Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with optional participation

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies. The players are located either on square lattices or random regular graphs with the same connectivity. Occasionally, every player reassesses its strategy by sampling the payoffs in its neighborhood. The loner strategy efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish, defective behavior and avoids deadlocks in states of mutual defection. On square lattices, Monte Carlo simulations reveal self-organizing patterns driven by the cyclic dominance, whereas on random regular graphs different types of oscillatory behavior are observed: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic or increasing oscillations occur. These results are compared to predictions by pair approximation. Although pair approximation is incapable of distinguishing the two scenarios because of the equal connectivity, the average frequencies as well as the oscillations on random regular graphs are well reproduced.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figure

Projected impacts of climate change on functional diversity of frugivorous birds along a tropical elevational gradient

Climate change forces many species to move their ranges to higher latitudes or elevations. Resulting immigration or emigration of species might lead to functional changes, e.g., in the trait distribution and composition of ecological assemblages. Here, we combined approaches from biogeography (species distribution models; SDMs) and community ecology (functional diversity) to investigate potential effects of climate-driven range changes on frugivorous bird assemblages along a 3000 m elevational gradient in the tropical Andes. We used SDMs to model current and projected future occurrence probabilities of frugivorous bird species from the lowlands to the tree line. SDM-derived probabilities of occurrence were combined with traits relevant for seed dispersal of fleshy-fruited plants to calculate functional dispersion (FDis; a measure of functional diversity) for current and future bird assemblages. Comparisons of FDis between current and projected future assemblages showed consistent results across four dispersal scenarios, five climate models and two representative concentration pathways. Projections indicated a decrease of FDis in the lowlands, an increase of FDis at lower mid-elevations and little changes at high elevations. This suggests that functional dispersion responds differently to global warming at different elevational levels, likely modifying avian seed dispersal functions and plant regeneration in forest ecosystems along tropical mountains

Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategy therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.Comment: 7 pages, 7 figure

Cooperation and its evolution in growing systems with cultural reproduction

We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and individuals with imitation capacity. We consider the topological structure and the evolution of strategies decoupled instead of a coevolutionary dynamic. We show conditions to build up a cooperative system with real topological structures for any natural selection intensity. When the system starts to grow, cooperation is unstable but becomes stable as soon as the system reaches a small core of cooperators whose size increase when the intensity of natural selection decreases. Thus, we reduce the emergence of cooperative systems with cultural reproduction to justify a small initial cooperative structure that we call cooperative seed. Otherwise, given that the system grows principally as cooperator whose cooperators inhabit the most linked parts of the system, the benefit-cost ratio required for cooperation evolve is drastically reduced compared to the found in static networks. In this way, we show that in systems whose individuals have imitation capacity the growing process is essential for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figures. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1111.247