Competition with Exclusive Contracts in Vertically Related Markets: An Equilibrium Non-Existence Result

I develop a model in the spirit of Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), in which two upstream firms compete to supply a homogeneous input to two downstream firms, who compete in prices with differentiated products in a downstream market. Upstream firms are allowed to offer exclusive two-part tariff contracts to the downstream firms. I show that, under very general conditions, this game does not have a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. The intuition is that variable parts in such an equilibrium would have to be pairwise-proof. But when variable parts are pairwise-proof, downstream competitive externalities are not internalized, and there exists a profitable deviation. I contrast this non-existence result with earlier papers that found equilibria in similar models

Anticompetitive vertical mergers waves

This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical mergers. We show that competition on an upstream market between integrated firms only is less intense than in the presence of unintegrated upstream firms. Indeed, when an integrated firm supplies the upstream market, it becomes a soft downstream competitor to preserve its upstream profits. This benefits other integrated firms, which may therefore choose not to cut prices on the upstream market. This mechanism generates waves of vertical mergers in which every upstream firm integrates with a downstream firm, and the remaining unintegrated downstream firms obtain the input at a high upstream price. We show that these anticompetitive vertical mergers waves are more likely when downstream competition is fiercer.

Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms

We propose a model of two-tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand result may not obtain, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium, which is detrimental to consumers' surplus and social welfare. We obtain that these partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce. We then use our model to assess the impact of several regulatory tools in the telecommunications industry.Vertical foreclosure, vertically-related markets, telecommunications.

International aspects of merger policy: a survey

This paper surveys the literature on merger policy in open economies. We first adopt a reduced-form approach to derive general insights on the scope for conflict between national antitrust authorities and on the gains from international merger policy coordination. Taking trade costs as given, we use standard oligopoly models to derive conditions on market structure, under which underenforcement or overenforcement of national merger policies can arise. We then study the interactions between merger policy and trade policy, and find that trade liberalization often leads to stricter national merger policies. We conclude by discussing empirical evidence on conflict between antitrust authorities

Anticompetitive vertical mergers waves

This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical mergers. We show that competition on an upstream market between integrated firms only is less intense than in the presence of unintegrated upstream firms. Indeed, when an integrated firm supplies the upstream market, it becomes a soft downstream competitor to preserve its upstream profits. This benefits other integrated firms, which may therefore choose not to cut prices on the upstream market. This mechanism generates waves of vertical mergers in which every upstream firm integrates with a downstream firm, and the remaining unintegrated downstream firms obtain the input at a high upstream price. We show that these anticompetitive vertical mergers waves are more likely when downstream competition is fiercer

Merger policy in a quantitative model of internationaltrade

In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. Calibrating the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada, we show that at present levels of trade costs merger policy is too tough in the vast majority of sectors. We also quantify the resulting externalities and study the impact of different regimes of coordinating merger policies at varying levels of trade costs

Gravity with granularity

We evaluate the consequences of oligopolistic behavior for the estimation of gravity equations for trade flows. With oligopolistic competition, firm-level gravity equations based on a standard CES demand framework need to be augmented by markup terms that are functions of firms' market shares. At the aggregate level, the additional term takes the form of the exporting country's market share in the destination country multiplied by an exporter-destination-specific Herfindahl-Hirschman index. For both cases, we show how to construct appropriate correction terms that can be used to avoid problems of omitted variable bias. We illustrate the quantitative importance of our results for combined French and Chinese firm-level export data as well as for a sample of product-level imports by European countries. Our results show that correcting for oligopoly bias can lead to substantial changes in the coefficients on standard gravity regressors such as distance or the impact of currency unions

Generating and visualizing a soccer knowledge base

This demo abstract describes the SmartWeb Ontology-based Information Extraction System (SOBIE). A key feature of SOBIE is that all information is extracted and stored with respect to the SmartWeb ontology. In this way, other components of the systems, which use the same ontology, can access this information in a straightforward way. We will show how information extracted by SOBIE is visualized within its original context, thus enhancing the browsing experience of the end user