Doings and Subject Causation

In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent error to human experience. A theory of ‘subject causation' according to which the active subject continuously and simultaneously causes physical changes is sketched. This account is—according to the phenomenological claim defended—compatible with the content of our daily experiences in doing something and in observing others in their doings and it has a number of further more theoretical advantages: it does not touch the autonomy of neurophysiology and it is compatible with a thesis of supervenience of the mental on the physical. It does however require a weak version of subject-body dualis

Transtemporale Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen

Unser natürliches Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen unterscheidet sich grundlegend von unserem Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität von Dingen, die wir nicht für bewusstseinsfähig halten. Der Unterschied beruht letztlich auf begrifflichen Besonderheiten unseres selbstbezogenen Denkens. Wir haben ein von Kriterien der transtemporalen Identität freies Verständnis der eigenen transtemporalen Identität und diese Kriterienfreiheit überträgt sich auf unsere Gedanken über andere bewusstseinsfähige Wesen. Diese begrifflichen Besonderheiten werden beschrieben und als angemessen verteidigt. Ihre Angemessenheit impliziert allerdings einen Subjekt-Körper-Dualismus nach welchem erlebende Subjekte einer eigenen ontologischen Kategorie zuzurechnen sin

Buchkritik Subjektivität. Wissen von innen

Sebastian Rödl: Self-Consciousness. Harvard University Press, Cambridge/Mass. 2007, 207

A global experiment on motivating social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic

Finding communication strategies that effectively motivate social distancing continues to be a global public health priority during the COVID-19 pandemic. This cross-country, preregistered experiment (n = 25,718 from 89 countries) tested hypotheses concerning generalizable positive and negative outcomes of social distancing messages that promoted personal agency and reflective choices (i.e., an autonomy-supportive message) or were restrictive and shaming (i.e., a controlling message) compared with no message at all. Results partially supported experimental hypotheses in that the controlling message increased controlled motivation (a poorly internalized form of motivation relying on shame, guilt, and fear of social consequences) relative to no message. On the other hand, the autonomy-supportive message lowered feelings of defiance compared with the controlling message, but the controlling message did not differ from receiving no message at all. Unexpectedly, messages did not influence autonomous motivation (a highly internalized form of motivation relying on one’s core values) or behavioral intentions. Results supported hypothesized associations between people’s existing autonomous and controlled motivations and self-reported behavioral intentions to engage in social distancing. Controlled motivation was associated with more defiance and less long-term behavioral intention to engage in social distancing, whereas autonomous motivation was associated with less defiance and more short- and long-term intentions to social distance. Overall, this work highlights the potential harm of using shaming and pressuring language in public health communication, with implications for the current and future global health challenges