Agrarian institutions and economic growth : was the sale of baldíos responsible of the Castilian agrarian crisis at the end of sixteenth century?

The traditional literature about the Castilian agriculture has interpreted the sale of baldíos as one of the main causes of the decline of Castile during the seventeenth century. The sale obligated the peasant to buy the land if he wanted to continue working on it. Many of these lands were marginal and poor soils, so the growth of production cost would have led many farmers to the ruin and poverty. Many of them had to migrate to other regions, causing a deep fall of agriculture production, the main production activity of Castile's economy at that period of time. This paper shows that Castile entered in decadence not because the baldíos were sold but because the reasons inviting people to use more land and to increase production during the first half of the sixteenth century disappeared around 1590. Instead of seeing exclusively the new costs faced by the farmer after the sale, this paper explores what happened with revenues from plowing more land. Baldíos was an institution that helped an increase of production through expansion of land and labor. Who was the owner of these lands seem to be indifferent in order to explain the amount of production factor used on agriculture. If baldíos was not the reason that provoked a huge migration in the Castilian countryside, then, who was the responsible?. Problems to maintain the returns from agriculture, and not the unexpected increase in the price of land, were the real cause of the final crisis at the end of the sixteenth century

Agrarian institutions and economic growth : was the sale of baldíos responsible of the Castilian agrarian crisis at the end of sixteenth century?.

The traditional literature about the Castilian agriculture has interpreted the sale of baldíos as one of the main causes of the decline of Castile during the seventeenth century. The sale obligated the peasant to buy the land if he wanted to continue working on it. Many of these lands were marginal and poor soils, so the growth of production cost would have led many farmers to the ruin and poverty. Many of them had to migrate to other regions, causing a deep fall of agriculture production, the main production activity of Castile's economy at that period of time. This paper shows that Castile entered in decadence not because the baldíos were sold but because the reasons inviting people to use more land and to increase production during the first half of the sixteenth century disappeared around 1590. Instead of seeing exclusively the new costs faced by the farmer after the sale, this paper explores what happened with revenues from plowing more land. Baldíos was an institution that helped an increase of production through expansion of land and labor. Who was the owner of these lands seem to be indifferent in order to explain the amount of production factor used on agriculture. If baldíos was not the reason that provoked a huge migration in the Castilian countryside, then, who was the responsible?. Problems to maintain the returns from agriculture, and not the unexpected increase in the price of land, were the real cause of the final crisis at the end of the sixteenth century.

Spanish monarchy's monetary problems in the seventeenth century : small change and foreign credit.

It is well known that the Spanish Monarchy found out some problems in its monetary system. So far, almost all the studies have been concentrated in the billon problem and inflation. However, small and large silver coins had also problems to circulate together in Castile. Without small change, among other consequences, it was more difficult to carry out small transactions and without large denominations the credit borrowed by the king to foreign bankers was more expensive. These problems were endogenous to the Castilian monetary system based on precious metals. Those problems were aggravated with the inflation of copper currency and the new war scenario in Flanders during the seventeenth century. The Monarchy took decisions against the market in order to avoid those problems. These measures did not solve the problems, but they affected the fineness of the currency, the price of transactions and the relationship between the Council of Finance and its foreign bankers. Theory helps to explain why those problems were intrinsically related to the Castilian monetary system. New historical evidence shows that the outcomes of the Crown's solutions to control the number of small coins and to eliminate any premium on large coins are in line with predictions of new developments in monetary theory.

Debt policy under constraints between Philip II, the Cortes and Genoese bankers

The large public debt was created in 16th century Castile. A new view of its fiscal system is presented. The main part of the debt was in perpetual redeemable annuities and its credibility was enhanced by decentralized funding through taxes administered by cities that represented the Realm in the Cortes. Accumulation of short-term debt would be refinanced by long-term debt. Short-term debt crises occurred when the service of the long-term debt reached the revenues of the taxes that funded the domestic long-term debt. They were resolved after protracted negotiations in the Cortes by tax increases and interest rate reductionsDebt funding, Sovereign loan defaults, Financial crises, Parliaments

The decline of Spain (1500–1850): conjectural estimates

This article attempts to quantify the decline of Spain over the period 1500–1850. In contrast to earlier estimates that focus almost exclusively on Castilian agriculture, we look at trends in urbanisation and construct new measures of agricultural and aggregate output at both regional and national levels. A distinctive long-run behaviour is found across Spanish regions that rejects the identification between Castile and Spain. Per capita income grew in the sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries, while contraction and stagnation occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the long run, output per head did not improve until the early nineteenth century. At the time of its imperial expansion Spain was a relatively affluent nation and, by 1590, was only behind the Low Countries and Italy in terms of per capita income. Spain's decline has its roots in the seventeenth century while its backwardness deepened in the first half of the nineteenth century.Publicad

La moneda de vellón y su influencia en la negociación del crédito de la monarquía durante el siglo XVII

Este trabajo muestra la estrategia de la Corona y de los agentes financieros en la negociación del crédito en un marco de gran incertidumbre sobre el valor real de los medios de pago. Dicha incertidumbre estuvo causada por la existencia de una moneda de cobre continuamente alterada por la Monarquía. A la inestabilidad derivada de la moneda fiduciaria se le unió el empeño de la Monarquía en mantener un precio máximo en el cambio vellón-plata completamente alejado de su precio real de mercado. La moneda de vellón fue utilizada por la Monarquía para incrementar sus recursos en el siglo XVII de cara a la negociación del crédito, pero en cuanto perdió su reputación como instrumento de cambio, se convirtió en un serio obstáculo al negociar con los banqueros. Sin embargo, como a pesar de las grandes incertidumbres que generaba la moneda, ambas partes estaban muy interesadas en mantener una estrecha relación en torno al crédito, tanto la Corona como sus banqueros adoptaron diferentes estrategias que les permitieron continuar sus negociaciones

Las remesas americanas en las finanzas de la Real Hacienda. La cuantificación del dinero de la Corona (1621-1675)

Editada en la Fundación Empresa PúblicaA la hora de estudiar la cuantificación de las remesas americanas se suele distinguir entre caudales públicos y privados, pero de esta ambigua clasificación sólo se obtienen resultados inexactos, especialmente en el siglo XVII. Este trabajo estudia los metales preciosos llegados para la Real Hacienda entre 1621 y 1675, y pretende mostrar que las remesas con que contó la Corona durante ese período fueron más importantes de lo que tradicionalmente se ha considerado. La causa de su infravaloración reside en un equivocado análisis de la fuente de carácter oficial utilizada en los estudios precedentes. La importancia de cuantificar lo más exactamente posible el volumen de metales preciosos con que contó la Real Hacienda sirve para entender mejor las relaciones de la Corona con los banqueros extranjeros.The quantification of the American remittances is tended to distinguish among wealth public and private. Fruit of this are some wrong results, above all in the XVII century. The present article study the precious metals import for the Royal Estate. It is intended to show that the remittances with which counted the Wreath were more important than what traditionally it has been considered. The cause of its infravaloration resides in a wrong analysis of the source of used official character. To know which was the volume of precious metals with which counted the Royal Estate is a resolutive topic to understand the evolution of the credit of the Wreath and the relationships that maintained with the foreign bankers.Publicad

Instituciones y desarrollo económico : la Casa de la Contratación y la Carrera de Indias (1503-1790)

La Casa de la Contratación fue creada por la Monarquía española en 1503 para controlar de forma exclusiva todas las actividades económicas entre España y América. ¿Fue una institución que promovió la actividad económica con los nuevos territorios americanos o, por el contrario, lo impidió desanimando a los inversores privados? Este trabajo pone de manifiesto el doble papel jugado por la Casa a lo largo de su historia. En primer lugar, los oficiales reales de Sevilla contribuyeron a reducir muchos de los costes de transacción e incertidumbres que tenía la Carrera de Indias en su inicio. Gracias a los bienes públicos que proporcionó, los mercaderes privados gozaron de mayor seguridad a la hora de invertir y el comercio con América se desarrolló a lo largo del siglo XVI. La Casa también se comportó como un obstáculo para el desarrollo del mercado americano porque estuvo al servicio de los intereses de la Monarquía española. No se respetó el marco legal establecido inicialmente, generando ineficiencia a través de la concesión de monopolios, incautando las remesas americanas, vendiendo cargos administrativos y cediendo a otros agentes privados parte de sus funciones a cambio de compensaciones económicas directas. Todo ello supuso un importante obstáculo para el crecimiento económico e impidió el desarrollo del comercio entre España y sus territorios americanos especialmente en el siglo XVII y XVIII

Searching for the roots of retardation : Spain in European perspective, 1500-1850

This paper investigates when did retardation begin in Spain and examines the evidence on economic performance over three centuries. In contrast to earlier estimates that focus almost exclusively on Castilian agriculture we look at trends in urbanization as a measure of economic activity outside agriculture and construct new measures of agricultural and total output at regional and national levels. We find distinctive long-run behaviour across Spanish regions that reject the identification between Castile and Spain. We also provide new output estimates for six Western European countries that allow placing Spanish performance in comparative perspective. Two main findings are highlighted. At the time of her imperial expansion Spain appears to have a relatively affluent nation and, by the late sixteenth century, her income per head was only below the Low Countries’ and Italy’s. The roots of Spanish retardation lie in the seventeenth century and deepened during the early nineteenth century.Preindustrial Spain, Europe, Urbanization, Agriculture, Retardation