The Identity of Indiscernibles and Spinoza\u27s Argument for Substance Monism

In A Study of Spinoza\u27s Ethics, Bennett provides an analysis of what he calls Spinoza\u27s \u27offical argument\u27 of substance monism. The official argument is Bennett\u27s interpretation of the demonstration of 1P14, and his criticisms of it are powerful ones. This paper addresses one aspect of Bennet\u27s criticisms. A premise of the official argument is the conclusion of 1P5, that there cannot be two substances with an attribute in common. Bennett argues that 1P5 is insufficient to support 1P14. This paper argues that a correct understanding of Spinoza\u27s version of the identity of indiscernibles reveals that 1P5 is sufficient to support 1P14 and Spinoza\u27s argument for substance monism

Leibniz on Substance and God in That a Most Perfect Being is Possible

Leibniz used Descartes\u27 strict notion of substance in That a Most Perfect being is Possible to characterize God but did not intend to undermine his own philosophical views by denying that there are created substances. The metaphysical view of substance in this passage is Cartesian. A discussion of radical substance without any sort of denial in the possibility of other substances does not indicate Spinozism. If this interpretation is correct, then the passage is neither anomalous nor mysterious. There is reason to believe that the passage expresses just the beliefs that we should expect Leibniz to hold in his De Summa Rerum period. Furthermore, this interpretation indicates that while Leibniz\u27s metaphysics during this stage of his career is suggestively similar to Spinoza\u27s, there is no evidence that Leibniz accepted Spinoza\u27s pantheistic conclusion

A Note on Leibniz\u27s Supposed Flirtation with Occasionalism in the 1669 Letter to Thomasius

According to the traditional account of Leibniz\u27s early philosophy, he briefly accepted a broadly Cartesian physics by which only God has the ability to move bodies by continually recreating them in different places... Some believe that this Cartesianism, which seems to be endorsed in the 1669 letter to Thomasius, indicates that Leibniz accepted a version of occasionalism in that letter. This paper argues that Leibniz does not hold an occasionalistic notion of causation in the 1669 letter to Thomasius. In pursuing a synthesis of hylomorphism and Cartesianism, Leibniz arrives at an account that avoids occasionalism and has striking similaries to scholastic theories about motion

Spinoza on the Essence, Mutability and Power of God

This paper argues that Spinoza makes a distinction between the constitutive essence of God (the totality of His attributes) and the essence of God per se (His power and causal efficacy). Using this distinction, I explain how Spinoza can conceive of God as being both an immutable simple unity and a subject for constantly changing modes. Spinoza believes that God qua Natura Naturans is immutable while God qua Natura Naturata is not. With this point established, Curley\u27s claim that Spinozistic modes are causally dependent on but not properties of God loses much of its attraction. In conclusion, I suggest how God\u27s essence is related to His attributes and His modes

Descartes\u27 Two Accounts of Mind Body Union

First paragraph: Descartes was committed both to the Christian doctrine of the unity of man and to an experimentally oriented mechanistic science. Furthermore, he was committed to a dualistic metaphysics in which humans consist of a union of mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa), which are absolutely distinct substances. There has been little agreement on how his explanation of union reflects his commitments. Some philosophers argue that Descarte\u27s primary or only account of union was the co-extension view because it is compatible with the unity of man. As we will see, however, the co-extension account would not have satisfied Descartes\u27 scientific inclinations. Philosophers who pay serious attention to the difficulties with the co-extension account argue that Descartes accepted or should have accepted the natural institution account of union, which is compatible with his scientific commitments. However, the natural institution account is guilty of a Platonism and arbitrariness that conflicts with the unity of man. I will argue that Descartes\u27 desire to accommodate all his commitments drove him to accept and be devoted to both the co-extension and the natural institution accounts

Use of Full-Text Electronic Resources by Philosophy Students at UNC-Chapel Hill: A Citation Analysis

This study addresses the issue of how important full-text electronic resources are to the advanced research of undergraduate and graduate philosophy students. The fact that students in the humanities tend to rely on resources that are often not available in full-text electronic format suggests that this format is of somewhat marginal importance to philosophy students, but no empirical studies have verified this. By performing a citation analysis of undergraduate honors theses and masters theses completed at UNC-Chapel Hill between 1998 and 2000, the researcher presents empirical evidence suggesting that students performing high-level philosophy research at UNC-Chapel Hill during this period made little use of material available in full-text electronic form