Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

The Influence of Real World Resource Asymmetries on Punishment in Economic Games

Punishment is crucial to the maintenance of cooperative systems, but it requires investment on the part of individuals. Some evolutionary theorists argue that it is in the best interests of cooperators to punish norm violations, while others argue that more selfish individuals are better equipped to absorb the costs. We argue more generally that those who derive the greatest benefit from group living will have both the resources and incentive to engage in costly punishment, independent of their inclination towards cooperation. To test this hypothesis, we administered an experimental economics “game” that included measures of cooperation and costly punishment, and a survey assessing individual access to social and financial resources. Our hypothesis was validated by three main findings: cooperators and defectors punished with equal frequency and intensity; individuals with greater access to social resources were more likely to punish non-cooperators; and punishers with greater access to financial resources were more likely to invest the maximum amount in punishment