Introduction - veterinary science

This introduction - co-written with Clare Palmer - sets up the following selection of open access essays in the 'living book': Veterinary Science: Animals, Humans and Health online at: http://www.livingbooksaboutlife.org/books/Veterinary_scienc

Veterinary science : humans, animals and health

This living book is a collection of open access materials bringing scientific papers to a humanities audienc

Does Breeding a Bulldog Harm It?

It is frequently claimed that breeding animals that we know will have unavoidable health problems is at least prima facie wrong, because it harms the animals concerned. However, if we take ‘harm’ to mean ‘makes worse off’, this claim appears false. Breeding an animal that will have unavoidable health problems does not make any particular individual animal worse off, since an animal bred without such problems would be a different individual animal. Yet, the intuition that there is something ethically wrong about breeding animals—such as purebred pedigree dogs—in ways that seem negatively to affect welfare remains powerful. In this paper, an animal version of what is sometimes called the non-identity problem is explored, along with a number of possible ways of understanding what might be wrong with such breeding practices, if it is not that they harm the animal itself. These possibilities include harms to others, placeholder arguments, non-comparative ideas of harm, an ‘impersonal’ approach, and concerns about human attitudes and disposition

What (If Anything) Do We Owe Wild Animals?

It’s widely agreed that animal pain matters morally – that we shouldn’t, for instance, starve our animal companions, and that we should provide medical care to sick or injured agricultural animals, and not only because it benefits us to do so. But do we have the same moral responsibilities towards wild animals? Should we feed them if they are starving, and intervene to prevent them from undergoing other forms of suffering, for instance from predation? Using an example that includes both wild and domesticated animals, I outline two contrasting ways of thinking about our moral responsibilities with respect to assisting animals that are apparently in need. One approach is based entirely around animals’ capacities; the other takes context and historical relations into account as well. While not attempting to adjudicate between these views, I’ll point out the advantages and difficulties of both

Just policy paralysis?

Treves et al. (2019) argue that policy making should include the interests and well-being of present and future generations of humans and nonhumans. There are deep and abiding conflicts of interest both between and within these groups. Trying to factor in so many considerations is likely to generate political gridlock. The authors need to explain how to avoid this

Yes, sheep are smart but the moral question is still “can they suffer?”

Sheep may be more complex and intelligent than we traditionally believed, but knowing this is unlikely to change human attitudes to sheep significantly; nor is it strongly relevant to their moral status. However, knowing more about what sheep are like could help to improve sheep welfare