On path-quasar Ramsey numbers

Let $G_1$ and $G_2$ be two given graphs. The Ramsey number $R(G_1,G_2)$ is the least integer $r$ such that for every graph $G$ on $r$ vertices, either $G$ contains a $G_1$ or $\overline{G}$ contains a $G_2$. Parsons gave a recursive formula to determine the values of $R(P_n,K_{1,m})$, where $P_n$ is a path on $n$ vertices and $K_{1,m}$ is a star on $m+1$ vertices. In this note, we first give an explicit formula for the path-star Ramsey numbers. Secondly, we study the Ramsey numbers $R(P_n,K_1\vee F_m)$, where $F_m$ is a linear forest on $m$ vertices. We determine the exact values of $R(P_n,K_1\vee F_m)$ for the cases $m\leq n$ and $m\geq 2n$, and for the case that $F_m$ has no odd component. Moreover, we give a lower bound and an upper bound for the case $n+1\leq m\leq 2n-1$ and $F_m$ has at least one odd component.Comment: 7 page

Ciencias y profesiones en la actividad física y el deporte

Los centros de formación de los profesionales universitarios en ciencias de la actividad física y el deporte tienen, a mi entender, tres grandes retos planteados. Lo primero es asumir la multidisciplinariedad de los estudios de la actividad física y el deporte y el planteamiento tecnológico de la carrera que se realiza. Lo segundo es reafirmarse en el enfoque profesional en la actividad física y el deporte y contemplar la existencia de la educación para la salud como una nueva dimensión educativa, complementaria pero diferente a la educación física. Lo tercero es ofrecer, desde el núcleo central de la educación física pero coordinadamente con las otras ciencias y tecnologías, unes formaciones básicas que cubran todas las necesidades que se han creado alrededor de la actividad física y el deporte, y complementariamente cursos de especialización partiendo de aquellas formaciones básicas

Strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games

We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in the load balancing games of m (m >= 2) identical servers, in which every job chooses one of the m servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost, given by the workload of the server it chooses. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile that is resilient to unilateral deviations. Finding an NE in such a game is simple. However, an NE assignment is not stable against coordinated deviations of several jobs, while a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) is. We study how well an NE approximates an SNE. Given any job assignment in a load balancing game, the improvement ratio (IR) of a deviation of a job is defined as the ratio between the pre-and post-deviation costs. An NE is said to be a ρ-approximate SNE (ρ >= 1) if there is no coalition of jobs such that each job of the coalition will have an IR more than ρ from coordinated deviations of the coalition. While it is already known that NEs are the same as SNEs in the 2-server load balancing game, we prove that, in the m-server load balancing game for any given m >= 3, any NE is a (5=4)-approximate SNE, which together with the lower bound already established in the literature implies that the approximation bound is tight. This closes the final gap in the literature on the study of approximation of general NEs to SNEs in the load balancing games. To establish our upper bound, we apply with novelty a powerful graph-theoretic tool

Pricing Ad Slots with Consecutive Multi-unit Demand

We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media advertisement market, as well as other related applications. In this market, there are multiple buyers (advertisers), and items (slots) that are arranged in a line such as a banner on a website. Each buyer desires a particular number of {\em consecutive} slots and has a per-unit-quality value $v_i$ (dependent on the ad only) while each slot $j$ has a quality $q_j$ (dependent on the position only such as click-through rate in position auctions). Hence, the valuation of the buyer $i$ for item $j$ is $v_iq_j$. We want to decide the allocations and the prices in order to maximize the total revenue of the market maker. A key difference from the traditional position auction is the advertiser's requirement of a fixed number of consecutive slots. Consecutive slots may be needed for a large size rich media ad. We study three major pricing mechanisms, the Bayesian pricing model, the maximum revenue market equilibrium model and an envy-free solution model. Under the Bayesian model, we design a polynomial time computable truthful mechanism which is optimum in revenue. For the market equilibrium paradigm, we find a polynomial time algorithm to obtain the maximum revenue market equilibrium solution. In envy-free settings, an optimal solution is presented when the buyers have the same demand for the number of consecutive slots. We conduct a simulation that compares the revenues from the above schemes and gives convincing results.Comment: 27page

The 2013 Ming K Jeang award for excellence in Cell & Bioscience

Two research groups led by Yihong Ye of National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases, National Institutes of Health, MD, USA and Dr. Lixin Wei of Medical Sciences Research Center, Renji hospital, School of Medicine, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China, won the 2013 Ming K Jeang Award for Excellence in Cell & Bioscience