How to manage speculative shocks: intra-European vs. International monetary coordination

The literature on currency crisis has generally not answered to the following question: which economic policies may reduce the contagion effects of a speculative shock? We use a dynamic Mundell-Fleming model extended to four countries and compute three time-consistent equilibria: a Nash equilibrium, and Nash-bargaining equilibria, first between the central banks of the G3 (a target zone equilibrium) and, second between European governments and the ECB. The best equilibrium for the Fed, European and Japanese policymakers is intra-European coordination. It induces a very expansionary fiscal policy in the USA whose government hence rejects it. Extensions to the case of a Stability Pact in European countries do not alter our results. Introducing a Fed less conservative than the ECB or the BoJ provokes a change in US preferences: both authorities give priority to the monetary equilibrium and the US government is no longer isolationist.

Does mode of transfer matter for business performance? Transfers to employees versus transfers to outsiders

International audienceThe way in which businesses are transferred does matter. This idea finds strong theoretical support from the theory of information and from the agency approach as applied to the issue of transferring small firms in which both ownership and management are typically transferred together. In this article, we compare two ways of transferring businesses: transfers to outsiders and transfers to employees. After identifying key advantages and disadvantages for each, we turn to a rich panel dataset on start-up and development conditions for new French businesses during the mid-2000s. Our results show that transfers to employees are more frequently long-lasting than transfers to outsiders. Our empirical investigation also shows that transfers to employees are less dynamic in terms of turnover growth than external transfers, but more dynamic in terms of job creation. We conclude the article by providing guidance on public action to promote business transfers

Impact de la forme de la reprise sur les réactions des stakeholders

National audienceFirms' transfers are embedded by informational imperfections. Buyers suffered from informational asymmetries on the quality of firms and on the behaviour of sellers during the transition of management. Buyers can suffer too from the reactions of stakeholders that anticipate the transfers. In this paper, the advantages of Management Buy Out are underlined. This internal market for firms' transfers reduces informational problems and uncertainty that commercial partners suffer from. More precisely, we study the signal MBO should produce in comparison with MBI whose managers do not come directly from the target. We underline in particular the role of MBO where new owners are members of sellers' family. Hypotheses are confirmed by econometrical tests on data coming from the SINE database.Dans le cadre d'une transmission, les partenaires de la firme supportent des incertitudes sur les performances présentes et futures de l'entreprise cédée. Dans cette situation, ils peuvent revoir à la baisse leur évaluation a priori de la qualité de la firme et développer des comportements de précaution qui pénalisent le repreneur. L'objet de cet article e d'étudier l'impact de la forme de la reprise, interne ou externe, sur les réactions l'environnement. Nous montrons, à partir de tests réalisés sur les données SINE de l'INSEE, que l'environnement réagit de manière plus favorable lorsque la reprise est interne et que, dès lors que le repreneur travaillait dans l'entreprise reprise, la reprise familiale domine toute autre forme de transmission. Nous justifions ces résultats en mettant en exergue la nature de l'information transmise selon le type de reprise et nous apprécions, à la lumière de ces résultats, les dernières mesures prises en faveur de la transmission d'entreprise

Marché interne de la transmission d'entreprise et environnement économique

Buy-out are difficult deals which are embedded by informational imperfections. Buyers suffered from informational asymmetries on the quality of firms and on the behaviour of sellers during the transition of management. Buyers can suffer too from the reactions of stakeholders that anticipate buyout. In this paper, we show the advantages the internal market of buy out can produce in order to reduce informational information and uncertainty whom commercial and financial partners suffer from. More precisely, we study the signal a management buy out should produce in comparison with the case of a management buy in where buyers and managers do not come directly from the target. Hypothesis are confirmed by econometrical tests on data coming from the SINE database.La transmission d'entreprise est une opération entachée par de nombreuses imperfections. Aux asymétries d'information entre repreneurs et cédants s'ajoutent des interactions stratégiques entre la firme et son environnement qui accentuent les difficultés de la transmission. La cession d'une entreprise génère pour l'environnement des incertitudes sur la qualité présente de la firme et sur la façon dont cette dernière va être gérée pendant la transition et dans le futur. Dans cette situation, les partenaires de l'entreprise peuvent revoir leurs a priori sur les performances et la pérennité de la firme. L'objet de ce papier est d'étudier les avantages qu'offre le marché interne de la cession – reprise pour favoriser la réussite des opérations de transmission. Plus précisément, nous recherchons les effets signal que ce type de reprise peut produire sur les partenaires de la firme relativement aux reprises externes où le dirigeant - repreneur n'a pas été préalablement salarié de l'entreprise cédée. Les hypothèses issues de l'analyse théorique sont corroborées à partir des données fournies par la base SINE de l'INSEE