Formation of the physical vapor deposited CdS Cu In,Ga Se2 interface in highly efficient thin film solar cells

We report on the buffer absorber interface formation in highly efficient 14.5 , AM1.5 ZnO CdS Cu In,Ga Se2 solar cells with a physical vapor deposited CdS buffer. For Se decapped Cu In,Ga Se2 CIGSe absorbers we observe sulfur passivation of the CIGSe grain boundaries during CdS growth and at the interface a thermally stimulated formation of a region with a higher band gap than that of the absorber bulk, determining the height of the potential barrier at the CdS CIGSe interface. For air exposed CIGSe samples the grain boundary passivation is impeded by a native oxide adsorbate layer at the CIGSe surface determining the thermal stability of the potential barrier heigh

And now for something completely different : inattentional blindness during a Monty Python's Flying Circus sketch

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page (http://www.uk.sagepub.com/aboutus/openaccess.htm)Perceptual science has frequently benefited from studying illusions created outside of academia. Here, we describe a striking, but little-known, example of inattentional blindness from the British comedy series “Monty Python's Flying Circus.” Viewers fail to attend to several highly incongruous characters in the sketch, despite these characters being clearly visible onscreen. The sketch has the potential to be a valuable research and teaching resource, as well as providing a vivid illustration of how people often fail to see something completely differentPeer reviewedFinal Published versio

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A pattern-recognition theory of search in expert problem solving

Understanding how look-ahead search and pattern recognition interact is one of the important research questions in the study of expert problem-solving. This paper examines the implications of the template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a), a recent theory of expert memory, on the theory of problem solving in chess. Templates are "chunks" (Chase & Simon, 1973) that have evolved into more complex data structures and that possess slots allowing values to be encoded rapidly. Templates may facilitate search in three ways: (a) by allowing information to be stored into LTM rapidly; (b) by allowing a search in the template space in addition to a search in the move space; and (c) by compensating loss in the "mind's eye" due to interference and decay. A computer model implementing the main ideas of the theory is presented, and simulations of its search behaviour are discussed. The template theory accounts for the slight skill difference in average depth of search found in chess players, as well as for other empirical data

Playing the flashbulb memory game: A comment on Cubelli and Della Sala

Flashbulb memory (FBM) is a term coined in 1977 by Brown and Kulik referring to vivid, detailed, and long-lasting memories for the reception context of important public events. Across the years, different authors have tried to establish that FBMs either exist or are virtually indistinguishable from ordinary autobiographical memory formations. In the present study we review studies in favour/against the FBM hypothesis focusing on two main issues: First, FBM accuracy appears to be difficult if not impossible to prove; secondly memory distortions and forgetting do not exclude that FBMs are formed and maintained. Personal and social consequentiality are considered to be crucial factors in determining real FBMs, although reconstructive processes also operate on these formations. We finally propose that, striving to play a kind of FBM game, researchers have sometimes failed to focus on real FBMs, misinterpreting the meaning of the camera metaphor and adopting research strategies open to criticisms and invalidation

Perceptual Pluralism

Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perception delivers a multiplicity of representational formats, some proprietary and some shared with cognition. The argument for perceptual pluralism marshals a wide array of empirical evidence in favor of iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations in perception as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) perceptual object representations

Attention mechanisms in the CHREST cognitive architecture

In this paper, we describe the attention mechanisms in CHREST, a computational architecture of human visual expertise. CHREST organises information acquired by direct experience from the world in the form of chunks. These chunks are searched for, and verified, by a unique set of heuristics, comprising the attention mechanism. We explain how the attention mechanism combines bottom-up and top-down heuristics from internal and external sources of information. We describe some experimental evidence demonstrating the correspondence of CHREST’s perceptual mechanisms with those of human subjects. Finally, we discuss how visual attention can play an important role in actions carried out by human experts in domains such as chess

Visual similarity in masking and priming: The critical role of task relevance

Cognitive scientists use rapid image sequences to study both the emergence of conscious perception (visual masking) and the unconscious processes involved in response preparation (masked priming). The present study asked two questions: (1) Does image similarity influence masking and priming in the same way? (2) Are similarity effects in both tasks governed by the extent of feature overlap in the images or only by task-relevant features? Participants in Experiment 1 classified human faces using a single dimension even though the faces varied in three dimensions (emotion, race, sex). Abstract geometric shapes and colors were tested in the same way in Experiment 2. Results showed that similarity reduced the visibility of the target in the masking task and increased response speed in the priming task, pointing to a double-dissociation between the two tasks. Results also showed that only task-relevant (not objective) similarity influenced masking and priming, implying that both tasks are influenced from the beginning by intentions of the participant. These findings are interpreted within the framework of a reentrant theory of visual perception. They imply that intentions can influence object formation prior to the separation of vision for perception and vision for action