Why renewable energy policy advocates should lobby state lawmakers later in the legislative process

Under the federalist system, US states have a great deal of decision-making power over a wide range of policy areas. In new research, Srinivas “Chinnu” Parinandi looks at how states can be encouraged to enact renewable energy development policies. Looking at the diffusion of state renewable energy development policy legislation over decades, he finds that state legislators are more likely to be influenced by the actions of other states and approve similar legislation at home when they are voting on it, rather than when bills are being developed

Devolution and Policy Experimentation under Federalism: Essays on Innovation and Emulation in the American States.

Scholars and policymakers have long argued that state-level officials operating free from the influence of the central government act as the major drivers of innovative, or novel, policy in a federal system. However, this belief runs counter to the possibility that electoral considerations and resource limitations could cause state-level officials to emulate (or copy) policy rather than innovating. In this dissertation, I evaluate the decision by state-level officials to innovate or emulate, and I conduct my analysis in three parts using data on renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policy. First, I evaluate the innovation and emulation activity of state legislatures making policy adoption decisions. Then I compare the innovation and emulation decisions of elected versus appointed state public utilities commissioners. And third, I analyze the innovation and emulation behavior of cosponsoring state legislators. I find evidence suggesting that the states are better described as drivers of emulation rather than innovation: both electoral vulnerability and legislative professionalism increase the likelihood of emulation rather than innovation. At the same time, giving policy authority to appointees will not increase innovation, as appointees are less likely to innovate compared to elected peers. Results suggest that the federal government may play an important role in advancing state policy innovation.PhDPolitical ScienceUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/111389/1/cparinan_1.pd

Conditional tax competition in American states

Cross-border commercial activity raises issues in federations where multiple jurisdictions can claim the right to tax the same income. In the United States, this coordination problem is resolved by splitting the tax base according to the geographic distribution of firms’ sales, capital and labour. The weight of each factor is determined on a state-by-state basis, which opens room for competitive legislative behaviour. In this complex issue area, however, policymakers must invest lot of resources to monitor competitors, evaluate policy alternatives and shepherd tax reform through the legislative process. This implies that highly professional legislatures should be more responsive to the policies of nearby states. We consider data on most American states over the period from 1986 to 2013 and find strong evidence of conditional spatial dependence. Our findings suggest that policy diffusion may often be moderated by institutional and political factors

Replication Data for: How Politics Influences the Energy Pricing Decisions of Elected Public Utilities Commissioners

Stata 15 data and code to replicate: Parinandi, Srinivas and Matthew P. Hitt. 2018. "How Politics Influences the Energy Pricing Decisions of Elected Public Utilities Commissioners." Energy Policy, 118: 77-87. If you use these data, please cite the original article in Energy Polic