Texts: A case study of joint action

Under embargo until: 2022-04-16Our linguistic communication often takes the form of creating texts. In this paper, we propose that creating texts or ‘texting’ is a form of joint action. We examine the nature and evolution of this joint action. We argue that creating texts ushers in a special type of joint action, which, while lacking some central features of normal, everyday joint actions such as spatio-temporal collocation of agency and embodiment, nonetheless results in an authentic, strong, and unique type of joint action agency. This special type of agency is already present in creating texts in general and is further augmented in creating texts through digital media. We propose that such a unique type of joint action agency has a transformative effect on the experience of our sense of agency and subjectivity. We conclude with the implications of the proposal for social cognition and social agency. The paper combines research in philosophy of mind with the emerging fields of digital humanities and text technology.publishedVersio

The FinderApp WiTTFind for Wittgenstein’s Nachlass

Since 2010, the Wittgenstein Archives at the University Bergen (WAB, Alois Pichler) and the Centre for Information and Language Processing at the Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich (CIS, Max Hadersbeck et al.) cooperate in the research group the “Wittgenstein Advanced Search Tools” (WAST). The WAST research group develops the web-frontend FinderApp WiTTFind together with specialized search tools for scholars in the humanities to investigate WAB’s transcriptions of the Nachlass of Ludwig Wittgenstein with advanced computational search tools. Their FinderApp WiTTFind (http://wittfind.cis.lmu.de) displays facsimile-extracts on the hit-page and allows double-sided paging through the facsimile with its WiTTReader Application. In our paper, we want to present the research work around the FinderApp WiTTFind, the WiTTReader, and our latest developments within WAST, the synonym-lexicon and the similarity search tools

Investigating the Health of a Rice Field Ecosystem Using Thermodynamic Extremal Principles

This study investigates the dynamic behaviour of a rice field ecosystem and aims to define its integral features using the stability concept of an ecological goal function. This function is based on the extremal principles of thermodynamics, which assume that certain energetic processes of ecosystems—such as the rate of exergy destruction—are directed by the self-organizing informatics of the systems towards maxima or minima.  In our study, we exploit the availability of substantially long time-series data relating to a rice field ecosystem to gain an evocative understanding of its growth trajectory in light of the thermodynamic principles. We accomplished this by constructing a model based on the STELLA 9.0 software and calculating the extremal values of growth rates (storage) and those of exergy destruction and entropy creation. The results showed that the values of both maximum dissipation and maximum exergy progressed apace with that of maximum storage till the maturation of rice and became stable thereafter, whereas maximum residence time and maximum specific dissipation values initially decreased before their asymptotic rise. A similar pattern was also observed for the maximum specific exergy. However, the maximum power dissipation curve followed a highly fluctuated course before becoming stable on the maturation of rice

Les théories sensorimotrices de la conscience visuelle

Ce travail traite de la question d'un cadre sous-tendant une théorie satisfaisante de la vision, qui serait fondé sur les théories existantes, tirant sa force de leurs idées bénéfiques respectives et ses leçons de leurs erreurs particulières, et, en cas d'échec, serait suffisamment flexible pour permettre sa révision tout en conservant ses principes acceptés. Le cadre proposé soutient qu'une théorie satisfaisante de la vision doit traiter le phénomène de la vision comme une question d'engagement attentif en temps réel, dans un environnement dynamique, d un agent cognitif incarné motivé. À cette fin, le cadre incorpore trois éléments critiques qui doivent être traités dans une explication de l'expérience de la vision. Il s'agit des notions d'action, cognition et incarnation. La métathéorie avancée dans ce travail traite aussi des quelques questions fondamentales auxquelles est confrontée la proposition d'une étude de la vision dans le contexte de la vraie vie d'un sujet percevant actif.The present work addresses the issue of an underlying framework for a satisfactory theory of vision that is built up on the on the existing theories, deriving its strength from their respective advantageous insights, learning from their particular mistakes, and if it does go wrong somewhere then being flexible enough so as to allow its revision with its accepted principles. The proposed framework maintains that a satisfactory theory of vision needs to address the phenomenon of vision as a matter of real-time attentive engagement of a purposeful cognitive embodied agent with the dynamic environment. To this end, the framework incorporates three critical elements that require to be treated in an account of the experience of seeing. These are the notions of action, cognition, and embodiment. The ll1eta-theory advanced in the present work also addresses some fundamental issues that face the proposaI of studying vision in its real-life context of an active perceiver.PARIS3-BU (751052102) / SudocSudocFranceF

Sensorimotor intentionality : understanding cognition as embodied agent action

This paper addresses the developmental origins of intentionality from an embodied perspective, taking into account the prospective nature of animal motor control. This efficient prospective control, evident in human sensorimotor activity from before birth, reveals an adaptive intentionality of a primary, pre-reflective, and non-conceptual nature that we identify as 'sensorimotor intentionality‘. We propose a structural continuity exists between the emergence of this earliest form of purposive movement and the basic structure of intentional mental states that, as Brentano reminds us, ‗includes something as object within itself‘. We present a hierarchical model of intentionality that structures cognition and develops from its first expression in the simple and discrete movements of the foetus to the more complex motor project of adults. This is a development from an 'intention in action‘ to 'an intention to act‘ and reflects a shift from proximal to distal intentions reflected in a comparable shift from midbrain activity to cortically-mediated activity. We claim continuity from early, simple actions to later, complex projects of actions confirms the existence of an ontogenetically primary form of intentionality in animal sensorimotor control. Its neural basis and implications for understanding cognition will be discussed

Perception, Action, Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Dual Vision

What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? These are issues at the heart of philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences.This book explores the relationship between perception and action from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives, ranging from theoretical discussion of concepts to findings from recent scientific studies. It incorporates contributions from leading philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and an artificial intelligence theorist. The contributions take a range of positions with respect to the view that perception is an achievement by an agent acting in a complex environment in which sensorimotor dynamics constitute an essential ingredient to perceptual experience.A key focus of the book is on the debate about action-oriented theories of visual perception versus the dual-visual systems hypothesis The former champions the role of sensorimotor dynamics in perceptual awareness while the latter favours a functional dichotomy between perception and action. At least on the surface, these two approaches are in conflict. Where one emphasizes the interdependence of action and perception, the other suggests that action and perception are functionally distinct. The dialogue between these two approaches brings out wider theoretical issues underlying the research paradigm of cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind.Exploring one of the major debates in the philosophy and psychology, this book is fascinating reading for all those in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind.https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cop-facbooks/1195/thumbnail.jp