Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7

Washington case law dealing with searches and seizures has now reached a developmental stage from which it can proceed either haphazardly or along any of several well-defined lines. The purpose of this Article is not to provide a compendium of Washington search-and-seizure cases. Rather, the Article analyzes the more recent (and some of the earlier) cases in which the Washington Supreme Court has interpreted article I, section 7, and suggests several alternative theoretical bases for the further development of Washington constitutional search-and-seizure jurisprudence

Twist and Shout and Truth Will Out: An Argument for the Adoption of a Safety-Valve Exception to the Washington Hearsay Rule

This Article will focus on two decisions of the Washington Supreme Court illustrating the unfortunate expansion of certain hearsay exceptions in order to accommodate truth, show that the expansion could have been avoided had Washington adopted a general exception comparable to that found in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and propose the adoption of an exception shorn of the defects of the rejected federal version

Search, Seizure, and Section 7: Standing from \u3cem\u3eSalvucci\u3c/em\u3e to \u3cem\u3eSimpson\u3c/em\u3e

This article traces the evolution of automatic standing from Jones v. United States to United States v. Salvucci and discusses the approach that has replaced the Jones rule in the Supreme Court. It then discusses the Washington Supreme Court’s continued adherence to the automatic standing rule, despite the Salvucci decision, under the Washington Constitution rather than the fourth amendment. After focusing on the failure of the United States Supreme Court to fashion a standing rule consistent with the Court’s stated purpose for the exclusionary rule, this article urges the Washington court to interpret the state’s constitution in a more consistent, principled fashion. This article concludes that the Washington court should adopt a policy to preserve the underlying privacy values of the Washington constitution for the principled development of its standing rule in the best tradition of American federalism and jurisprudence

Search, Seizure, and Section 7: Standing from \u3cem\u3eSalvucci\u3c/em\u3e to \u3cem\u3eSimpson\u3c/em\u3e

This article traces the evolution of automatic standing from Jones v. United States to United States v. Salvucci and discusses the approach that has replaced the Jones rule in the Supreme Court. It then discusses the Washington Supreme Court’s continued adherence to the automatic standing rule, despite the Salvucci decision, under the Washington Constitution rather than the fourth amendment. After focusing on the failure of the United States Supreme Court to fashion a standing rule consistent with the Court’s stated purpose for the exclusionary rule, this article urges the Washington court to interpret the state’s constitution in a more consistent, principled fashion. This article concludes that the Washington court should adopt a policy to preserve the underlying privacy values of the Washington constitution for the principled development of its standing rule in the best tradition of American federalism and jurisprudence

Equitable Conversion in Washington: The Doctrine That Dares Not Speak Its Name

Since the 1925 decision of Ashford v. Reese, Washington has had the distinction of being the only American jurisdiction totally, albeit implicitly, to reject the doctrine of equitable conversion. Ashford was overruled in 1977, in a remarkable opinion which simultaneously, and explicitly, rejected the doctrine of equitable conversion, thus maintaining Washington\u27s unique status with respect to that doctrine. But the opinion failed to provide a substitute for either the rule of Ashford or the contrary doctrine of equitable conversion, both of which it emphatically abjured. The result is an unbroken line of Washington cases consistent with only one rule of law-the doctrine of equitable conversion. The effect of the opinion is thus de jure rejection and de facto adoption of equitable conversion. This article will analyze the process by which Washington has managed to achieve substantial conformity with the majority of American jurisdictions, while resolutely maintaining a unique stance

Equitable Conversion in Washington: The Doctrine That Dares Not Speak Its Name

Since the 1925 decision of Ashford v. Reese, Washington has had the distinction of being the only American jurisdiction totally, albeit implicitly, to reject the doctrine of equitable conversion. Ashford was overruled in 1977, in a remarkable opinion which simultaneously, and explicitly, rejected the doctrine of equitable conversion, thus maintaining Washington\u27s unique status with respect to that doctrine. But the opinion failed to provide a substitute for either the rule of Ashford or the contrary doctrine of equitable conversion, both of which it emphatically abjured. The result is an unbroken line of Washington cases consistent with only one rule of law-the doctrine of equitable conversion. The effect of the opinion is thus de jure rejection and de facto adoption of equitable conversion. This article will analyze the process by which Washington has managed to achieve substantial conformity with the majority of American jurisdictions, while resolutely maintaining a unique stance