Stage-associated overexpression of the ubiquitin-like protein, ISG15, in bladder cancer

Bladder cancer is among the most prevalent malignancies, and is characterised by frequent tumour recurrences and localised inflammation, which may promote tissue invasion and metastasis. Microarray analysis was used to compare gene expression in normal bladder urothelium with that in tumours at different stages of progression. The innate immune response gene, interferon-stimulated gene 15 kDa (ISG15, GIP2), was highly expressed at all stages of bladder cancer as compared to normal urothelium. Western blotting revealed a tumour-associated expression of ISG15 protein. ISG15 exhibited a stage-associated expression, with significantly (P<0.05) higher levels of ISG15 protein in muscle-invasive T2–T4 tumours, compared with normal urothelium. Although ISG15 is involved in the primary immune response, ISG15 expression did not correlate with bladder inflammation. However, immunohistochemical staining revealed expression of ISG15 protein in both cancer cells and stromal immune cells. Interestingly, a significant fraction of ISG15 protein was localised to the nuclei of tumour cells, whereas no nuclear ISG15 staining was observed in ISG15-positive stromal cells. Taken together, our findings identify ISG15 as a novel component of bladder cancer-associated gene expression

Software countermeasures for control flow integrity of smart card C codes

International audienceFault attacks can target smart card programs in order to disrupt an execution and gain an advantage over the data or the embedded functionalities. Among all possible attacks, control flow attacks aim at disrupting the normal execution flow. Identifying harmful control flow attacks as well as designing countermeasures at software level are tedious and tricky for developers. In this paper, we propose a methodology to detect harmful intra-procedural jump attacks at source code level and to automatically inject formally-proven countermeasures. The proposed software countermeasures defeat 100% of attacks that jump over at least two C source code statements or beyond. Experiments show that the resulting code is also hardened against unexpected function calls and jump attacks at assembly level