Greece: the paradox of power

Why doesn’t Greece reform? Over the past few years the inability of successive Greek governments to deliver on the demands of international creditors has been a key feature of Greece’s bailout drama. Frustrated observers have pointed to various pathologies of the Greek political system to explain this underperformance: the lack of political will; entrenched sectoral interests resisting change; and the irrational allocation of resources skewed by clientelism and corruption. There is, of course, a significant element of truth in all these assertions. Yet, for many outsiders the real elephant in the room remains unnoticed. The endemic weaknesses of the Greek public administration are indeed crucial in understanding much of what has gone wrong over the past 5 years (and before). Back in 2010 the beleaguered Greek government had very little input into its own ‘rescue’. Lacking basic capabilities and running out of time, it almost entirely ‘sub-contracted’ the design of the bailout programme to the IMF, who, by its own admission, grossly overestimated the capacity of the domestic system to deliver. Unrealistic expectations were built on the assumption that an F1 driver will steer a Ferrari to perfection. In reality, it wasn’t a Ferrari but a rusty Trabant

When do crises centralise decision-making? The core executive in the Greek economic crisis

When can crises overcome the fragmentation of a core executive and facilitate a centralised management response? Here, we identify the latter by reference to the concept of a ‘crisis response network’ (CRN). We draw on several literatures that refer to crisis centralisation and develop hypotheses that comprise likely contributing factors. We explore these hypotheses in the setting of a core executive normally identified as being ‘segmentary’, but which has exhibited centralised management of past crises, and in the context of an acute economic crisis: that is, Greece in its debt crisis in two seminal periods. Based on extensive interviews with all the senior personnel involved, including both Prime Ministers, as well as documentary evidence, we find that the strength of the CRN in leading the crisis response varied and that this was consistent with our hypotheses. We consider the conceptual and empirical implications of our findings

Sentiment and speculation in a market with heterogeneous beliefs

We present a dynamic model featuring risk-averse investors with heterogeneous beliefs. Individual investors have stable beliefs and risk aversion, but agents who were correct in hindsight become relatively wealthy; their beliefs are overrepresented in market sentiment, so "the market" is bullish following good news and bearish following bad news. Extreme states are far more important than in a homogeneous economy. Investors understand that sentiment drives volatility up, and demand high risk premia in compensation. Moderate investors supply liquidity: they trade against market sentiment in the hope of capturing a variance risk premium created by the presence of extremists

Can the information content of share repurchases improve the accuracy of equity premium predictions?

We adjust the dividend–price ratio for share repurchases and investigate whether predictive power can be improved when constructing forecasts of the UK and French equity premia. Regulations in the two largest European stock markets allow us to employ actual repurchase data in our predictive regressions. Hence, we are able to overcome problems associated with markets characterised by less stringent disclosure requirements, where investors might have to rely on proxies for measuring repurchase activity. We find that predictability does not improve either in a statistical or in an economically significant sense once actual share repurchases are considered. Furthermore, we employ a proxy measure of repurchases which can be easily constructed in international markets and demonstrate that its predictive content is not in line with that of the actual repurchase data

Essays in financial economics

This thesis consists of three essays in financial economics. In the first chapter, I present an asymmetric information model of financial markets that features rational, but uninformed, hedge fund managers who trade against informed and noise traders. Managers are uncertain not only about fundamentals, but also about the proportion of informed to noise traders in the market and use prices to update their beliefs about these uncertainties. Extreme news leads to an increase in both types of uncertainty, while it decreases price informativeness. Prices react asymmetrically to positive and negative news, with higher expected returns at times of increased uncertainty about market composition. The model generates a price-volume relationship that is consistent with established stylized facts. I then extend to a three-period model and study the dynamics of expected returns and volatility. In the second chapter, we study a dynamic model featuring risk-averse investors with heterogeneous beliefs. Individual investors have stable beliefs and risk aversion, but agents who were correct in hindsight become relatively wealthy; their beliefs are overrepresented in market sentiment, so \the market" is bullish following good news and bearish following bad news. Extreme states are far more important than in a homogeneous economy. Investors understand that sentiment drives volatility up, and demand high risk premia in compensation. Moderate investors supply liquidity: they trade against market sentiment in the hope of capturing a variance risk premium created by the presence of extremists. In the final chapter, we consider a continuum of potential investors allocating funds in two consecutive periods between a manager and a market index. The manager's alpha, defined as her ability to generate idiosyncratic returns, is her private information and is either high or low. In each period, the manager receives a private signal on the potential performance of her alpha, and she also obtains some public news on the market's condition. The investors observe her decision to either follow a market neutral strategy, or an index tracking one. It is shown that the latter always results in a loss of reputation, which is also reflected on the fund's flows. This loss is smaller in bull markets, when investors expect more managers to use high beta strategies. As a result, a manager's performance in bull markets is less informative about her ability than in bear markets, because a high beta strategy does not rely on it. We empirically verify that flows of funds that follow high beta strategies are less responsive to the fund's performance than those that follow market neutral strategies

Control of Unknown Nonlinear Systems with Linear Time-Varying MPC

We present a Model Predictive Control (MPC) strategy for unknown input-affine nonlinear dynamical systems. A non-parametric method is used to estimate the nonlinear dynamics from observed data. The estimated nonlinear dynamics are then linearized over time-varying regions of the state space to construct an Affine Time-Varying (ATV) model. Error bounds arising from the estimation and linearization procedure are computed by using sampling techniques. The ATV model and the uncertainty sets are used to design a robust Model Predictive Controller (MPC) which guarantees safety for the unknown system with high probability. A simple nonlinear example demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach where commonly used estimation and linearization methods fail

Managing other people's money: an agency theory in financial management industry

We build an active asset management model to study the interplay between the career concerns of a manager and prevailing market conditions. We show that fund managers overinvest in market-neutral strategies, as these have a reputational benefit. This benefit is smaller in bull markets, when investors expect more managers to use high-beta strategies, making their performance less informative about their ability than in bear markets. Consequently, fund flows that follow high-beta strategies are less responsive to the fund's performance, and flow-performance sensitivity is higher in bear markets than in bull markets

Probabilistic satisfiability

AbstractWe study the following computational problem proposed by Nils Nilsson: Several clauses (disjunctions of literals) are given, and for each clause the probability that the clause is true is specified. We are asked whether these probabilities are consistent. They are if there is a probability distribution on the truth assignments such that the probability of each clause is the measure of its satisfying set of assignments. Since this problem is a generalization of the satisfiability problem for propositional calculus it is immediately NP-hard. We show that it is NP-complete even when there are at most two literals per clause (a case which is polynomial-time solvable in the non-probabilistic case). We use arguments from linear programming and graph theory to derive polynomial-time algorithms for some interesting special cases