Studies on the cornin extracted from bovine liver. II. Inhibitory effect of the cornin on DNA synthesis and cell growth of L cells cultured in suspension

Gornin was extracted from bovine liver. The effects of cornin on DNA synthesis were compared with its effects on cell growth using L cells growing in suspension. As the first step of this experiment, a simple method of suspension culture was established with a new modification of YLE medium. Both effects of cornin paralleled with dosage. And the properties of the inhibitory factor of DNA synthesis are the same as those of growth inhibitor in respect to the heat stability and impermeability against dialyzing membrane. The inhibitor of DNA synthesis could not be separated from that of growth by gel filtration with Sephadex G-75.</p

Evolutionary dynamics and fixation probabilities in directed networks

We investigate the evolutionary dynamics in directed and/or weighted networks. We study the fixation probability of a mutant in finite populations in stochastic voter-type dynamics for several update rules. The fixation probability is defined as the probability of a newly introduced mutant in a wild-type population taking over the entire population. In contrast to the case of undirected and unweighted networks, the fixation probability of a mutant in directed networks is characterized not only by the degree of the node that the mutant initially invades but by the global structure of networks. Consequently, the gross connectivity of networks such as small-world property or modularity has a major impact on the fixation probability.Comment: 7 figure

Studies on the cornin extracted from bovine liver. I. Purification of the cornin and its physico-chemical properties

A factor, cornin, inhibiting the growth of L cells cultured in monolayer was extracted from bovine liver with boiling water and was partially purified by gel filtration with Sephadex G-200. The factor was (1) precipitable with ethanol at the concentration between 70% and 90%, (2) impermeable through dializing memo brane, (3) eluted as the last peak at the gel filtration and (4) containing protein and RNA but no DNA.</p

Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas.

Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Previous studies explored indirect reciprocity in the so-called donation game, a special class of Prisoner\u27s Dilemma (PD) with unilateral decision making. A more general class of social dilemmas includes Snowdrift (SG), Stag Hunt (SH), and PD games, where two players perform actions simultaneously. In these simultaneous-move games, moral assessments need to be more complex; for example, how should we evaluate defection against an ill-reputed, but now cooperative, player? We examined indirect reciprocity in the three social dilemmas and identified twelve successful social norms for moral assessments. These successful norms have different principles in different dilemmas for suppressing cheaters. To suppress defectors, any defection against good players is prohibited in SG and PD, whereas defection against good players may be allowed in SH. To suppress unconditional cooperators, who help anyone and thereby indirectly contribute to jeopardizing indirect reciprocity, we found two mechanisms: indiscrimination between actions toward bad players (feasible in SG and PD) or punishment for cooperation with bad players (effective in any social dilemma). Moreover, we discovered that social norms that unfairly favor reciprocators enhance robustness of cooperation in SH, whereby reciprocators never lose their good reputation

Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism that explains large-scale cooperation in humans. In indirect reciprocity, individuals use reputations to choose whether or not to cooperate with a partner and update others' reputations. A major question is how the rules to choose their actions and the rules to update reputations evolve. In the public reputation case, where all individuals share the evaluation of others, social norms called Simple Standing (SS) and Stern Judging (SJ) have been known to maintain cooperation. However, in the case of private assessment where individuals independently evaluate others, the mechanism of maintenance of cooperation is still largely unknown. This study theoretically shows for the first time that cooperation by indirect reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable under private assessment. Specifically, we find that SS can be stable, but SJ can never be. This is intuitive because SS can correct interpersonal discrepancies in reputations through its simplicity. On the other hand, SJ is too complicated to avoid an accumulation of errors, which leads to the collapse of cooperation. We conclude that moderate simplicity is a key to success in maintaining cooperation under the private assessment. Our result provides a theoretical basis for evolution of human cooperation.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figures, 1 table (main); 15 pages, 4 figures, 2 tables (supplement

Evolutionary Stability on Graphs

Evolutionary stability is a fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory. A strategy is called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), if its monomorphic population rejects the invasion of any other mutant strategy. Recent studies have revealed that population structure can considerably affect evolutionary dynamics. Here we derive the conditions of evolutionary stability for games on graphs. We obtain analytical conditions for regular graphs of degree $k > 2$. Those theoretical predictions are compared with computer simulations for random regular graphs and for lattices. We study three different update rules: birth–death (BD), death–birth (DB), and imitation (IM) updating. Evolutionary stability on sparse graphs does not imply evolutionary stability in a well-mixed population, nor vice versa. We provide a geometrical interpretation of the ESS condition on graphs.MathematicsOrganismic and Evolutionary Biolog

Direct Reciprocity on Graphs

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on the idea of repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine direct reciprocity in structured populations, where individuals occupy the vertices of a graph. The edges denote who interacts with whom. The graph represents spatial structure or a social network. For birth–death or pairwise comparison updating, we find that evolutionary stability of direct reciprocity is more restrictive on a graph than in a well-mixed population, but the condition for reciprocators to be advantageous is less restrictive on a graph. For death–birth and imitation updating, in contrast, both conditions are easier to fulfill on a graph. Moreover, for all four update mechanisms, reciprocators can dominate defectors on a graph, which is never possible in a well-mixed population. We also study the effect of an error rate, which increases with the number of links per individual; interacting with more people simultaneously enhances the probability of making mistakes. We provide analytic derivations for all results.MathematicsOrganismic and Evolutionary Biolog

The Replicator Equation on Graphs

We study evolutionary games on graphs. Each player is represented by a vertex of the graph. The edges denote who meets whom. A player can use any one of n strategies. Players obtain a payoff from interaction with all their immediate neighbors. We consider three different update rules, called ‘birth-death’, ‘death-birth’ and ‘imitation’. A fourth update rule, ‘pairwise comparison’, is shown to be equivalent to birth-death updating in our model. We use pair-approximation to describe the evolutionary game dynamics on regular graphs of degree k. In the limit of weak selection, we can derive a differential equation which describes how the average frequency of each strategy on the graph changes over time. Remarkably, this equation is a replicator equation with a transformed payoff matrix. Therefore, moving a game from a well-mixed population (the complete graph) onto a regular graph simply results in a transformation of the payoff matrix. The new payoff matrix is the sum of the original payoff matrix plus another matrix, which describes the local competition of strategies. We discuss the application of our theory to four particular examples, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Snow-Drift game, a coordination game and the Rock-Scissors-Paper game.MathematicsOrganismic and Evolutionary Biolog