Political Institutions and Public Policy: The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union and the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy

In this paper we study the implications of the introduction of the co-decision procedure for the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy and its refirm. We use a game-theoretical model of the legislative procedures in the European Union and show that the move from consultation to co-decision implies a shift of power from the Commission to the European Parliament. The implications for the Common Agricultural Policy depend on the configuration of preferences, the location of the status quo, and the bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. If the member states and the European Parliament are more opposed to refirm than is the Commission, the introduction of co-decision reduces the prospects for refirm of the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy

POLICY PREFERENCE FORMATION IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS:STRUCTURES, ACTORS, AND FOCAL POINTS

This dissertation introduces and tests a model of policy preference formation in legislative politics. Emphasizing a dynamic relationship between structure, agent, and decision-making process, it ties the question of policy choice to the dimensionality of the normative political space and the strategic actions of parliamentary agenda-setters. The model proposes that structural factors, such as ideology, shape policy preferences to the extent that legislative specialists successfully link them to specific policy proposals through the provision of informational focal points. These focal points shift attention toward particular aspects of a legislative proposal, thus shaping the dominant interpretation of its content and consequences and, in turn, individual-level policy preferences. The propositions of the focal point model are tested empirically with data from the European Parliament (EP), using both qualitative (interview data, content analyses of parliamentary debates) and quantitative methods (multinomial logit regression analyses of roll-call votes). The findings have implications for our understanding of politics and law-making in the European Union and for the study of legislative decision-making more generally

Political competition in the European parliament: Evidence from roll call and survey analyses

Ever since Schumpeter (1942) defined democracy in terms of a competition of political leaders for the votes of the people, public contestation or political competition has been generally recognized as one of the most essential characteristics of modern democracy (Dahl 1971). As modern democracy is hardly conceivable without political parties, political competition implies a major function for mass political parties. As Bingham Powell (1982: 3) puts it: “The competitive electoral context, with several political parties organizing the alternatives that face the voters, is the identifying property of the contemporary democratic process.” It is in this respect that the European Union is often said to be failing. There is no competitive electoral context at the European level. European elections are basically fought by national political parties on national rather than European issues. Because national party systems are based on national cleavages, they fail to organize the alternatives that are relevant to the voters in European elections, i.e., alternatives with respect to the development of the European Union as such. Even worse, any debate on these issues is suppressed by the leadership of the major political parties because they are internally divided on these issues and would risk being split apart when these issues were politicized. In order to remedy this aspect of the democratic deficit, it has been argued that in order to face the European electorate with a relevant choice, the party system should be reshuffled in such a way that parties organize themselves along the continuum pro-vs. Anti-European Integration