THE HUMAN, LOVE, AND THE INNER LIFE: ETHICS AFTER MURDOCH

Moral philosophy, it is often pointed out, can easily end up demolishing rather than advancing our ethical self-understanding. I offer an interpretation of Iris Murdoch’s analysis of this phenomenon that bears on questions about the moral status of human beings, the proper objects of moral assessment, and the relation between morality and love. According to the view I develop, moral philosophy is today, as it was at the time Murdoch was writing, largely unable to countenance the importance that the concept of a human being, inner life, and the capacity for love have in our ethical self-understanding. This is because of the enduring prevalence of the two assumptions Murdoch identified as the sources of this inability. These assumptions are (1) that volition and cognition are sharply separated powers, and (2) that empirical sciences set the standards for factuality. I argue that recognizing that these assumptions are not rationally compulsory, thereby freeing moral thought of their influence, makes possible a better understanding of the humanities and of their relation with the sciences

Interiority and Idiosyncrasy, Two Kinds of Privacy in Murdoch’s Conception of Mental Life

Il est de notoriété publique qu’Iris Murdoch a critiqué la psychologie morale dominante de son époque, la considérant exclusivement axée sur la dimension publique des concepts et incapable de rendre compte de l’existence et de l’importance de leur dimension privée. Selon Murdoch, ce type de psychologie morale ignorait deux sens distincts dans lesquels nos concepts peuvent s’entendre comme privés. Alors que le premier (c’est-à-dire leur intériorité) a été généralement reconnu, le second (c’est-à-dire leur idiosyncrasie)ne l’est pas encore. L’engagement de Murdoch à affirmer que certains concepts, en particulier les concepts mentaux, peuvent être idiosyncrasiques a été soit complètement oublié, soit mis de côté. Dans cet article, je tente de démontrer que l’attachement de Murdoch au caractère idiosyncrasique de certains aspects de notre vie mentale est au centre de sa conception de l’individu et qu’il enrichit cette dernière.It is widely known that Iris Murdoch criticised the dominant moral psychology of her time as exclusively focused on the public dimension of concepts and incapable to account for the existence and importance of their private dimension. According to Murdoch, I submit, this kind of moral psychology was missing two distinct senses in which our concepts can be private. While the first (i.e. their interiority) has been generally acknowledged, the second (i.e. their idiosyncrasy) hasn’t been. Murdoch’s commitment to the claim that some concepts, especially mental ones, can be idiosyncratic has been either missed altogether or set apart as a slip. In this article, I offer a reading of Murdoch according to which her commitment to the idiosyncratic character of certain aspects of our mental life is central to her conception of the human individual and I argue that the latter is none the worse for it

Michael Thompson, Life and Action Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 2008, pp. 223

In my review I explain the central theses of each of the three chapters of Life and Action (∫∫ 2-4) and the framework informing the overall project (∫ 1) and then offer some critical remarks (∫ 5). The reader is provided with a general picture of how Thompson develops and responds to the work in practical philosophy of some of the most influential figures in the analytic tradition (Anscombe, Foot, Davidson, Gauthier, Rawls) and of his analysis and appropriation of a philosophical method, which he credits Anscombe with, that combines lessons coming from two very different thinkers: Aristotle and Frege.Nella mia lettura critica spiego le tesi centrali di ciascuno dei tre capitoli di Life and Action (∫∫ 2-4) e l’approccio che informa il progetto nel suo insieme (∫ 1) e poi offro alcune considerazioni critiche (∫ 5). Fornisco a chi legge un’immagine generale (a) di come Thompson sviluppa e reagisce alla filosofia pratica di alcune delle figure più influenti nella tradizione analitica (Anscombe, Foot, Davidson, Gauthier, Rawls) e (b) della sua analisi e appropriazione di un metodo filosofico che lui attribuisce a Anscombe e che combina lezioni provenienti da due figure molto distanti: Aristotele and Frege

Iris Murdoch and the Ethical Imagination: Legacies and Innovations

Ce numéro d’Études britanniques contemporaines est issu des travaux do colloque de la SEAC organisé par Camille Fort et Marie Laniel en octobre 2019 à l’Université d’Amiens-Jules Verne. Tous nos remerciements s’adressent aux membres des comités d’organisation de ces manifestations ainsi qu’aux chargées d’édition du présent volume. This issue of Études britanniques contemporaines offers a selection of papers given during the SEAC conference convened by Camille Fort and Marie Laniel in October 2019 at the Université d’Amiens-Jules Verne. We would like to express our gratitude to the members of the organising committee and to the guest editors of this volume