Quarkonia and heavy flavors at the LHC

Perspectives for quarkonia and heavy flavors measurements in heavy ion collisions at LHC are reviewedComment: 6 pages, Proceedings of the Hard Probes 2004 Conference, Ericeira, Portugal, Nov 2004, replaced with revised versio

Nuclear Effects in Deep Inelastic Scattering of Charged-Current Neutrino off Nuclear

Nuclear effect in the neutrino-nucleus charged-Current inelastic scattering process is studied by analyzing the CCFR and NuTeV data. Structure functions $F_2(x,Q^2)$ and $xF_3(x,Q^2)$ as well as differential cross sections are calculated by using CTEQ parton distribution functions and EKRS and HKN nuclear parton distribution functions, and compared with the CCFR and NuTeV data. It is found that the corrections of nuclear effect to the differential cross section for the charged-current anti-neutrino scattering on nucleus are negligible, the EMC effect exists in the neutrino structure function $F_2(x,Q^2)$ in the large $x$ region, the shadowing and anti-shadowing effect occurs in the distribution functions of valence quarks in the small and medium $x$ region,respectively. It is also found that shadowing effects on $F_2(x,Q^2)$ in the small $x$ region in the neutrino-nucleus and the charged-lepton-nucleus deep inelastic scattering processes are different. It is clear that the neutrino-nucleus deep inelastic scattering data should further be employed in restricting nuclear parton distributions.Comment: 24 pages, 5 figure

The Well

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Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as usual?

We study the short-run effect of elections on monetary aggregates in a sample of 85 low and middle income democracies (1975-2009). We find an increase in the growth rate of M1 during election months of about one tenth of a standard deviation. A similar effect can neither be detected in established OECD democracies nor in other months. The effect is larger in democracies with many poor and uneducated voters, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and in East-Asia and the Pacific. We argue that the election month monetary expansion is related to systemic vote buying which requires significant amounts of cash to be disbursed right before elections. The finely timed increase in M1 is consistent with this; is inconsistent with a monetary cycle aimed at creating an election time boom; and it cannot be, fully, accounted for by alternative explanations

Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive

We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the incumbent re-runs. To account for the potential endogeneity associated with this decision, we apply a unique instrumental variables approach based on age and pension eligibility rules. We find sizable and significant effects in expenditures before council elections and before joint elections when the incumbent re-runs