Moral philosophy, it is often pointed out, can easily end up demolishing rather than advancing our ethical self-understanding. I offer an interpretation of Iris Murdoch’s analysis of this phenomenon that bears on questions about the moral status of human beings, the proper objects of moral assessment, and the relation between morality and love. According to the view I develop, moral philosophy is today, as it was at the time Murdoch was writing, largely unable to countenance the importance that the concept of a human being, inner life, and the capacity for love have in our ethical self-understanding. This is because of the enduring prevalence of the two assumptions Murdoch identified as the sources of this inability. These assumptions are (1) that volition and cognition are sharply separated powers, and (2) that empirical sciences set the standards for factuality. I argue that recognizing that these assumptions are not rationally compulsory, thereby freeing moral thought of their influence, makes possible a better understanding of the humanities and of their relation with the sciences
