With enough women, majority based decision making rules can help foster communication processes that support women’s authority

Recent years have seen growing calls for the greater representation of women in political bodies and corporate boards. But does greater representation for women lead to more power in decision making? Using data from an empirical study of group interaction around deliberation, J. Baxter Oliphant, Tali Mendelberg, and Christopher F. Karpowitz find that the rules around how decisions are made matter; when decisions are majority-based, and there are enough women to control the decision, then men begin to treat women with more respect. When decisions need to be unanimous, minority men are empowered and do not modify their behavior towards women

Gender inequality in deliberation: Unpacking the black box of interaction

When and why do women gain from increased descriptive representation in deliberating bodies? Using a large randomized experiment, and linking individual-level speech with assessments of speaker authority, we find that decision rules interact with the number of women in the group to shape the conversation dynamics and deliberative authority, an important form of influence. With majority rule and few women, women experience a negative balance of interruptions when speaking, and these women then lose influence in their own eyes and in others'. But when the group is assigned to unanimous rule, or when women are many, women experience a positive balance of interruptions, mitigating the deleterious effect of small numbers. Men do not experience this pattern. We draw implications for a type of representation that we call authoritative representation, and for democratic deliberation. © 2014 American Political Science Association

Supramolecular copolymers predominated by alternating order: Theory and application

We investigate the copolymerization behavior of a two-component system into quasi-linear self-assemblies under conditions that interspecies binding is favored over identical species binding. The theoretical framework is based on a coarse-grained self-assembled Ising model with nearest neighbor interactions. In Ising language, such conditions correspond to the anti-ferromagnetic case giving rise to copolymers with predominantly alternating configurations. In the strong coupling limit, we show that the maximum fraction of polymerized material and the average length of strictly alternating copolymers depend on the stoichiometric ratio and the activation free energy of the more abundant species. They are substantially reduced when the stoichiometric ratio noticeably differs from unity. Moreover, for stoichiometric ratios close to unity, the copolymerization critical concentration is remarkably lower than the homopolymerization critical concentration of either species. We further analyze the polymerization behavior for a finite and negative coupling constant and characterize the composition of supramolecular copolymers. Our theoretical insights rationalize experimental results of supramolecular polymerization of oppositely charged monomeric species in aqueous solutions

Gender Inequality in Deliberation: Unpacking the Black Box of Interaction

When and why do women gain from increased descriptive representation in deliberating bodies? Using a large randomized experiment, and linking individual-level speech with assessments of speaker authority, we find that decision rules interact with the number of women in the group to shape the conversation dynamics and deliberative authority, an important form of influence. With majority rule and few women, women experience a negative balance of interruptions when speaking, and these women then lose influence in their own eyes and in others'. But when the group is assigned to unanimous rule, or when women are many, women experience a positive balance of interruptions, mitigating the deleterious effect of small numbers. Men do not experience this pattern. We draw implications for a type of representation that we call authoritative representation, and for democratic deliberation. © 2014 American Political Science Association

Legal Realism for Economists

Economists have made great progress in understanding the incentives and behavior of actors who operate outside of traditional economic markets, including voters, legislators, and bureaucrats. The incentives and behavior of judges, however, remain largely opaque. Do judges act as neutral third-party enforcers of substantive decisions made by others? Are judges "ordinary" policymakers who advance whatever outcomes they favor without any special consideration for law as such? Emerging recent scholarship has started to explore more nuanced conceptions of how law, facts, and judicial preferences may interact to influence judicial decisions. This work develops a perspective on judging that can usefully be understood as the modern manifestation of American Legal Realism, a jurisprudential movement of lawyers, judges, and law professors that flourished in the early twentieth century. The purpose of this essay is to introduce, in simplified form, the Realist account of judicial decision making; to contrast this view with alternative theories about law and judging; and to sketch out how a more explicit integration of the Realists' conceptual insights about law and judicial behavior might enrich the rapidly expanding economic work in this field.