Tax constraints, social policy preferences, and support for redistribution

The aim of this paper is to explore whether support for the welfare state is lower if people are made aware of its costs. Using data from a series of survey experiments in the German Internet Panel, we analyse individual spending preferences for different areas of the welfare state and support for redistribution. Tax constraints lead to lower support for unemployment benefits and for redistribution. Tax constraints do not affect support for more spending on pensions, healthcare, and long-term care. We consider whether the effect of tax constraints varies with pre-existing political attitudes or with individual material circumstances. We find little evidence that a political ideology makes respondents more responsive to tax constraints. However, we find some support that low income respondents are less responsive to the tax constraint and maintain their high support despite its costs. Attitudes towards the welfare state are not independent of attitudes towards taxation, and we conclude that our understanding of public attitudes might considerably benefit from combining these different strands of the literature

The framing of risks and the communication of subjective probabilities for victimizations

What does ‘likely' mean, when respondents estimate the risk to become a victim of crime? Victimization risks can either be interpreted as gains ("being spared of offences”) or as losses ("becoming a victim of crime”). Because losses are perceived as more severe, respondents will state lower subjective victimization probabilities in the loss-frame, compared to the gain-frame. We demonstrate such a framing-effect with data from an experimental survey. Furthermore, we show that the meaning of vague quantifiers varies with the frequency and the severity of the event. Respondents assign to the same vague quantifiers (e.g. ‘unlikely') higher likelihoods in terms of percentages for frequent and for less severe events than for infrequent and for severe events. In conclusion, respondents do not use vague quantifiers consistently so that it is problematic to compare subjective risks for different victimization

Welfare state support during the COVID-19 pandemic: Change and continuity in public attitudes towards social policies in Germany

Our analysis asks whether the pandemic situation affects welfare state support in Germany. The pandemic has increased the health and income risks calling for welfare state intervention. While increased needs, more deservingness, and higher state responsibility during such a crisis would suggest augmented support generally and among those at risk, this might be a short‐term effect and cost considerations could reverse this trend. We study public attitudes towards four key social policy areas based on the German Internet Panel (GIP). We use three waves prior and further three waves since the pandemic had been declared in March 2020. The analysis shows both continuity in the popularity of social policies, in particular health and pensions, and some short‐term increase in support for unemployment and family policies. The results after nearly 2 years suggest rather continuation with some thermostatic short‐term boosts in support instead of any long‐lasting change

Aging Societies and Intergenertional Conflict in Europe

Vor dem Hintergrund alternder Gesellschaften in Europa wird zunehmend vor einem Generationenkonflikt gewarnt. Doch haben Alte und Junge tatsächlich unterschiedliche Interessen und damit entgegen gesetzte Politikpräferenzen? Hierauf geben wir eine theoretische und eine empirische Antwort. Wir zeigen spieltheoretisch, dass Alte wie Junge ein Interesse an intergenerationaler Umverteilung haben sollten. Ein Konflikt bezüglich Transferzahlungen zwischen den Generationen ist erst zu erwarten, wenn die Gesellschaft altert. Unsere empirische Auswertung basiert auf Umfragedaten aus 27 EU-Mitgliedsländern im Jahr 2009 und zeigt einen schwachen Konflikt zwischen den Generationen. Die Zustimmung der Alten zu einer altenfreundlichen Ausgabenpolitik mit mehr Renten- und weniger Bildungsausgaben ist etwas stärker als die der Jungen. Allerdings finden wir keine Hinweise, dass der Konflikt zwischen Alten und Jungen mit einer Alterung der Gesellschaft stärker wird.The possibility of upcoming intergenerational conflict in an aging society is a recurrent topic in scholarly and public debate. However, do old and young people really have opposing political preferences? We give a theoretical as well as an empirical answer to this question. Game theoretical modelling leads us to the conclusion that both old andyoung people might be expected to favor intergenerational redistribution, but also that aging within society might heighten the possibility of generational conflict. Empirical analyses based on survey data from twenty-seven EU member states reveal a rather weak conflict status. We find a small intergenerational difference in regard to preferences forgovernmental spending on education and pensions. Old people as compared to young people have a slight preference for a policy favoring old people. We do not find evidence that aging intensifies intergenerational conflict. Our results suggest that intergenerational conflict could be mitigated by adopting an active policy on aging

Wie wahrscheinlich ist 'wahrscheinlich'? Zur subjektiven Einschätzung und Kommunikation von Viktimisierungswahrscheinlichkeiten

'Was bedeutet 'wahrscheinlich' wenn Befragte das Risiko einschätzen, Opfer einer Straftat zu werden? Solche Risiken können einerseits als Gewinne interpretiert und dargestellt werden, indem man hofft, von Straftaten verschont zu bleiben. Andererseits können solche Risiken als Verluste interpretiert werden, indem Respondenten ihre Wahrscheinlichkeit einschätzen, Opfer von Straftaten zu werden. Die Verfasser können anhand eines experimentellen Surveys in Leipzig einen Framing-Effekt zeigen: Da ein Verlust schwerer wiegt, werden im Verlust-Frame niedrigere subjektive Viktimisierungswahrscheinlichkeiten angegeben als im Gewinn-Frame. Weiterhin variiert die Zuordnung von prozentualen Wahrscheinlichkeitsangaben zu verbalen Antwortkategorien mit der Häufigkeit eines Ereignisses: Das häufige Ereignis ist 'von einer Straftat verschont zu bleiben', das seltene Ereignis ist 'einer Straftat zum Opfer fallen'. Die Verfasser können zeigen, dass demselben verbalen Wahrscheinlichkeitslabel (z.B. 'unwahrscheinlich' oder 'sehr wahrscheinlich') beim häufigen Ereignis höhere prozentuale Wahrscheinlichkeiten zugeordnet werden als beim seltenen Ereignis. Schließlich sinken mit zunehmender Schwere einer Straftat die den verbalen Antwortkategorien zugeschriebenen prozentualen Wahrscheinlichkeitswerte. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass verbale Wahrscheinlichkeitslabel ('Vague Quantifiers') nicht wörtlich zu interpretieren sind. Da kategoriale Antwortskalen für verschiedene Viktimisierungen nicht einheitlich verwendet werden, ist ein direkter Vergleich von Anteilswerten über verschiedene Viktimisierungen hinweg als problematisch einzustufen.' (Autorenreferat)'What is the meaning of 'likely', when respondents estimate the risk to become victim of crime? On the one hand, such risks can be presented and interpreted as gains, in terms of being spared of becoming a victim of crime. On the other hand, such risks can be presented and interpreted as losses, in terms of becoming a victim of crime. The authors demonstrate a framing-effect with data from an experimental survey in Leipzig. Because losses are perceived as more severe, respondents state lower subjective victimization probabilities in the loss-frame, compared to the gain-frame. In addition, the meaning of vague quantifiers varies with the frequency of an event: The frequent event is 'being spared of a crime'; the infrequent event is 'becoming a victim of crime'. The authors show that the same verbal likelihood labels (e.g. 'unlikely' or 'very unlikely') are more often chosen (in terms of percentages) for frequent than for infrequent events. Finally, with increasing severity of offences, respondents assign for their likelihood estimate lower percentages to the same verbal label. The author's evidence shows that vague quantifiers cannot be interpreted literally. Because respondents do not use vague quantifiers consistently for different victimizations, it is problematic to compare subjective victimization risks across different victimizations.' (author's abstract)

Anstieg depressiver Symptome bei Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen während des ersten Lockdowns in Deutschland: Ergebnisse des Beziehungs- und Familienpanels pairfam

Hintergrund: Die COVID-19-Pandemie (Corona Virus Disease 2019) hat innerhalb kürzester Zeit das gesellschaftliche Leben grundlegend verändert. Bei politischen Entscheidungen steht oft die Abwägung zwischen der Pandemiebekämpfung und den möglichen negativen wirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen im Vordergrund. Zunehmend finden jedoch auch die psychologischen und sozialen Auswirkungen des Lockdowns Beachtung. Fragestellung: Wie hat sich die psychische Gesundheit von Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen in Deutschland während der ersten Welle der COVID-19-Pandemie und der dadurch bedingten Kontaktbeschränkungen in Deutschland verändert? Material und Methoden: Die Analysen basieren auf Längsschnittdaten von bundesweit per Zufallsverfahren ausgewählten Ankerpersonen des Beziehungs- und Familienpanels pairfam. Die hier betrachtete Altersgruppe der Geburtsjahrgänge 2001-2003 wurde im Jahr 2018/2019 erstmalig im Zuge einer Aufstockungsstichprobe befragt und 854 dieser Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen im Alter von 16-19 Jahren nahmen auch an der COVID-19-Zusatzbefragung von Mai bis Juli 2020 (erster Lockdown) teil. Die Depressivität wird mit der State-Trait Depression Scale erhoben. Ergebnisse: Während des ersten Lockdowns zeigte sich bei den jungen Menschen ein deutlicher Anstieg depressiver Symptome: Vor dem Lockdown hatten 10,4% klinisch relevante depressive Symptome [95%-KI: 8,4; 12,5], im Frühjahr 2020 stieg dieser Anteil auf 25,3% [95%-KI: 22,4; 28,2]. Das Risiko, depressive Symptome zu entwickeln, war bei weiblichen Jugendlichen und jungen Frauen erhöht. Der Migrationshintergrund zeigte sich als ein ähnlich starker Risikofaktor: Die Prävalenz depressiver Symptome stieg bei Migrationshintergrund von 11% auf 33%. Diskussion: Um diese Risikogruppen zu erreichen, sind flächendeckende, zielgruppenspezifische und niedrigschwellige Angebote der Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung nötig.Background. The COVID-19 pandemic has fundamentally changed social life within a very short time. Lockdown policies often consider the tradeoff between containing the spread of the pandemic and negative consequences for the economy. Policymakers should pay more attention to the psychological and social impacts of the lockdown. Research question. How did the mental health of adolescents in Germany change during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown? Materials and methods. Analyses are based on longitudinal data from nationwide randomly selected anchors of the German family panel pairfam. The age group considered here, born between 2001 and 2003, was surveyed for the first time in 2018/2019 in the course of a refreshment sample, and 854 of these adolescents and young adults aged 16-19 also participated in the COVID-19 supplementary survey from May to July 2020 (first lockdown). Depressiveness is assessed with the State-Trait Depression Scale. Results. During the first lockdown, adolescents show a significant increase in depressive symptoms. Prior to the lockdown, 10.4% had clinically relevant depressive symptoms [95% CI: 8.4; 12.5]. In spring 2020, the prevalence increased to 25.3% [95% CI: 22.4; 28.2]. Young women have a significantly higher risk of developing depressive symptoms than men of the same age. Immigrant background is an equally strong risk factor. The prevalence of depressive symptoms among adolescents with an immigrant background increased from 11% to 33%. Discussion. To address this increased mental health risk and the inequalities, policymakers and society should ensure access and availability of target-group-specific and low-threshold prevention and counselling

The Mannheim Corona study: Life in Germany in a state of emergency : Report for March 20 to July 09, 2020

We are all affected by the corona pandemic and the measures taken by the federal government to decelerate the spread of the virus. At the University of Mannheim, we have developed a survey instrument over the past eight years which we can use to quickly examine the social implications of the pandemic in Germany. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the only one in Germany which can assess how the corona crisis is affecting people’s lives in Germany on a daily basis. That is why we consider it as our social duty to contribute to a better understanding of how the corona crisis is affecting the population and to inform the public as well as decision-makers in politics and business about current developments. The Mannheim Corona Study started on Friday, March 20. The study is carried out daily and reports on life in Germany during the corona crisis. We examine social and economic aspects (such as childcare, employment situations, and disposable income), the influence of political measures on social interactions, anxiety as well as public acceptance of the measures taken to contain the pandemic. Between 411 und 643 (on average 489) respondents take part in the study every day

The Mannheim Corona study: life in Germany in a state of emergency : report for March 20 to May 28, 2020, English translation of the original report (in German)

We are all affected by the corona pandemic and the measures taken by the federal government to decelerate the spread of the virus. At the University of Mannheim, we have developed a survey instrument over the past eight years which we can use to quickly examine the social implications of the pandemic in Germany. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the only one in Germany which can assess how the corona crisis is affecting people’s lives in Germany on a daily basis. That is why we consider it as our social duty to contribute to a better understanding of how the corona crisis is affecting the population and to inform the public as well as decision-makers in politics and business about current developments. The Mannheim Corona Study started on Friday, March 20. The study is carried out daily and reports on life in Germany during the corona crisis. We examine social and economic aspects (such as childcare, employment situations, and disposable income), the influence of political measures on social interactions, anxiety as well as public acceptance of the measures taken to contain the pan

The Mannheim Corona Study: Life in Germany in a state of emergency : Report for March 20 to June 30, 2020 ; English translation of the original report (in German)

We are all affected by the corona pandemic and the measures taken by the federal government to decelerate the spread of the virus. At the University of Mannheim, we have developed a survey instrument over the past eight years which we can use to quickly examine the social implications of the pandemic in Germany. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the only one in Germany which can assess how the corona crisis is affecting people’s lives in Germany on a daily basis. That is why we consider it as our social duty to contribute to a better understanding of how the corona crisis is affecting the population and to inform the public as well as decision-makers in politics and business about current developments