lessons learned from monitoring conservation agreements in the Colombian Amazon

Many environmental issues can be attributed to misaligned distribution of the costs of conservation and the benefits of conservation. For instance, biodiversity represents value for the global community, but biodiversity protection imposes various costs on local communities in forested areas of developing countries. Correcting this misalignment requires presenting these local communities with appropriate incentives. Conservation agreements – negotiated transactions in which conservation investors finance direct social benefits in return for conservation actions by communities – are one tool for doing so. The results of this approach depend crucially on effective monitoring of both ecological and socio‐economic impacts to verify that environmental and development objectives are met in a socially equitable, economically efficient, and financially sustainable way. Monitoring also is needed to verify that parties to the agreements are in compliance with their commitments. This paper will present the conservation agreement model and demonstrate the central role of robust monitoring frameworks, using the example of agreements between Conservation International and communities in the Colombian Amazon. These agreements are designed to protect forest areas and two endangered species of fish that are important to local livelihoods and have a high commercial value in neighboring countries. A key feature of this project is that the agreements both depend on and strengthen social and resource governance within the partner communities, thereby promoting self‐determination while enhancing the overall context for socio‐economic development. At the same time, lessons generated by this project inform emerging frameworks for scaling up the approach to advance conservation and development at the national level, requiring integration with national policies. The paper will conclude by identifying the strengths and limitations of the conservation agreement approach, emphasizing that effective monitoring is essential for success and exploring the implications of scaling‐up for design of monitoring frameworks

Gestion durable des forêts et incitations directes à la conservation de la biodiversité

[eng] Eduard NiESTEN, Richard RICE — Sustainable forest management and direct incentives for biodiversity conservation Current strategies for conservation are generally based on indirect incentives through which the habitat protection is an ancillary benefit from another activity. Sustainable forest management is typical of such a strategy. However it is neither financially feasible nor ecologically satisfactory. Only direct incentive strategies based on remunerating conservation efforts can be efficient. Such are the mechanisms of the market for environmental services. Several instruments exist in form of indemnities for environmental servitudes or transferable development rights, although conservation concessions based on the repurchasing of use rights appear to be better adapted to the developing countries.

Direct payments for biodiversity conservation in developing countries: Practical insights for design and implementation

The idea of direct payments for biodiversity conservation in developing countries has generated much debate. Despite substantial experience with related economic instruments in high-income countries such approaches are rare in tropical developing countries, where conservation action is most urgently needed. We explore current experience with the application of direct payments in developing countries through an extensive review and subsequent analysis of the efforts of Conservation International. Our review identifies a broad spectrum of possible direct payment contracts. However, we focus on those involving international conservation interests. Firstly, we develop a framework for the design of direct payment applications, addressing four major aspects: contractual arrangements, definition of conservation services, performance payments, and monitoring and enforcement systems. Secondly, we discuss implementation issues, highlighting the need to consider social factors such as participatory processes, property rights, local institutions and contract legitimacy. Finally, we discuss important considerations for future payment schemes. These include the need for social responsibility, as well as rigorous assessments of effectiveness. We conclude that direct payments show potential as an innovative tool for engaging local communities or resource users in conservation and as a mechanism for channelling global investments in biodiversity conservation services to site-based initiatives

Incentive-based approaches in marine conservation: Applications for sea turtles

Conservation practitioners are increasingly turning to incentive-based approaches to encourage local resource users to change behaviors that impact biodiversity and natural habitat. We assess the design and performance of marine conservation interventions with varying types of incentives through an analysis of case studies from around the world. Here we focus on seven examples that are particularly relevant to designing incentives for sea turtle conservation. Four of the cases are focused on sea turtle conservation, and the others contain elements that may be applied to turtle projects. Many more opportunities exist for interventions that combine the strengths of these approaches, such as performance-based agreements that provide funds for education or alternative livelihood development, and leasing fishing rights to reduce bycatch

Social development and freshwater fisheries conservation: lessons learned from monitoring conservation agreements in the Colombian Amazon

Abstract: Many environmental issues can be attributed to misaligned distribution of the costs of conservation and the benefits of conservation. For instance, biodiversity represents value for the global community, but biodiversity protection imposes various costs on local communities in forested areas of developing countries. Correcting this misalignment requires presenting these local communities with appropriate incentives. Conservation agreements -negotiated transactions in which conservation investors finance direct social benefits in return for conservation actions by communities -are one tool for doing so. The results of this approach depend crucially on effective monitoring of both ecological and socio-economic impacts to verify that environmental and development objectives are met in a socially equitable, economically efficient, and financially sustainable way. Monitoring also is needed to verify that parties to the agreements are in compliance with their commitments. This paper will present the conservation agreement model and demonstrate the central role of robust monitoring frameworks, using the example of agreements between Conservation International and communities in the Colombian Amazon. These agreements are designed to protect forest areas and two endangered species of fish that are important to local livelihoods and have a high commercial value in neighboring countries. A key feature of this project is that the agreements both depend on and strengthen social and resource governance within the partner communities, thereby promoting self-determination while enhancing the overall context for socio-economic development. At the same time, lessons generated by this project inform emerging frameworks for scaling up the approach to advance conservation and development at the national level, requiring integration with national policies. The paper will conclude by identifying the strengths and limitations of the conservation agreement approach, emphasizing that effective monitoring is essential for success and exploring the implications of scaling-up for design of monitoring frameworks

ASSESSING POTENTIAL CARBON REVENUES FROM REDUCED FOREST COVER LOSS IN LIBERIA

We conducted an analysis that explores the merits of a low-carbon development strategy for Liberia. This chapter describes both our cost-benefit analysis initiative and a plausible policy process for Liberia. We proposed a simple approach that models the costs and benefits of land placed under different uses. Policy scenarios then determine the amount of land under each land use and the implications for costs, benefits, and carbon emissions. A “low-carbon development strategy ” for Liberia would include a number of cost beneficial policies, the most obvious being a transition to more efficient agriculture. Other beneficial policies include accelerating the establishment of Protected Areas; ensuring that tree crop plantations are located on degraded land rather than forest areas; and introducing energy-efficient stoves for charcoal and fuel wood

Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring

Abstract This article examines the structure and performance of conservation agreements, which are relational contracts used across the world to protect natural resources. Key elements of these agreements are (1) they are ongoing arrangements between a local community and an outside party, typically a nongovernmental organization (NGO); (2) they feature payments in exchange for conservation services; (3) the prospects for success depend on the NGO engaging in costly monitoring to detect whether the community is foregoing short-term gains to protect the resource; (4) lacking a strong external enforcement system, they rely on self-enforcement; and (5) the parties have the opportunity to renegotiate at any time. A repeated-game model is developed and utilized to organize an evaluation of real conservation agreements, using three case studies as representative examples. (JEL D74, D86, Q20, Q56