Operational levels of cognitive stage achievement and representations of cognitive structures used in mathematical problem solving by young adult prospective teachers

The differential achievement among concrete, transitional, and formal operational levels of cognitive stage in young adults was investigated. Also, the relations were tested among (a) cognitive stage achievement, (b) mathematical problem solution success, and (c) problem-solving strategies used in mathematics (spontaneous figure labeling, chosen solution strategy, and its match with actual strategy). The cognitive interviews replicated those of Piaget and Inhelder (1975) on notions of chance and probability with the use of Green's (1978) quasi-standardized procedural and methodological suggestions. The relations among cognitive achievement, success, and strategies used with math problem solving were tested with an inventory for representations of mathematical cognitive structure (Clark & Reeves, in press). Forty subjects represented prospective teachers. The mean age was 25. 5 years

On the Efficiency of Competitive Electricity Markets With Time-Invariant Retail Prices

Most customers in electricity markets do not face prices that change frequently to reflect changes in wholesale costs, known as real-time pricing (RTP). We show that not only does time-invariant pricing in competitive markets lead to prices and investment that are not first best, it even fails to achieve the constrained second-best optimum. Increasing the share of customers on RTP is likely to improve efficiency, though surprisingly it does not necessarily reduce capacity investment, and it is likely to harm customers that are already on RTP. Simulations demonstrate that the efficiency gains from RTP are potentially quite significant

Cadillac Desert Revisited: Property Rights, Public Policy, and Water Resource Depletion

To alleviate Arizona‘s dependence on groundwater, the federal government subsidized construction of the Central Arizona Project (CAP) to import water from the Colorado River. In exchange for the subsidy, Arizona reformed its groundwater law to eliminate common-property pumping and to ban groundwater mining after the year 2025. We build a model of water resource development in which imported water is a capacity constrained backstop. The model is applied to quantify the welfare effects of alternative CAP construction dates and Arizona groundwater laws. We reach two general conclusions. First, CAP was completed 86 years too early, in 1987, at a deadweight loss of $2.612 billion. Ironically, construction in 1987 yielded lower surplus than never constructing CAP. Second, the political exchange of reform for subsidy introduced a greater loss ($2.612 billion) than it corrected ($0.810 billion). The exchange was worse than doing nothing at all

Privatization of Water-Resource Development

This paper analyzes the inefficiencies from market power and return-flow externalities in private construction of a water project. The model pays special attention to increasing groundwater pumping costs, project set-up costs, limited project capacity, and return flow to the aquifer. For a given capacity, the return-flow externality causes project owners to construct the project too late when the price of groundwater is too high because the external benefit of return-flow to the aquifer is not captured. Market power exacerbates these effects since the project owner delays construction to accelerate groundwater overdraft. The return-flow externality and market power also decrease installed capacity and increase over-draft from the aquifer. Applying the model to the construction of the Central Arizona Project (CAP) for a given capacity, the estimated deadweight loss from hypothetical private construction of the project ($0.853 billion) is substantially less than the literature‘s estimate of deadweight loss from actual construction by the Bureau of Reclamation ($2.603 billion). However, under the federal subsidies and insecure property rights that accompanied the CAP, private construction results in a larger estimated efficiency loss ($6.126 billion)

Set-up costs and the existence of competitive equilibrium when extraction capacity is limited

Although set-up costs are prevalent and substantial in natural resource extraction, it is known that a Walrasian competitive equilibrium cannot exist in simple extraction models with set-up costs. This paper demonstrates that this result is sensitive to the assumption of unlimited extraction capacity and derives sufficient conditions for existence. An equilibrium exists if extraction is limited such that each firm earns sufficient surplus to cover its set-up costs or if firms choose extraction capacity subject to non-increasing returns. The resulting competitive equilibrium price either grows at the rate of interest when total extraction is below industry capacity or is constant when industry capacity is fully utilized. In the equilibrium, identical deposits are opened simultaneously, and set-up costs for new deposits are incurred when the industry has excess capacity rather than when capacity is fully utilized

Greenhouse Gas Reductions under Low Carbon Fuel Standards?

A low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by limiting the carbon intensity of fuels. We show this decreases high carbon fuel production but increases low carbon fuel production, possibly increasing net carbon emissions. The LCFS cannot be efficient, and the best LCFS may be nonbinding. We simulate a national LCFS on gasoline and ethanol. For a broad parameter range, emissions decrease, energy prices increase, abatement costs are large ($80–$760 billion annually), and average abatement costs are large ($307–$2,272 per CO2 metric ton). A cost effective policy has much lower average abatement costs ($60–$868). (JEL Q54, Q58

Learning to Be Deviant: A Qualitative Study of Differential Association

Edwin H. Sutherland's theory of Differential Association may be categorized as a learning theory. The basic premise is that criminal behavior is acquired through the learning process, just as is lawful behavior. The socialization process is essentially the same, regardless of whether the messages being transmitted are conformist or deviant. Through interaction with others, people learn attitudes both favorable and unfavorable to law violation. Sutherland claims that a person turns to criminal behavior when there is an excess of attitudes and values favoring law violation. In theory, Differential Association is one of the most logical explanations of criminal behavior. However, practical application often lessens the significance of seemingly good theories. Hence, I am interested in researching Sutherland's theory to see if it is as thoroughly explanatory as it seems to be. This paper will focus on a subjective test of Differential Association as a theory of criminal involvement

Optimal trading ratios for pollution permit markets

We demonstrate a novel method for improving the efficiency of pollution permit markets by optimizing the exchange of emissions through trade. Under full-information, it is optimal for emissions to exchange according to the ratio of marginal damages. Under asymmetric information, we derive necessary conditions for the marginal damage trading ratios to be optimal, illustrate that the marginal damage trading ratios are generally not optimal, and show how to improve efficiency using optimal trading ratios. We calculate the optimal trading ratios for a global carbon market. The gains from using optimal trading ratios rather than marginal damage trading ratios range from substantial to trivial, which suggests the need for careful consideration of asymmetric information when designing permit markets

What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California's Nox Trading Program.

An advantage of cap-and-trade programs over more prescriptive environmental regulation is that compliance flexibility and cost effectiveness can make more stringent emissions reductions politically feasible. However, when markets (versus regulators) determine where emissions occur, it becomes more difficult to assure that mandated emissions reductions are equitably achieved. We investigate these issues in the context of Southern California’s RECLAIM program by matching facilities in RECLAIM with similar California facilities also in nonattainment areas. Our results indicate that average emissions fell 20 percent at RECLAIM facilities relative to our counterfactual. Furthermore, observed changes in emissions do not vary significantly with neighborhood demographic characteristics