Collective Action and Violence In Iran: 1951-1981

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/51107/1/339.pd

Social Structure, Economic Development and Political Upheaval in the United States, Russia, Nicaragua, and Iran

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/51089/1/321.pd

Economic development and political transformation

Social structure and economic development largely influence the nature of social conflicts and political transformation. A combination of low political and economic integration and a high level of consolidation results in reformist conflicts. Low state intervention in the allocation and accumulation of capital reduces the probability that class conflict will be directed against the state. When state intervention is low, depoliticized, abstract market forces determine capital allocation and accumulation. In addition, low political and economic integration may give the state the appearance of serving societal interests rather than the interests of the upper class. This appearance of autonomy is reinforced by the institutions of formal democracy. As a consequence, class conflict is contained within civil society and deflected from the state. When consolidation is high, reformist conflicts against holders of capital may emerge. The United States experienced such movements in the 1930s. During the Great Depression, the state was drawn into some conflicts, but was not attacked by the working class. Today, the United States, like other advanced industrial societies, is less receptive to consolidation because of moderate levels of economic polarization, greater economic resilience, and high social differentiation. When state intervention and consolidation are low, organized groups with resources may gain economic benefits through segmented class conflict, whereas collectivities with weak solidarity and few resources remain inactive. Such is the case in the United States today.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43642/1/11186_2004_Article_BF00160019.pd

Theories of collective action and the Iranian revolution

Most analyses of the collective actions that led to the Iranian revolution rest upon one of two classical models: social breakdown or social movement. These explanations emphasize such factors as the politicization of recently uprooted migrants, the growth of a new middle class opposing autocracy, the authority of the clergy, and specific aspects of Shiite Islam. Conflicts of interest, capacity for mobilization, coalition formation, and the structure of opportunities that shaped the collective actions of various groups and classes are ignored or downplayed. This paper argues that mobilization and collective action against the monarchy resulted from the adverse effects of state development policies on bazaaris, industrial workers, white-collar employees, and professionals. Bazaaris' mobilization provided an opportunity for other social groups and classes to oppose the government. A coalition of disparate interests, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, brought down the monarchy.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45662/1/11206_2005_Article_BF01115123.pd

Social origins of the Iranian revolution.

Two broad theories of the relationship between social change and collective action are (1) breakdown theories, pointing to a sequence of change/dissolution/strain/disorder, and (2) solidarity theories, stressing the development of common identities in classes created by the organization of production. The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 fits solidarity models better than breakdown models, but suggests the need for incorporating a theory of rights and moral outrage. Violations of established rights and privileges of social groups by visible human or social agents lead to moral outrage motivating victims to engage in collective action if there is no alternative option available and if they have sufficient resources. In the 1960's and 70's, Iranian society experienced tremendous economic growth and urbanization. When OPEC price increases quadrupled Iranian oil revenues, the state and the private sector suddenly multiplied their investments. The immediate results were rising inflation and income inequality. With the exception of the "labor aristocracy" and a segment of the middle class that gained from l and speculation and the construction boom, this economic development negatively affected all the social classes below the ruling bloc. Since people experienced the consequences of increasing inequality individually, and through the market, those consequences did not translate readily into political programs and alignments. The government generated a revolutionary situation by violating the established middle class rights: it lowered the prices of thous and s of items and launched an "anti-profiteering" campaign, to check the inflation. It arrested, jailed, exiled and fined thous and s of shopkeepers all over the country. The direct government intervention in the economic institution made it a visible target responsible for the problems of the traditional middle class. That class, possessing its own powerful trading network and having historic ties with the mosque, organized large demonstrations, and pulled other social classes into a coalition against the regime leading to the revolution. A quantitative comparison of collective action in 172 Iranian cities from the fall of 1977 to the mid-fall of 1978 tends to confirm the crucial role of the traditional middle class in the struggles against the Shah, and fails to support breakdown theories.Ph.D.Social structureMiddle Eastern historyUniversity of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/156598/1/9611032.pd

Theories of collective action and the Iranian revolution

Most analyses of the collective actions that led to the Iranian revolution rest upon one of two classical models: social breakdown or social movement. These explanations emphasize such factors as the politicization of recently uprooted migrants, the growth of a new middle class opposing autocracy, the authority of the clergy, and specific aspects of Shiite Islam. Conflicts of interest, capacity for mobilization, coalition formation, and the structure of opportunities that shaped the collective actions of various groups and classes are ignored or downplayed. This paper argues that mobilization and collective action against the monarchy resulted from the adverse effects of state development policies on bazaaris, industrial workers, white-collar employees, and professionals. Bazaaris' mobilization provided an opportunity for other social groups and classes to oppose the government. A coalition of disparate interests, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, brought down the monarchy.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45662/1/11206_2005_Article_BF01115123.pd

The Islamic Republican Party of Iran in the Factory: Control over Workers’ Discourse in Posters (1979–1987)

This article discusses how May Day posters, released by the Islamic Republican Party of Iran (which represented the core of Ayatollah Khomeini’s supporters in terms of state power between 1979 and 1987), started to express a new socially constructed identity for workers within the factory. By tracking hidden meanings and the particular use of visual language, it investigates why various styles and symbols were woven together. Finally, it shows – through the analysis of discourse in posters – how a process of appropriation of leftist symbols developed, in order to nullify a perceived ideological threat to the Islamic Republic, represented by both secular Marxists groups and those who, in Khomeini’s words, “mixed Islamic ideas with Marxist ideas and have created a concoction which is in no way in accordance with the progressive teachings of Islam” [Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah. “We Shall Confront the World with Our Ideology.” MERIP Reports (1980). Middle Eastern Studie