54 research outputs found
Teleology and Realism in Leibniz's Philosophy of Science
This paper argues for an interpretation of Leibniz’s claim that physics requires both mechanical and teleological principles as a view regarding the interpretation of physical theories. Granting that Leibniz’s fundamental ontology remains non-physical, or mentalistic, it argues that teleological principles nevertheless ground a realist commitment about mechanical descriptions of phenomena. The empirical results of the new sciences, according to Leibniz, have genuine truth conditions: there is a fact of the matter about the regularities observed in experience. Taking this stance, however, requires bringing non-empirical reasons to bear upon mechanical causal claims. This paper first evaluates extant interpretations of Leibniz’s thesis that there are two realms in physics as describing parallel, self-sufficient sets of laws. It then examines Leibniz’s use of teleological principles to interpret scientific results in the context of his interventions in debates in seventeenth-century kinematic theory, and in the teaching of Copernicanism. Leibniz’s use of the principle of continuity and the principle of simplicity, for instance, reveal an underlying commitment to the truth-aptness, or approximate truth-aptness, of the new natural sciences. The paper concludes with a brief remark on the relation between metaphysics, theology, and physics in Leibniz
Kant's conception of proper science
Kant is well known for his restrictive conception of proper science. In the present paper I will try to explain why Kant adopted this conception. I will identify three core conditions which Kant thinks a proper science must satisfy: systematicity, objective grounding, and apodictic certainty. These conditions conform to conditions codified in the Classical Model of Science. Kant's infamous claim that any proper natural science must be mathematical should be understood on the basis of these conditions. In order to substantiate this reading, I will show that only in this way it can be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific status. © 2009 The Author(s)
Reconsidering the Carnap-Kuhn Connection
Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged the ‘received view’ on the relationship between
Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting that there is a close affinity
(rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on
incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this
revisionist view, I argue that the philosophical relationship between Carnap and Kuhn should be regarded as opposed rather than complementary. In particular, I argue that a consideration of the fundamentally disparate nature of the broader philosophical projects of Carnap (logic of science)
and Kuhn (providing a theory of scientific revolutions)renders the alleged similarities between their views superficial in comparison to their fundamental differences. In defense of the received view, I suggest that Carnap and Kuhn are model representatives of two contrasting styles of
doing philosophy of science, viz., logical analysis and historical
analysis respectively. This analysis clarifies the
role played by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions
in the demise of logical empiricism in the second half of the twentieth-century
Struggles Over History and Identity: "Opening the Gates" of the Kingdom to Tourism
Product of workshop No. 8 at the 2nd MRM 200
Utopias, Dolphins, and Computers: Problems of Philosophical PlumbingMary Midgley New York: Routledge, 1996, x + 182 pp., $22.95
Middle East Update
What has been going on in the Middle East in the last few months? Will things change with the new U.S. administration? What are the chances for a renewal of the Iran nuclear deal? Will Syria\u27s President Bashar al-Assad survive? Will Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman continue the war in Yemen? Can Egypt\u27s President Sisi crush the coronavirus? Can the Palestinian Authority get serious peace talks back on track? A panel with experts on the Middle East based in Northwest Arkansas discuss these and other issues in this lively presentation
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