Difficult action decisions reduce the sense of agency: A study using the Eriksen flanker task

The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions and, through them, of events in the outside world. Much research has focused on the importance of retrospectively matching predicted and actual action outcomes for a strong sense of agency. Yet, recent studies have revealed that a metacognitive signal about the fluency of action selection can prospectively inform our sense of agency. Fluent, or easy, action selection leads to a stronger sense of agency over action outcomes than dysfluent, or difficult, selection. Since these studies used subliminal priming to manipulate action selection, it remained unclear whether supraliminal stimuli affecting action selection would have similar effects. We used supraliminal flankers to manipulate action selection in response to a central target. Experiment 1 revealed that conflict in action selection, induced by incongruent flankers and targets, led to reduced agency ratings over an outcome that followed the participant's response, relative to neutral and congruent flanking conditions. Experiment 2 replicated this result, and extended it to free choice between alternative actions. Finally, Experiment 3 varied the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between flankers and target. Action selection performance varied with SOA. Agency ratings were always lower in incongruent than congruent trials, and this effect did not vary across SOAs. Sense of agency is influenced by a signal that tracks conflict in action selection, regardless of the visibility of stimuli inducing conflict, and even when the timing of the stimuli means that the conflict may not affect performance

How action selection influences the sense of agency: An ERP study

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions and, through them, of events in the outside world. One influential view claims that the SoA depends on retrospectively matching the expected and actual outcomes of action. However, recent studies have revealed an additional, prospective component to SoA, driven by action selection processes. We used event-related potentials (ERPs) to clarify the neural mechanisms underlying prospective agency. Subliminal priming was used to manipulate the fluency of selecting a left or right hand action in response to a supraliminal target. These actions were followed by one of several coloured circles, after a variable delay. Participants then rated their degree of control over this visual outcome. Incompatible priming impaired action selection, and reduced sense of agency over action outcomes, relative to compatible priming. More negative ERPs immediately after the action, linked to post-decisional action monitoring, were associated with reduced agency ratings over action outcomes. Additionally, feedback-related negativity evoked by the outcome was also associated with reduced agency ratings. These ERP components may reflect brain processes underlying prospective and retrospective components of sense of agency respectively

Integrating prospective and retrospective cues to the sense of agency: a multi-study investigation

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience of voluntary control over one’s own actions, and, through them, over events in the outside world. Recent accounts suggest that SoA involves an integration of various cues. These include prospective cues, for example, related to the fluency of action selection, and retrospective cues, linked to outcome monitoring. It remains unclear whether these cues may have independent effects on SoA, and, in particular, how their relative contributions may change during instrumental learning. In the present study, we explored these issues by conducting a multi-study analysis of seven published and unpublished studies on the role of prospective cues to the SoA. Our main question was how the effects of selection fluency on SoA might change as information about action–outcome contingencies is gathered. Results show that selection fluency can have a general and consistent influence on the SoA, independent of outcome monitoring. This suggests selection fluency is used as a heuristic cue, to prospectively inform our SoA. In addition, our results show that the influence of selection fluency on SoA may change systematically as action–outcome contingencies are gradually learned. We speculate that dysfluent selection may impair formation of mental associations between action and outcome

Losing control in social situations: How the presence of others affects neural processes related to sense of agency

Social contexts substantially influence individual behavior, but little is known about how they affect cognitive processes related to voluntary action. Previously, it has been shown that social context reduces participants' sense of agency over the outcomes of their actions and outcome monitoring. In this fMRI study on human volunteers, we investigated the neural mechanisms by which social context alters sense of agency. Participants made costly actions to stop inflating a balloon before it burst. On "social" trials, another player could act in their stead, but we analyzed only trials in which the other player remained passive. We hypothesized that mentalizing processes during social trials would affect decision-making fluency and lead to a decreased sense of agency. In line with this hypothesis, we found increased activity in the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), precuneus, and middle frontal gyrus during social trials compared with nonsocial trials. Activity in the precuneus was, in turn, negatively related to sense of agency at a single-trial level. We further found a double dissociation between TPJ and angular gyrus (AG): activity in the left AG was not sensitive to social context but was negatively related to sense of agency. In contrast, activity in the TPJ was modulated by social context but was not sensitive to sense of agency

How social contexts affect cognition: mentalizing interferes with sense of agency during voluntary action

Living in complex social structures, humans have evolved a unique aptitude for mentalizing: trying to understand and predict the behaviour of others. To date, little is known about how mentalizing interacts with other cognitive processes. “Sense of agency” refers to the feeling of control over the outcomes of one's actions, providing a precursor of responsibility. Here, we test a model of how social context influences this key feature of human action, even when action outcomes are not specifically social. We propose that in social contexts, sense of agency is affected by the requirement to mentalize, increasing the complexity of individual decision-making. We test this hypothesis by comparing two situations, in which participants could either consider potential actions of another person (another participant acting to influence the task), or potential failures of a causal mechanism (a mechanical device breaking down and thereby influencing the task). For relatively good outcomes, we find an agency-reducing effect of external influence only in the social condition, suggesting that the presence of another intentional agent has a unique influence on the cognitive processes underlying one's own voluntary action. In a second experiment, we show that the presence of another potential agent reduces sense of agency both in a context of varying financial gains or of losses. This clearly dissociates social modulation of sense of agency from classical self-serving bias. Previous work primarily focused on social facilitation of human cognition. However, when people must incorporate potential actions of others into their decision-making, we show that the resulting socio-cognitive processes reduce the individuals' feelings of control

How social contexts affect cognition: Mentalizing interferes with sense of agency during voluntary action

Living in complex social structures, humans have evolved a unique aptitude for mentalizing: trying to understand and predict the behaviour of others. To date, little is known about how mentalizing interacts with other cognitive processes. “Sense of agency” refers to the feeling of control over the outcomes of one's actions, providing a precursor of responsibility. Here, we test a model of how social context influences this key feature of human action, even when action outcomes are not specifically social. We propose that in social contexts, sense of agency is affected by the requirement to mentalize, increasing the complexity of individual decision-making. We test this hypothesis by comparing two situations, in which participants could either consider potential actions of another person (another participant acting to influence the task), or potential failures of a causal mechanism (a mechanical device breaking down and thereby influencing the task). For relatively good outcomes, we find an agency-reducing effect of external influence only in the social condition, suggesting that the presence of another intentional agent has a unique influence on the cognitive processes underlying one's own voluntary action. In a second experiment, we show that the presence of another potential agent reduces sense of agency both in a context of varying financial gains or of losses. This clearly dissociates social modulation of sense of agency from classical self-serving bias. Previous work primarily focused on social facilitation of human cognition. However, when people must incorporate potential actions of others into their decision-making, we show that the resulting socio-cognitive processes reduce the individuals' feelings of control

Investigating the Prospective Sense of Agency: Effects of Processing Fluency, Stimulus Ambiguity, and Response Conflict

How do we know how much control we have over our environment? The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions, and that, through them, we can control our external environment. Thus, agency clearly involves matching intentions, actions, and outcomes. The present studies investigated the possibility that processes of action selection, i.e., choosing what action to make, contribute to the sense of agency. Since selection of action necessarily precedes execution of action, such effects must be prospective. In contrast, most literature on sense of agency has focussed on the retrospective computation whether an outcome fits the action performed or intended. This hypothesis was tested in an ecologically rich, dynamic task based on a computer game. Across three experiments, we manipulated three different aspects of action selection processing: visual processing fluency, categorization ambiguity, and response conflict. Additionally, we measured the relative contributions of prospective, action selection-based cues, and retrospective, outcome-based cues to the sense of agency. Manipulations of action selection were orthogonally combined with discrepancy of visual feedback of action. Fluency of action selection had a small but reliable effect on the sense of agency. Additionally, as expected, sense of agency was strongly reduced when visual feedback was discrepant with the action performed. The effects of discrepant feedback were larger than the effects of action selection fluency, and sometimes suppressed them. The sense of agency is highly sensitive to disruptions of action-outcome relations. However, when motor control is successful, and action-outcome relations are as predicted, fluency or dysfluency of action selection provides an important prospective cue to the sense of agency

Beyond the Libet clock: modality variants for agency measurements

The Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to our capability to control our own actions and influence the world around us. Recent research in HCI has been exploring SoA to provide users an instinctive sense of “I did that” as opposed to “the system did that”. However, current agency measurements are limited. The Intentional Binding (IB) paradigm provides an implicit measure of the SoA. However, it is constrained by requiring high visual attention to a “Libet clock” onscreen. In this paper, we extend the timing stimulus through auditory and tactile cues. Our results demonstrate that audio timing through voice commands and haptic timing through tactile cues on the hand are alternative techniques to measure the SoA using the IB paradigm. They both address limitations of the traditional method (e.g., lack of engagement and visual demand). We discuss how our results can be applied to measure SoA in tasks involving different interactive scenarios common in HCI

TMS stimulation over the inferior parietal cortex disrupts prospective sense of agency

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling an external event through one's own action. On one influential view, sense of agency is inferred after an action, by "retrospectively" comparing actual effects of actions against their intended effects. However, it has been recently shown that earlier processes, linked to action selection, may also contribute to sense of agency, in advance of the action itself, and independently of action effects. The inferior parietal cortex (IPC) may underpin this "prospective" contribution to agency, by monitoring signals relating to fluency of action selection in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Here, we combined transcranial stimulation (TMS) with subliminal priming of action selection to investigate the causal role of these regions in the prospective coding of agency. In a first experiment, we showed that TMS over left IPC at the time of action selection disrupts perceived control over subsequent effects of action. In a second experiment, we exploited the temporal specificity of single-pulse TMS to pinpoint the exact timing of IPC contribution to sense of agency. We replicated the reduction in perceived control at the point of action selection, while observing no effect of TMS-induced disruption of IPC at the time of action outcomes

Abacateiro (Persea americana Mill.): podridão radicular

Apresenta esporângio isolado de solo através de isca (círculo de folha de abacateiro) após cinco dias de incubaçãoComponente Curricular::Educação Superior::Ciências Agrárias::Agronomi