Stock Option Compensation and Managerial Turnover

This study examines the association between managerial turnover and equity-based compensation. I investigate whether stock options act to bond executives to their firms and whether retention of managers is a motivation of companies in designing CEO incentive contracts. The results show that stock options do negatively influence the probability of a CEO leaving the company. The monetary cost of losing the value of equity-based compensation package keeps the manager with his company. I also find that in deciding upon a CEO's compensation scheme, firms take into account the probability of a CEO resigning from the company in the next period and award more stock options to reduce the threat of turnover. In general, the results show that stock options have an important role in managers' retention by testing economic explanations for observed behavior.managerial retention; executive compensation; stock options; turnover; ownership.

Bicrossed products with the Taft algebra

Let $G$ be a group which admits a generating set consisting of finite order elements. We prove that any Hopf algebra which factorizes through the Taft algebra and the group Hopf algebra $K[G]$ (equivalently, any bicrossed product between the aforementioned Hopf algebras) is isomorphic to a smash product between the same two Hopf algebras. The classification of these smash products is shown to be strongly linked to the problem of describing the group automorphisms of $G$. As an application, we completely describe by generators and relations and classify all bicrossed products between the Taft algebra and the group Hopf algebra $K[D_{2n}]$, where $D_{2n}$ denotes the dihedral group.Comment: Continues arXiv:1205.6110, arXiv:1205.6564, arXiv:1603.01854, arXiv:1611.05674; restates preliminaries and definitions for sake of clarit