The Effects of the Security Environment on Military Expenditures: Pooled Analyses of 165 Countries, 1950-2000

Countries' military expenditures differ greatly across both space and time. This study examines the determinants of military spending, with particular reference to the importance of the external security environment. Using the liberal-realist model of international relations, we first estimate the probability that two countries will be involved in a fatal militarized interstate dispute. We then aggregate these ex ante estimates of the likelihood of dyadic conflict, calculating the annual joint probability that a country will be involved in a fatal dispute. This is our measure of the external threat. We then estimate the level of military spending by country and year as a function of the security environment, arms races with foes and the defense expenditures of friendly countries, states' involvement in actual military conflict, economic output, and various other political variables. In analyses of a panel of 165 countries, 1950 to 2000, we find that the security environment is a powerful determinant of military spending. Indeed, our prospectively measured estimate of the external threat is more influential than any of several influences known only ex post. Our best estimate is that a one percentage point rise in the probability of a fatal dispute leads to a 3 percent increase in military spending.Military spending, Security threat, Arms race, Militarized disputes, Democracy, Alliances

The Effects of the Security Environment on Military Expenditures: Pooled Analyses of 165 Countries, 1950-2000

Countries’ military expenditures differ greatly across both space and time. This study examines the determinants of military spending, with particular reference to the importance of the external security environment. Using the liberal-realist model of international relations, we first estimate the probability that two countries will be involved in a fatal militarized interstate dispute. We then aggregate these ex ante estimates of the likelihood of dyadic conflict, calculating the annual joint probability that a country will be involved in a fatal dispute. This is our measure of the external threat. We then estimate the level of military spending by country and year as a function of the security environment, arms races with foes and the defense expenditures of friendly countries, states’ involvement in actual military conflict, economic output, and various other political variables. In analyses of a panel of 165 countries, 1950 to 2000, we find that the security environment is a powerful determinant of military spending. Indeed, our prospectively measured estimate of the external threat is more influential than any of several influences known only ex post. Our best estimate is that a one percentage point rise in the probability of a fatal dispute leads to a 3 percent increase in military spending

The coexistence of peace and conflict in South America: toward a new conceptualization of types of peace

South America's predominant democratic regimes and its increasing interdependence on regional trade have not precluded the emergence of militarized crises between Colombia and Venezuela or the revival of boundary claims between Chile and Peru. This way, how can we characterize a zone that, in spite of its flourishing democracy and dense economic ties, remain involved in territorial disputes for whose resolution the use of force has not yet been discarded? This article contends that existing classifications of zones of peace are not adequate to explain this unusual coexistence. Thus, its main purpose is to develop a new analytical category of regional peace for assessing this phenomenon: the hybrid peace. It aims to research the evolution of security systems in South America during the previous century and build a new, threefold classification of peace zones: negative peace zones, hybrid peace zones, and positive peace zones

The 'knowledge politics' of democratic peace theory

How do academic ideas influence US foreign policy, under what conditions and with what consequences? This article traces the rise, ‘securitisation’ and political consequences of democratic peace theory (DPT) in the United States by exploring the work of Doyle, Diamond and Fukuyama. Ideas influence US foreign policy under different circumstances, but are most likely to do either during and after crises when the policy environment permits ‘new thinking’, or when these ideas have been developed through state-connected elite knowledge networks, or when they are (or appear paradigmatically congenial to) foreign policymakers’ mindsets, or, finally, when they become institutionally-embedded. The appropriation of DPT by foreign policymakers has categorised the world into antagonistic blocs – democratic/non-democratic zones of peace/turmoil – as the corollary to a renewed American mission to make the world ‘safer’ through ‘democracy’ promotion. The roles of networked organic intellectuals – in universities and think tanks, for instance – were particularly important in elevating DPT from the academy to national security managers