ケーラー アインシュタイン ケイリョウ ノ ソンザイ エノ ショウガイテキ インシ ニツイテ ブブン タヨウタイ ノ ビブン キカガクテキ ケンキュウ

Tax competition poses two problems for international cooperation: defection and distributive conflict. Multilateral cooperation to stop tax competition may fail because states face incentives to renege on their promises or because they face adverse distributional consequences, either of which makes cooperation an unattractive option for them. Conventional wisdom in international relations concentrates on the first problem, highlighting that the problem of tax competition resembles a Prisoner's dilemma. We argue instead that it is the peculiar distributional consequences of tax competition which explain why all attempts to regulate it cooperatively have failed. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical research on the European Union's unsuccessful record of tax cooperation, we show how distributive, "within-group" conflict amongst potential cooperators interacts with the constraints imposed by a non-cooperating "outside world" to make multilateral tax cooperation an especially elusive goal for international collaboration.Der Steuerwettbewerb stellt die internationale Kooperation vor ein Defektions- und ein Verteilungsproblem. Die Kooperation kann scheitern, weil Kooperationszusagen opportunistisch ausgebeutet werden oder weil Verteilungskonflikte verhindern, daß es überhaupt zu solchen Zusagen kommt. Die bisherige Literatur hat sich fast ausschließlich auf das erste Problem konzentriert. Sie zeigt, daß der Steuerwettbewerb die Struktur eines Gefangenendilemmas hat und erklärt dadurch das regelmäßige Scheitern von Kooperationsversuchen. Wir argumentieren dagegen, daß dieses Scheitern in erster Linie auf Verteilungsprobleme zurückzuführen ist. Modelltheoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde aus dem europäischen Binnenmarkt zeigen, wie Verteilungskonflikte sowohl zwischen den potentiellen Kooperationspartnern als auch zwischen diesen und dritten Staaten den Steuerwettbewerb zu einem schwer lösbaren Kooperationsproblem werden lassen.1 Tax Competition and Economic Integration 2 Why Is International Cooperation to Stop Tax Competition So Difficult? 3 A Model of Tax Competition 3.1 Building Blocks 3.2 Exercising the Model 3.3 Two Hunches about Tax Competition 4 Empirical Evidence 4.1 The Agonies of Withholding-Tax Harmonization in the EC 4.2 Explaining the Failure 4.3 The "Close to Equilibrium" Hunch 4.4 The "Small Is Competitive" Hunch 5 The Outside World Constraint 5.1 Partial Cooperation and the Leakage Effect 5.2 Tax Creation and Tax Diversion 6 Conclusion Reference

From National Hierarchies to International Standardization: Historical and Modal Changes in the Coordination of Telecommunications

Die Konvergenz von Telekommunikation und Datenverarbeitung hat eine globale Expansion von Netzen und Diensten ausgelöst, die von einer Deregulierung des Sektors begleitet wurde. Eine Vielzahl heterogener Akteure auf dem Weltmarkt muß die jeweiligen Entwicklungs- und Produktionsaktivitäten ebenso wie das Angebot neuer Dienste koordinieren. Der alte Modus hierarchischer Koordination, der technische, ökonomische und politische Steuerung internalisierte und sich in der Ära souveräner Nationalstaaten früherer Jahrzehnte etablierte, ließ sich nicht in eine transnationale Hierarchie transformieren. Koordination beschränkt sich daher auf die Herstellung technischer Kompatibilität von Systemen der Telekommunikation. Es hat sich ein Netz internationaler und regionaler Standardisierungsgremien herausgebildet, das ständig größer wird. Diese Gremien erarbeiten die benötigten Empfehlungen, die eher optional und komplementär als substitutiv sind, was eine Arbeitsteilung anstelle von Konkurrenz begünstigt hat.The convergence of telecommunications and computer technology stimulated a global expansion of networks and services which was accompanied by a deregulation of this industry. In the liberalized worldmarket a great number of heterogeneous actors must coordinate the development and production of technology as well as the provision of new services. The old mode of hierarchical coordination internalizing technical, economic and political control, which originated from the sovereign state system of earlier decades, could not be transformed into transnational hierarchy. Thus coordination is widely restricted to achieving technical compatibility of telecommunications systems. A network of international and regional standardization committees, growing in number, has evolved. They issue the required technical recommendations, which are usually more complementary and optional than substitutive, so that division of labor instead of competition prevails.Abstract 1 Introduction 2 Large Technical Systems in National Containment: The Old Order in Telecommunications 3 From National Isolation to Minimal International Coordination 3.1 Modes of International Coordination: Some Theoretical Considerations 3.2 The Long Road to Little International Coordination 4 Trans-border Expansion of Telecommunications and the Erosion of the Old Order 5 Technical Systems' Compatibility Requirements and the Proliferation of International Standardization 5.1 Basic Problems of International Standardization Procedures 5.2 The Proliferation of International Standardization Organizations 6 Conclusion Bibliograph

Government Euroscepticism and differentiated integration

It is common to consider mass politics and Eurosceptic politicization as “post-functionalist” constraints that encourage differentiated European integration. This study argues that the relevance of Euroscepticism depends on who wins the domestic competition for government office. European mass politics are organized as delegation systems. These systems concentrate authority in the government and give little influence to parliaments and publics. If Eurosceptic parties reach the government, they will push for differentiation and even disintegration. If pro-EU parties succeed, uniform integration is likely to prevail. An empirical analysis of differentiated integration from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty to the 2016 Single Resolution Fund shows that only government Euroscepticism—rather than opposition, extra-parliamentary, or popular Euroscepticism—encourages differentiation. This study explains how uniform integration can prevail even in ostensibly Eurosceptic countries. It suggests that the impact of Eurosceptic politicization depends on party competition and is often more limited than might seem at first sight

Eastern enlargement and differentiated integration: towards normalization

Against the background of theoretical arguments and the historical record, enlargements of the European Union tend to increase differentiated integration. The actual development of differentiation of the 2004 and 2007 accession countries can, therefore, be seen as an indicator of the Union’s integration capacity. We map the newcomers’ differentiated integration since accession, and also distinguish between exemptions and discrimination. Furthermore, we approximate a counterfactual scenario of how their level of differentiation might have developed in the absence of recent accession through a comparison to the Southern member states. Finally, we explore correlations between exemptions, discriminations and two structural country characteristics, wealth and identity. Overall, the level, trajectory and patterns of differentiation point towards a normalization of the new member states’ integration in the Union

Power, norms and institutional change in the European Union: the protection of the free movement of goods

How do institutions of the European Union change? Using an institutionalist approach, this article highlights the interplay between power, cognitive limits, and the normative order that underpins institutional settings and assesses their impact upon the process of institutional change. Empirical evidence from recent attempts to reinforce the protection of the free movement of goods in the EU suggests that, under conditions of uncertainty, actors with ambiguous preferences assess attempts at institutional change on the basis of the historically defined normative order which holds a given institutional structure together. Hence, path dependent and incremental change occurs even when more ambitious and functionally superior proposals are on offer

Grand Theories, Differentiated Integration

Even though differentiation has become a core feature of the EU, the grand theories have focused almost exclusively on uniform integration. In this paper, we derive hypotheses about differentiated integration from liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, and postfunctionalism. In an analysis of EU treaty making between 1992 and 2016, we find evidence that heterogeneity of both wealth and identity, integration in the area of core state powers, and pre-existing differentiation drive differentiated integration. A comparison of the explanatory power of the grand theories shows that neo- and post-functionalism explain the differentiations that member states obtain in EU reform treaties more convincingly than liberal intergovernmentalism. A synthetic model performs best, however. The grand theories also leave noteworthy variation unexplained

Explaining differentiation in European Union treaties

Since the early 1990s, European integration has become increasingly differentiated. Analysing the conditions under which member states make use of the opportunity to opt out of, or exclude other countries from, European integration, we argue that different explanations apply to treaty and accession negotiations, respectively. Threatening to block deeper integration, member states with strong national identities secure differentiations in treaty reform. In enlargement, in turn, old member states fear economic disadvantages and low administrative capacity and therefore impose differentiation on poor newcomers. Opt-outs from treaty revisions are limited to the area of core state powers, whereas they also occur in the market in the context of enlargement

Insights into the Regulatory Characteristics of the Mycobacterial Dephosphocoenzyme A Kinase: Implications for the Universal CoA Biosynthesis Pathway

Being vastly different from the human counterpart, we suggest that the last enzyme of the Mycobacterium tuberculosis Coenzyme A biosynthetic pathway, dephosphocoenzyme A kinase (CoaE) could be a good anti-tubercular target. Here we describe detailed investigations into the regulatory features of the enzyme, affected via two mechanisms. Enzymatic activity is regulated by CTP which strongly binds the enzyme at a site overlapping that of the leading substrate, dephosphocoenzyme A (DCoA), thereby obscuring the binding site and limiting catalysis. The organism has evolved a second layer of regulation by employing a dynamic equilibrium between the trimeric and monomeric forms of CoaE as a means of regulating the effective concentration of active enzyme. We show that the monomer is the active form of the enzyme and the interplay between the regulator, CTP and the substrate, DCoA, affects enzymatic activity. Detailed kinetic data have been corroborated by size exclusion chromatography, dynamic light scattering, glutaraldehyde crosslinking, limited proteolysis and fluorescence investigations on the enzyme all of which corroborate the effects of the ligands on the enzyme oligomeric status and activity. Cysteine mutagenesis and the effects of reducing agents on mycobacterial CoaE oligomerization further validate that the latter is not cysteine-mediated or reduction-sensitive. These studies thus shed light on the novel regulatory features employed to regulate metabolite flow through the last step of a critical biosynthetic pathway by keeping the latter catalytically dormant till the need arises, the transition to the active form affected by a delicate crosstalk between an essential cellular metabolite (CTP) and the precursor to the pathway end-product (DCoA)