Judicial review in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was conceived of as an area ill-suited for full judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty confers on the Court limited jurisdiction which the recent case law has interpreted in broad terms. This article will place this case law in the broader constitutional setting of the EU legal order and will provide a critical analysis of its implications for both the EU's and domestic courts. The analysis is structured on the basis of three main themes. The first is about the position of CFSP in the EU's constitutional architecture: the article will analyse the constitutional ambivalence that characterizes this position and how it is conveyed by the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union governing the Court's jurisdiction. The second theme is about the recent case law, and the integrationist approach that the Court of Justice has adopted to the scope of its jurisdiction. The third theme is about national courts: the article will argue that recent case law has been too quick to dismiss them, and that primary law renders them an essential part of the judicial review system governing CFSP

Institutional balance and sincere cooperation in treaty-making under EU law

A stream of recent judgments by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice has shed light on the procedures that govern treaty-making by the European Union. This article explores how this case-law aproaches the principle of institutional balance and the duty of cooperation between the institutions. It argues that the former is construed in a balanced manner on the basis of a literal interpretation of primary law that promotes strict compliance with procedural rules and does not favour a particular institution. As for the duty of cooperation, whilste its procedural dimension is strengthened, its scope remains somewhat elusive. The analysis identifies a pragmatic streak in the Court’s balanced approach, and argues that there is an inherent limit to the impact of constitutional law on inter-institutional disputes. Ultimately, the less time and energy the institutions waste on turf wars about their procedural powers, the greater their contribution to inceasing the efficiency of the Union’s treaty-making practice

Reflections

The American Society of International Law Committee recommended that the Manley 0. Hudson Medal be awarded to Professor Eric Stein for his lifetime of significant contributions to international and comparative law. Stein, the Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, Emeritus, at the University of Michigan Law School, had been an active supporter of ASIL as Honorary Vice President, Counsellor, and Honorary Editor of, and frequent contributor to, the American Journal of International Law. His many books and articles established him as a leading thinker and writer on European Community law and on what he described in a famous article as the Uses, Misuses, and Nonuses of Comparative Law