36 research outputs found

    Social network structures and the politics of public goods provision: evidence from the Philippines

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    We study the relationship between social structure and political incentives for public goods provision. We argue that when politicians—rather than communities—are responsible for the provision of public goods, social fractionalization may decrease the risk of elite capture and lead to increased public goods provision and electoral competition. We test this using large-scale data on family networks from over 20 million individuals in 15,000 villages of the Philippines. We take advantage of naming conventions to assess intermarriage links between families and use community detection algorithms to identify the relevant clans in those villages. We show that there is more public goods provision and political competition in villages with more fragmented social networks, a result that is robust to controlling for a large number of village characteristics and to alternative estimation techniques

    Social network structures and the politics of public goods provision: evidence from the Philippines

    No full text
    We study the relationship between social structure and political incentives for public goods provision. We argue that when politicians—rather than communities—are responsible for the provision of public goods, social fractionalization may decrease the risk of elite capture and lead to increased public goods provision and electoral competition. We test this using large-scale data on family networks from over 20 million individuals in 15,000 villages of the Philippines. We take advantage of naming conventions to assess intermarriage links between families and use community detection algorithms to identify the relevant clans in those villages. We show that there is more public goods provision and political competition in villages with more fragmented social networks, a result that is robust to controlling for a large number of village characteristics and to alternative estimation techniques

    Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: evidence from the Philippines

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    We demonstrate the importance of politician social networks for electoral outcomes. Using largescale data on family networks from over 20 million individuals in 15,000 villages in the Philippines, we show that candidates for public office are disproportionately drawn from more central families and family network centrality contributes to higher vote shares during the elections. Consistent with our theory of political intermediation, we present evidence that family network centrality facilitates relationships of political exchange. Moreover, we show that family networks exercise an effect independent of wealth, historical elite status, or previous electoral success

    Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: evidence from the Philippines

    No full text
    We demonstrate the importance of politician social networks for electoral outcomes. Using largescale data on family networks from over 20 million individuals in 15,000 villages in the Philippines, we show that candidates for public office are disproportionately drawn from more central families and family network centrality contributes to higher vote shares during the elections. Consistent with our theory of political intermediation, we present evidence that family network centrality facilitates relationships of political exchange. Moreover, we show that family networks exercise an effect independent of wealth, historical elite status, or previous electoral success

    Political dynasties, term limits and female political representation: Evidence from the Philippines

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    We investigate the effect of term limits on female political representation. Using data from Philippine municipalities where strict term limits have been in place since 1987, we show that term limits led to a large increase in the number of women running and winning in mayoral elections. However, we show that this increase is entirely driven by female relatives of the term-limited incumbents. We further show that the differential gender impact of this policy is driven by political dynasties’ adaptive strategies to stay in power

    The real winner's curse

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    Traditional theories of democracy suggest that political representation of excluded groups can reduce their incentives to engage in conflict and lead to lower violence. However, this argument ignores the response of established elites when (1) their interests are threatened by the policy stance of new political actors and (2) elites have a comparative advantage in the exercise of violence. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we show that the narrow election of previously excluded left‐wing parties to local executive office in Colombia results in a one standard deviation increase in violent events by right‐wing paramilitaries. We interpret this surge in violence as a reaction of traditional elites to offset the increase in outsiders' access to formal political power. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that violence by left‐wing guerrillas and other actors is unaffected and that violence is not influenced by the victory of right‐wing or other new parties in close elections

    Changes in mental disorder prevalence among conflict-affected populations: a prospective study in Sri Lanka (COMRAID-R).

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    BACKGROUND: Longitudinal data are lacking on mental health trajectories following conflict resolution and return migration. COMRAID-R is a follow-up study of Muslims displaced by conflict from Northern Sri Lanka 20 years ago who are now beginning to return. METHODS: Of 450 participants in displacement interviewed in 2011, 338 (75.1%) were re-interviewed a year later, and a supplementary random sample (n = 228) was drawn from return migrants with a comparable displacement history. Common mental disorder (CMD; Patient Health Questionnaire) and post-traumatic stress disorder (CIDI-subscale) were measured. RESULTS: A CMD prevalence of 18.8% (95%CI 15.2-22.5) at baseline had reduced to 8.6% (5.6-11.7) at follow-up in those remaining in displacement, and was 10.3% (6.5-14.1) in return migrants. PTSD prevalences were 2.4%, 0.3% and 1.6% respectively. CONCLUSIONS: We observed a substantial decrease in CMD prevalence in this population over a short period, which may reflect the prospect of return migration and associated optimism following conflict resolution
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