Modern Slavery, Unfree Labour and the Labour Market: The Social Dynamics of Legal Characterization

Treating the United Kingdom’s Modern Slavery Act as its focus, this article examines what the legal characterization of labour unfreedom reveals about the underlying conception of the labour market that informs contemporary approaches to labour law in the United Kingdom. It discusses how unfree labour is conceptualized within two key literatures – Marxist-inspired political economy and liberal approaches to modern slavery – and their underlying assumptions of the labour market and how it operates. As an alternative to these depictions of the labour market, it proposes a legal institutionalist or constitutive account. It develops an approach to legal characterization and jurisdiction that is attentive to modes of governing and the role of political and legal differentiation both in producing labour exploitation and unfree labour and in developing strategies for its elimination. It argues that the problem with the modern slavery approach to unfree labour is that it tends to displace labour law as the principal remedy to the problem of labour abuse and exploitation, while simultaneously reinforcing the idea that flexible labour markets of the type that prevails in the United Kingdom are realms of labour freedom

An asymmetric multi-item auction with quantity discounts applied to Internet service procurement in Buenos Aires public schools

This article studies a multi-item auction characterized by asymmetric bidders and quantity discounts. We report a practical application of this type of auction in the procurement of Internet services to the 709 public schools of Buenos Aires. The asymmetry in this application is due to firms' existing technology infrastructures, which affect their ability to provide the service in certain areas of the city. A single round first-price sealed-bid auction, it required each participating firm to bid a supply curve specifying a price on predetermined graduated quantity intervals and to identify the individual schools it would supply. The maximal intersections of the sets of schools each participant has bid on define regions we call competition units. A single unit price must be quoted for all schools supplied within the same quantity interval, so that firms cannot bid a high price where competition is weak and a lower one where it is strong. Quantity discounts are allowed so that the bids can reflect returns-to-scale of the suppliers and the auctioneer may benefit of awarding bundles of units instead of separate units. The winner determination problem in this auction poses a challenge to the auctioneer. We present an exponential formulation and a polynomial formulation for this problem, both based on integer linear programming. The polynomial formulation proves to find the optimal set of bids in a matter of seconds. Results of the real-world implementation are reported.Complex Engineering Systems Institute (Santiago, Chile) / FONDECYT (Chile) 1140787 1120475 ANPCyT PICT-2012-1324 CONICET PIP 112-201201-00450CO UBACyT 20020130100808B