An Alternative Characterization of Efficient Group Strategy-Proof Rules in Linear Production Economies with Convex Preferences

In linear production economies, Maniquet and Sprumont（1999）characterized Pareto-efficient and group strategy-proof rules. This paper shows an alternative characterization of the rules by Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and strong non-bossiness（Ritz, 1983）when the preferences are continuous, strictly monotonic, and convex.departmental bulletin pape

Clinical features of 125 patients with sarcoidosis: Okayama University Hospital review of a recent 10-year period.

Clinical features were studied in 125 patients with sarcoidosis (72 females and 53 males) diagnosed at Okayama University Hospital during a recent 10-year period. The age distribution had two peaks in patients in their 20s and the 50s. Over half of the patients were detected at health screening check and were asymptomatic, while the remaining were symptomatic. Twelve patients were in stage 0, 41 were in stage I, 54 were in stage II, 16 were in stage III, and 2 were in stage IV according to the chest x-ray findings. Serum angiotensin converting enzyme levels and serum lysozyme levels were elevated in 60% and 76% of the patients, respectively. The bronchoalveolar lavage fluid showed lymphocytosis, especially of helper T-cells. The clinical features of sarcoidosis appear to depend on the duration of the disease.</p

An Efficient Securely Implementable Allocation Rule in Linear Production Economies

In linear production economies with classical preferences, Nishizaki (2018b) showed that the combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) is equivalent to secure implementability (Saijo, , and Yamato, 2007) under Pareto-efficient rules. In fact, the equal budget free choice rule (Maniquet and Sprumont, 1999), that is a strategy-proof, non-bossy, and Paretoefficient rule in the environments, is securely implementable, as shown in this paper.departmental bulletin pape

Securely Implementable Social Choice Functions in Divisible and Non-Excludable Public Good Economies with Quasi-Linear Utility Functions

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo,T., T. Sjӧstrӧm, and T. Yamato (2007) 〝Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjӧstrӧm, and Yamato (2007) showed that the Groves mechanisms (Groves, T. (1973) 〝Incentives in Teams," Econometrica 41, pp.617-631) are securely implementable in some of the economies, we have the following negative result: securely implementable social choice functions are dictatorial or constant in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions.平成26年関西大学若手研究者育成経費This paper is a product of research which was finacially supported (in part) by the Kansai University Subsidy for Supporting Young Scholars (2014)“Robustness of Secure Implementation