416 research outputs found
Competing to Invest in the Foreign Market
This paper analyzes foreign-direct-investment (FDI) competition in a three-country framework: two Northern countries and one Southern country. We have in mind the competition of Airbus and Boeing (or GM and Volkswagen) in a developing country. The host-country government endogeneizes tariffs, while Airbus and Boeing choose domestic output and FDI. Wages and employment in the home countries are bargained over between labor and management. We find that in the unique equilibrium, both Airbus and Boeing compete to undertake FDI in the developing country. This arises because the host country can play off the multinational corporations, which in turn stems from three factors: (a) Oligopolistic rivalry; (b) Quid prod quo FDI, which reduces tariffs; (c) Strategic outsourcing-FDI drives down the union wages at home if the host-country wage is sufficiently low. However, if the host-country wage is sufficiently high, then the union wage increases under FDI. In such cases, FDI competition benefits the multinationals, the labor unions as well as the host country. If Boeing undertakes FDI while Airbus does not, then: (i) Boeing's market share and profits are higher than Airbus's; (ii) the tariff facing Boeing is lower than that facing Airbus.FDI Competition, Quid Pro Quo FDI, Labor Union, Political Economy, Emerging Markets
Welfare Analysis of Free Entry in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
This paper presents a welfare analysis of free entry equilibrium in dynamic general equilibrium environments with oligopolistic competition. First, we show that a marginal decrease in the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium improves social welfare. Second, we show that if a government can control the number of entrants intertemporally so as to maximize the level of social welfare, the number of entrants under free entry may be less than the second-best number of entrants. Capital accumulation plays an important role in determining whether excess entry occurs.Excess entry; Oligopolistic competition; Dynamic general equilibrium
Licensing and R&D Investment of Duopolistic Firms with Partially Complementary Technologies
We consider research and development (R&D) investment competition between duopolistic firms that independently invest in two complementary technologies to produce their products. By "partially complementary technologies", we mean that each firm can produce the goods without both technologies but they incur more redundant costs than with both technologies. We derive the investment competition equilibria in R&D of the two technologies with and without a licensing system. By comparing R&D investment levels in the two equilibria, we show that the licensing system discourages R&D investment in most cases; however, it encourages R&D investment in some cases when the duopolistic firms can produce the goods using both technologies. We also show that (cross-) licensing increases the expected social surplus at the symmetric equilibrium.partially complementary technologies, licensing system, duopoly, R&D investment
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