Endogenous Price Leadership: A Bargaining Model of International Telecommunications Settlements

This article develops a noncooperative bargaining model to address the effects of the uniform settlements policy (USP) in international telecommunications. The model predicts that the USP is more likely to increase (decrease) access charges in markets where, under the USP, U.S. firms carry more (less) outbound than inbound traffic. This is due to the model's more general prediction that forbidding price discrimination may allow an upstream monopolist to credibly commit to a take-it or leave-it intermediate product price. Two brief case studies from the international telegraph market lend support to this prediction.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100894/1/ECON345.pd

Pre-emptive steroids for a severe oedematous Buruli ulcer lesion: a case report

Severe oedematous forms of Buruli ulcer (BU) often result in extensive tissue destruction, even with the institution of appropriate antibiotic treatment, leading to reconstructive surgery and long-term disability. We report a case of a patient with severe oedematous BU, which describes for the first time the pre-emptive use of prednisolone therapy commenced at the time of antibiotic initiation aimed at limiting the ongoing tissue destruction and its secondary sequelae

Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Foreclosure, and Exclusive Dealing

We examine the incentives for market foreclosure when two upstream firms contract with a retail monopolist. We find that if nonlinear supply contracts are feasible, an exclusive dealing arrangement offers an upstream firm no advantage it would not have had without the arrangement. If a fully integratred (horizontally and vertically) firm would sell only one product, an upstream firm can foreclose its rival with a nonlinear supply contract and achieve the same profit it would receive if it required exclusive dealing. If a fully integrated firm would sell both products, the feasibility of nonlinear supply contracts renders it unprofitable to foreclose, with or without exclusive dealing.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100893/1/ECON344.pd

The Welfare Effects of Forbidding Discriminatory Discounts: A Ssecondary Line Analysis of Robinson-Patman

We examine the welfare effects of forbidding price discrimination in intermediate goods markets when firms can bargain over terms of their nonlinear supply contracts. In particular, our focus is on secondary line injury to competition under three interpretations of what it means to forbid price discrimination. We find that in each case, forbidding discriminatory discounts renders retailer bargaining power useless in mitigating manufacturer market power. As a result, all retailers end up paying higher input prices, and all retail prices rise. We show by example that the welfare loss can be substantial.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100958/1/ECON402.pd

Non-linear Contracts, Foreclosure, and Executive Dealing

This paper examines the nature of upstream rivalry in non-linear supply contracts with and without exclusive dealing. We find that foreclosure can occur without exclusive dealing, if economies of scale are sufficiently large, as well as with exclusive dealing. Surprisingly, however, it is the retailer and not the upstream firms who benefit. This formalizes the view that exclusive dealing will not be initiated by supplier because retailer compensation is too steep. It also implies that anticompetitive foreclosure is more likely to occur when downstream firms have bargaining power.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100895/1/ECON346.pd

Earths in Other Solar Systems N-body simulations: the Role of Orbital Damping in Reproducing the Kepler Planetary Systems

The population of exoplanetary systems detected by Kepler provides opportunities to refine our understanding of planet formation. Unraveling the conditions needed to produce the observed exoplanets will sallow us to make informed predictions as to where habitable worlds exist within the galaxy. In this paper, we examine using N-body simulations how the properties of planetary systems are determined during the final stages of assembly. While accretion is a chaotic process, trends in the ensemble properties of planetary systems provide a memory of the initial distribution of solid mass around a star prior to accretion. We also use EPOS, the Exoplanet Population Observation Simulator, to account for detection biases and show that different accretion scenarios can be distinguished from observations of the Kepler systems. We show that the period of the innermost planet, the ratio of orbital periods of adjacent planets, and masses of the planets are determined by the total mass and radial distribution of embryos and planetesimals at the beginning of accretion. In general, some amount of orbital damping, either via planetesimals or gas, during accretion is needed to match the whole population of exoplanets. Surprisingly, all simulated planetary systems have planets that are similar in size, showing that the "peas in a pod" pattern can be consistent with both a giant impact scenario and a planet migration scenario. The inclusion of material at distances larger than what Kepler observes has a profound impact on the observed planetary architectures, and thus on the formation and delivery of volatiles to possible habitable worlds.Comment: Resubmitted to ApJ. Planet formation models available online at http://eos-nexus.org/genesis-database

Comprehensive HIV care and Anti-Retroviral Therapy in a conflict setting-outcomes, experiences, and lessons learned from Bukavu, Democratic Republic of Congo

2006 AIDS Conference in Toront