanden als Bestimmung anhand „persönlicher Vorlieben“, die für die betreffende Person konstituierend sind. Freiheit und Determinismus sind also kompatibel. Die Schlüsselfrage ist nicht, ob unser Handeln überhaupt determiniert ist, sondern eher, ob dies durch persönliche Vorlieben geschieht. Diese Erklärung kann den meisten freiheitsbezogenen Intuitionen gerecht werden, einschließlich der Fähigkeit, anders [als gewohnt] zu handeln. Im Gegensatz dazu würde der Verzicht auf eine Determinierung eher das genannte Minimalkriterium verletzen, als „mehr“ Freiheit zu ermöglichen. Der Verfasser kommt zum Schluss, dass Selbstbestimmung die Verwirklichung aller unserer Ansprüche ermöglicht, wenn wir Freiheit fordern

Illuminating the dark matter of social neuroscience: Considering the problem of social interaction from philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives

Successful human social interaction depends on our capacity to understand other people's mental states and to anticipate how they will react to our actions. Despite its importance to the human condition, the exact mechanisms underlying our ability to understand another's actions, feelings, and thoughts are still a matter of conjecture. Here, we consider this problem from philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives. In a critical review, we demonstrate that attempts to draw parallels across these complementary disciplines is premature: The second-person perspective does not map directly to Interaction or Simulation theories, online social cognition, or shared neural network accounts underlying action observation or empathy. Nor does the third-person perspective map onto Theory-Theory (TT), offline social cognition, or the neural networks that support Theory of Mind (ToM). Moreover, we argue that important qualities of social interaction emerge through the reciprocal interplay of two independent agents whose unpredictable behavior requires that models of their partner's internal state be continually updated. This analysis draws attention to the need for paradigms in social neuroscience that allow two individuals to interact in a spontaneous and natural manner and to adapt their behavior and cognitions in a response contingent fashion due to the inherent unpredictability in another person's behavior. Even if such paradigms were implemented, it is possible that the specific neural correlates supporting such reciprocal interaction would not reflect computation unique to social interaction but rather the use of basic cognitive and emotional processes combined in a unique manner. Finally, we argue that given the crucial role of social interaction in human evolution, ontogeny, and every-day social life, a more theoretically and methodologically nuanced approach to the study of real social interaction will nevertheless help the field of social cognition to evolve

Effects of reinforcement learning on gaze following of gaze and head direction in early infancy: An interactive eye‐tracking study

The current four experiments investigated gaze following behavior in response to gaze and head turns in 4‐month‐olds and how reinforcement learning influences this behavior (N = 99). Using interactive eye tracking, infants’ gaze elicited an animation whenever infants followed a person’s head or gaze orientation (Experiment 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2) or looked at the opposite side (Experiment 1.2). Infants spontaneously followed the direction of a turning head with and without simultaneously shifted gaze direction (Cohen’s d: 0.93–1.05) but not the direction of isolated gaze shifts. We only found a weak effect of reinforcement on gaze following in one of the four experiments. Results will be discussed with regard to the impact of reinforcement on the maintenance of already existing gaze following behavior

KONFRONTATION, KONKURRENZ ODER KOOPERATION? ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON GEISTES- UND NATURWISSENSCHAFTEN

Es vergeht derzeit kaum eine Woche, ohne daß wir mit mehr oder minder spektakulären Behauptungen über bevorstehende Veränderungen unseres Selbst- oder Menschenbildes konfrontiert würden, die angesichts neuer naturwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse oder technischer Entwicklungen unumgänglich seien: Das Ich sei ein bloßes Konstrukt, die Willensfreiheit eine blanke Illusion, und früher oder später müßten wir damit rechnen, daß Computer alle die Leistungen vollbringen, auf die wir als Menschen so stolz sind – nur etwas schneller, mit weniger Fehlern und selbstredend auch umweltfreundlicher

Maternal self-efficacy development from pregnancy to 3 months after birth

The present study uses a prospective longitudinal study design to investigate the development of maternal self-efficacy in the transition phase to parenthood, drawing on a large sample of socially and/or culturally disadvantaged families (N = 292). Parity, maternal education, migration, informal and formal social support are considered as potential predictors. Results indicate that previous birth experience, being born abroad, and higher levels of formal and informal social support during pregnancy jointly predict higher levels of maternal self-efficacy three months after birth. First-time mothers and mothers born in Germany (where the study was conducted) benefit more from formal support than mothers with previous experience and mothers born outside of Germany. Overall, maternal self-efficacy increases significantly. Implications for prenatal maternal care are discussed

Corrigendum: Reduced mu power in response to unusual actions is context-dependent in 1-year-olds

During social interactions infants predict and evaluate other people’s actions. Previous behavioral research found that infants’ imitation of others’ actions depends on these evaluations and is context-dependent: 1-year-olds predominantly imitated an unusual action (turning on a lamp with one’s forehead) when the model’s hands were free compared to when the model’s hands were occupied or restrained. In the present study, we adapted this behavioral paradigm to a neurophysiological study measuring infants’ brain activity while observing usual and unusual actions via electroencephalography. In particular, we measured differences in mu power (6 – 8 Hz) associated with motor activation. In a between-subjects design, 12- to 14-month-old infants watched videos of adult models demonstrating that their hands were either free or restrained. Subsequent test frames showed the models turning on a lamp or a soundbox by using their head or their hand. Results in the hands-free condition revealed that 12- to 14-month-olds displayed a reduction of mu power in frontal regions in response to unusual and thus unexpected actions (head touch) compared to usual and expected actions (hand touch). This may be explained by increased motor activation required for updating prior action predictions in response to unusual actions though alternative explanations in terms of general attention or cognitive control processes may also be considered. In the hands-restrained condition, responses in mu frequency band did not differ between action outcomes. This implies that unusual head-touch actions compared to hand-touch actions do not necessarily evoke a reduction of mu power. Thus, we conclude that reduction of mu frequency power is context-dependent during infants’ action perception. Our results are interpreted in terms of motor system activity measured via changes in mu frequency band as being one important neural mechanism involved in action prediction and evaluation from early on