Monitoring and controlling bank risk: does risky debt serve any purpose?

To examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market monitoring and control risk-taking, the authors extract the credit-spread curve for each banking firm in their sample. After controlling for changes in market and liquidity variables, they find that changes in credit spreads do not reflect changes in bank risk variables. The result is robust to firm type, examination rating, size, leverage, and profitability, as well as to different model specifications. They also find that issuing subordinated debt does not alter banks' risk-taking behavior. They conclude that a mandatory subordinated debt requirement for banks is unlikely to provide the intended benefits of enhancing risk-monitoring or controlling risk-taking.Bank capital ; Risk

A review of multi-component maintenance models with economic dependence

In this paper we review the literature on multi-component maintenance models with economic dependence. The emphasis is on papers that appeared after 1991, but there is an overlap with Section 2 of the most recent review paper by Cho and Parlar (1991). We distinguish between stationary models, where a long-term stable situation is assumed, and dynamic models, which can take information into account that becomes available only on the short term. Within the stationary models we choose a classification scheme that is primarily based on the various options of grouping maintenance activities: grouping either corrective or preventive maintenance, or combining preventive-maintenance actions with corrective actions. As such, this classification links up with the possibilities for grouped maintenance activities that exist in practice

Option pricing with downward-sloping demand curves: The case of supply chain options

This article investigates the role of option contracts in a supply chain when the demand curve is downward sloping. We consider call (put) options that provide the retailer with the right to reorder (return) goods at a fixed price. We show that the introduction of option contracts causes the wholesale price to increase and the volatility of the retail price to decrease. In general, options are not zero-sum games. Conditions are derived under which the manufacturer prefers to use options. When this happens the retailer is also better off, if the uncertainty in the demand curve is low. However, if the uncertainty is sufficiently high, then the introduction of option contracts alters the equilibrium prices in a way that hurts the retailer. © 2005 INFORMS