14 research outputs found
Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions
We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders.To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment.In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller s revenues and deviations from equilibrium).However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.auctions;bidding;strategy;behavioural science;general equilibrium;risk
Relaxing the symmetry assumption in participation games: A specification test for cluster heterogeneity
Published online: 05 April 2023.
OnlinePublWe propose a novel approach to check whether individual behaviour in binary-choice participation games is consistent with the restrictions imposed by symmetric models. This approach allows in particular an assessment of how much cluster-heterogeneity a symmetric model can tolerate to remain consistent with its behavioural restrictions. We assess our approach with data from market-entry experiments which we analyse through the lens of âExploration versus Explorationâ (EvE, which is equivalent to Logit-QRE) or of Impulse Balance Equilibrium (IBE). We find that when the symmetry assumption is imposed, both models are typically rejected when assuming pooled data and IBE yields more data-consistent estimates than EvE, i.e., IBEâs estimates of session and pooled data are more consistent than those of EvE. When relaxing symmetry, EvE (IBE) is rejected for 17% (42%) of the time. Although both models support cluster-heterogeneity, IBE is much less likely to yield over-parametrised specifications and insignificant estimates so it outperforms EvE in accommodating a model-consistent cluster-heterogeneity. The use of regularisation procedures in the estimations partially addresses EvEâs shortcomings but leaves our overall conclusions unchanged.Alan Kirman, François Laisney, Paul Pezanis, Christo
Bidding at Sequential First-price Auctions with(out) Supply Uncertainty: A Laboratory Analysis
Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis
Abstract not availableWerner GĂźth, Paul Pezanis-Christo
Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: An indirect evolutionary analysis
Bidding behavior at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: A laboratory analysis
We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on bidding behavior and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). We observe an important overbidding in all but the last stage of a sequence, no matter whether supply is certain, and a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain. Yet, the data qualitatively support most stage-to-stage bid predictions and the price trend predictions for risk neutral bidders. Š 2006.Tibor Neugebauer, Paul Pezanis-Christo
An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
Published online: 20 October 2020We justify risk neutral equilibrium bidding in commonly known fair division games with incomplete information by an evolutionary setup postulating (i) minimal common knowledge, (ii) optimal responses to conjectural beliefs how others behave and (iii) evolutionary selection of conjectural beliefs with fitness measured by expected payoffs. After justifying the game forms we derive the evolutionary games for first and second-price fair division and determine the evolutionarily stable conjectures. The latter coincide with equilibrium bidding, irrespectively of the number of bidders, i.e., heuristic belief adaptation can imply the same bidding behavior as equilibrium analysis based on common knowledge and counterfactual bidding.Werner GĂźth, Paul Pezanis-Christo