Development Aid in the Presence of Corruption: Differential Games among Donors

In this paper, we complement the work of Kemp and Shimomura (2002) by considering the case of many donors playing a dynamic non-cooperative game of foreign aid. We consider two models. Model 1 deals with the case where donor countries continually feel the warm glow of from the act of giving. Model 2 postulates that donors will stop giving aid when a target level of development is reached. One of the main results of Model 1 is that there are multiple equilibria that can be Pareto ranked. Another interesting result is that an increase in the level of corruption in the recipient country will reduce the aid level of the low aid equilibrium, but increase that of the high aid equilibrium. In Model 2, the equilibrium strategies are non-linear functions of the level of development. The flow of aid falls at a faster and faster rate as the target is approached. An increase in corruption will increase the flow of aid in this model. On présente deux modèles d’aide internationale dans lesquels deux pays avancés s’engagent dans un jeu dynamique. Dans le premier modèle, les aides apportent aux donateurs des gains moraux. On montre qu’une hausse de la corruption du pays sous-développé peut augmenter les aides. Il y a une multiplicité d’équilibres de Nash, qui peuvent être ordonnés sous le critère de Pareto. Dans le deuxième modèle, les pays donateurs cessent de donner aussitôt que le niveau du développement atteint un but fixé. On montre que l’équilibre de ce modèle implique que le flux d’aide devient de plus en plus faible au fur et à mesure que le niveau de développement s’approche du but fixé. Les pays avancés donnent plus si le taux de corruption augmente.development aid, corruption, dynamic games, differential games, aide internationale, corruption, jeux dynamiques, jeux différentiels

Extracting Several Resource Deposits of Unknown Size: Optimal Order

Oil companies often announce revised estimates of their reserves. This indicates that stock uncertainty is a prevalent feature of natural resource industries. In this paper we consider the multi-deposit case where resource extraction produces information about the size of reserves. We show that the optimal order of extracting resource deposits depends both on the informational characteristics of the extraction process and on the extraction costs. Differences in extraction costs, a key consideration highlighted in Solow and Wan (1976), must be balanced against the relative value of information generated by the extraction of various deposits. Our model supplies an explanation of why high cost deposits are sometimes extracted when lower cost deposits have not been exhausted. Les compagnies pétrolières révisent souvent les chiffres de leurs réserves, ce qui indique que l’incertitude concernant les stocks est prévalente. Nous considérons le cas où l’extraction donne des informations sur la taille des réserves. Nous prouvons que l’ordre optimal d’exploitation des stocks dépend des propriétés du processus d’extraction concernant la révélation d’information et des coûts. La différence des coûts, qui est une considération importante dans Solow and Wan (1976), doit être balancée contre la valeur informative des réserves. Notre modèle fournit une explication du fait que les réserves plus coûteuses sont parfois exploitées avant l’épuisement des réserves moins coûteuses.order of extraction, value of information, uncertainty, ordre d’extraction, valeur de l’information, incertitude

Highly nonlinear pulse splitting and recombination in a two-dimensional granular network

The propagation of highly nonlinear signals in a branched two-dimensional granular system was investigated experimentally and numerically for a system composed of chains of spherical beads of different materials. The system studied consists of a double Y-shaped guide in which high- and low-modulus/mass chains of spheres are arranged in various geometries. We observed the transformation of a single or a train of solitary pulses crossing the interface between branches. We report fast splitting of the initial pulse, rapid chaotization of the signal and impulse redirection and bending. Pulse and energy trapping was also observed in the branches. Numerical analysis based on Hertzian interaction between the particles and the side walls of the guide was found in agreement with the experimental data, except for nonsymmetric arrangements of particles excited by a large mass striker

A Differential Game Model of Tariff War

We present a simple two(-country) by two(-good) differental game model of international trade in which the governments of the two countries play a tariff-setting game. We explicitly derive a unilateral optimum tarifff rate and then a Markov-perfect equilibrium pair of tariff strategies (bilateral optimum tariff strategies) and compare the welfare level of each country among autarchic, free-trade, unilateral and bilateral optimum-tariff equilibria.Tariff-setting game, Durbale consumption good, Markov-perfect strategies, The rate of time preference

ATD-2 Integrated Arrival/Departure/Surface (IADS) System Specification - Phase 2

The purpose of this document is to capture the core capabilities developed in ATD-2 Phase 2

Faisceaux pervers, homomorphisme de changement de base et lemme fondamental de Jacquet et Ye

We give a geometric interpretation of the base change homomorphism between the Hecke algebra of GL(n) for an unramified extension of local fields of positive characteristic. For this, we use some results of Ginzburg, Mirkovic and Vilonen related to the geometric Satake isomorphism. We give new proof for these results in the positive characteristic case. By using that geometric interpretation of the base change homomorphism, we prove the fundamental lemma of Jacquet and Ye for arbitrary Hecke function in the the equal characteristic case.Comment: 66 pages, Latex, frenc