Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousness

Author's responseMartínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/ process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.Gerard O'Brien and Jonathan Opi

Internalizing communication

Carruthers presents evidence concerning the cross-modular integration of information in human subjects which appears to support the “cognitive conception of language.” According to this conception, language is not just a means of communication, but also a representational medium of thought. However, Carruthers overlooks the possibility that language, in both its communicative and cognitive roles, is a nonrepresentational system of conventional signals – that words are not a medium we think in, but a tool we think with. The evidence he cites is equivocal when it comes to choosing between the cognitive conception and this radical communicative conception of language.Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opi

Sins of omission and commission

O'Regan & Noë (O&N) fail to address adequately the two most historically important reasons for seeking to explain visual experience in terms of internal representations. They are silent about the apparently inferential nature of perception, and mistaken about the significance of the phenomenology accompanying dreams, hallucinations, and mental imagery.Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opi

Functional resemblance and the internalization of rules

Kubovy and Epstein distinguish between systems that follow rules, and those that merely instantiate them. They regard compliance with the principles of kinematic geometry in apparent motion as a case of instantiation. There is, however, some reason to believe that the human visual system internalizes the principles of kinematic geometry, even if it does not explicitly represent them. We offer functional resemblance as a criterion for internal representation.Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opi

The computational baby, the classical bathwater, and the middle way

We are sympathetic with the broad aims of Perruchet & Vinter's “mentalistic” framework. But it is implausible to claim, as they do, that human cognition can be understood without recourse to unconsciously represented information. In our view, this strategy forsakes the only available mechanistic understanding of intelligent behaviour. Our purpose here is to plot a course midway between the classical unconscious and Perruchet & Vinter's own noncomputational associationism.Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opi

The dawn of the dead : (improbable) art after aI-zombie apocalypse

In recent years there has been growing interest in artificial neural networks (ANNs) which are quickly becoming the primary device for machine learning. Used for finding patterns in large data sets, ANNs were also recently employed in many artistic contexts: as tools for artists, semi-independent creators of content, and even as invisible "critics" which / who predict our aesthetic preferences. The aim of this paper is to speculate about the disruptive effect of these ‘alien agencies’ on the (modernist) aesthetic regime of art centred around the notion of autonomy. The author examines how neural networks and connectionist epistemologies may potentially affect the most common ways of producing, circulating, and valorising art. He claims that the possibility of automatizing creativity and art criticism may lead to the emergence of a new aesthetic regime based on forms of dynamic, distributed and probabilistic governance

Analysis of arterial intimal hyperplasia: review and hypothesis

which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Background: Despite a prodigious investment of funds, we cannot treat or prevent arteriosclerosis and restenosis, particularly its major pathology, arterial intimal hyperplasia. A cornerstone question lies behind all approaches to the disease: what causes the pathology? Hypothesis: I argue that the question itself is misplaced because it implies that intimal hyperplasia is a novel pathological phenomenon caused by new mechanisms. A simple inquiry into arterial morphology shows the opposite is true. The normal multi-layer cellular organization of the tunica intima is identical to that of diseased hyperplasia; it is the standard arterial system design in all placentals at least as large as rabbits, including humans. Formed initially as one-layer endothelium lining, this phenotype can either be maintained or differentiate into a normal multi-layer cellular lining, so striking in its resemblance to diseased hyperplasia that we have to name it "benign intimal hyperplasia". However, normal or "benign " intimal hyperplasia, although microscopically identical to pathology, is a controllable phenotype that rarely compromises blood supply. It is remarkable that each human heart has coronary arteries in which a single-layer endothelium differentiates earl

Radical connectionism: thinking with (not in) language

In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims that cognition never implicates an internal symbolic medium, not even when natural language plays a part in our thought processes. On the face of it, such a position renders the human capacity for abstract thought quite mysterious. However, we argue that connectionism is committed to an analog conception of neural computation, and that representation of the abstract is no more problematic for a system of analog vehicles than for a symbol system. Natural language is therefore not required as a representational medium for abstract thought. Since natural language is arguably not a representational medium at all, but a conventionally governed scheme of communicative signals, we suggest that the role of internalised (i.e. self-directed) language is best conceived in terms of the coordination and control of cognitive activities within the brain.Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opiehttp://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/616/description#descriptio

What's really doing the work here? Knowledge representation or the Higher-Order Thought theory of Consciousness?

Dienes &amp; Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off.</jats:p

Intentionality lite or analog content? A response to Hutto and Satne

In their target article, Hutto and Satne eloquently articulate the failings of most current attempts to naturalize mental content. Furthermore, we think they are correct in their insistence that the only way forward is by drawing a distinction between two kinds of intentionality, one of which is considerably weaker than—and should be deployed to explain—the propositional variety most philosophers take for granted. The problem is that their own rendering of this weaker form of intentionality—contentless intentionality—is too weak. What’s needed is a species of intentionality distinct from both the industrial-strength version beloved by philosophers and the intentionality lite recommended by Hutto and Satne. We briefly motivate and sketch this alternative, and say a few words about the account of cognition that it spawns.Gerard O'Brien, Jon Opi