Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design

In the classical experimental design setting, an experimenter E has access to a population of $n$ potential experiment subjects $i\in \{1,...,n\}$, each associated with a vector of features $x_i\in R^d$. Conducting an experiment with subject $i$ reveals an unknown value $y_i\in R$ to E. E typically assumes some hypothetical relationship between $x_i$'s and $y_i$'s, e.g., $y_i \approx \beta x_i$, and estimates $\beta$ from experiments, e.g., through linear regression. As a proxy for various practical constraints, E may select only a subset of subjects on which to conduct the experiment. We initiate the study of budgeted mechanisms for experimental design. In this setting, E has a budget $B$. Each subject $i$ declares an associated cost $c_i >0$ to be part of the experiment, and must be paid at least her cost. In particular, the Experimental Design Problem (EDP) is to find a set $S$ of subjects for the experiment that maximizes V(S) = \log\det(I_d+\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i}) under the constraint $\sum_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$; our objective function corresponds to the information gain in parameter $\beta$ that is learned through linear regression methods, and is related to the so-called $D$-optimality criterion. Further, the subjects are strategic and may lie about their costs. We present a deterministic, polynomial time, budget feasible mechanism scheme, that is approximately truthful and yields a constant factor approximation to EDP. In particular, for any small $\delta > 0$ and $\epsilon > 0$, we can construct a (12.98, $\epsilon$)-approximate mechanism that is $\delta$-truthful and runs in polynomial time in both $n$ and $\log\log\frac{B}{\epsilon\delta}$. We also establish that no truthful, budget-feasible algorithms is possible within a factor 2 approximation, and show how to generalize our approach to a wide class of learning problems, beyond linear regression

High-fidelity readout of trapped-ion qubits

We demonstrate single-shot qubit readout with fidelity sufficient for fault-tolerant quantum computation, for two types of qubit stored in single trapped calcium ions. For an optical qubit stored in the (4S_1/2, 3D_5/2) levels of 40Ca+ we achieve 99.991(1)% average readout fidelity in one million trials, using time-resolved photon counting. An adaptive measurement technique allows 99.99% fidelity to be reached in 145us average detection time. For a hyperfine qubit stored in the long-lived 4S_1/2 (F=3, F=4) sub-levels of 43Ca+ we propose and implement a simple and robust optical pumping scheme to transfer the hyperfine qubit to the optical qubit, capable of a theoretical fidelity 99.95% in 10us. Experimentally we achieve 99.77(3)% net readout fidelity, inferring at least 99.87(4)% fidelity for the transfer operation.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures; improved readout fidelity (numerical results changed

Methods for estimating supersaturation in antisolvent crystallization systems

The mole fraction and activity coefficient-dependent (MFAD) supersaturation expression is the least-assumptive, practical choice for calculating supersaturation in solvent mixtures. This paper reviews the basic thermodynamic derivation of the supersaturation expression, revisits common simplifying assumptions, and discusses the shortcomings of those assumptions for the design of industrial crystallization processes. A step-by-step methodology for estimating the activity-dependent supersaturation is provided with focus on ternary systems. This method requires only solubility data and thermal property data from a single differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) experiment. Two case studies are presented, where common simplifications to the MFAD supersaturation expression are evaluated: (1) for various levels of supersaturation of L-asparagine monohydrate in water–isopropanol mixtures and (2) for the dynamic and steady-state mixed-suspension, mixed-product removal (MSMPR) crystallization of a proprietary API in water–ethanol–tetrahydrofuran solvent mixtures. When compared to the MFAD supersaturation estimation, it becomes clear that errors in excess of 190% may be introduced in the estimation of the crystallization driving force by making unnecessary simplifications to the supersaturation expression. These errors can result in additional parameter regression errors – sometimes by nearly an order of magnitude – for nucleation and growth kinetic parameters, limiting the accurate simulation of dynamic and steady-state crystallization systems

Experimental realization of a quantum game on a one-way quantum computer

We report the first demonstration of a quantum game on an all-optical one-way quantum computer. Following a recent theoretical proposal we implement a quantum version of Prisoner's Dilemma, where the quantum circuit is realized by a 4-qubit box-cluster configuration and the player's local strategies by measurements performed on the physical qubits of the cluster. This demonstration underlines the strength and versatility of the one-way model and we expect that this will trigger further interest in designing quantum protocols and algorithms to be tested in state-of-the-art cluster resources.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figure

Quantum Games

In these lecture notes we investigate the implications of the identification of strategies with quantum operations in game theory beyond the results presented in [J. Eisert, M. Wilkens, and M. Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. After introducing a general framework, we study quantum games with a classical analogue in order to flesh out the peculiarities of game theoretical settings in the quantum domain. Special emphasis is given to a detailed investigation of different sets of quantum strategies.Comment: 13 pages (LaTeX), 3 figure

Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems

It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments') that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We show that such strategies exist for the sequential pivotal mechanism of the well-known public project problem. We also exhibit an optimal strategy with the property that a maximal social welfare is generated when each player follows it. Finally, we show that these strategies can be achieved by an implementation in Nash equilibrium.Comment: 19 pages. The version without the appendix will appear in the Proc. 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 200

Global and regional left ventricular myocardial deformation measures by magnetic resonance feature tracking in healthy volunteers: comparison with tagging and relevance of gender

This work was funded by a grant from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EP/G030693/1) and supported by the Oxford British Heart Foundation Centre of Research Excellence and the National Institute for Health Research Oxford Biomedical Research Centr

Fixed Price Approximability of the Optimal Gain From Trade

Bilateral trade is a fundamental economic scenario comprising a strategically acting buyer and seller, each holding valuations for the item, drawn from publicly known distributions. A mechanism is supposed to facilitate trade between these agents, if such trade is beneficial. It was recently shown that the only mechanisms that are simultaneously DSIC, SBB, and ex-post IR, are fixed price mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are parametrised by a price p, and trade occurs if and only if the valuation of the buyer is at least p and the valuation of the seller is at most p. The gain from trade is the increase in welfare that results from applying a mechanism; here we study the gain from trade achievable by fixed price mechanisms. We explore this question for both the bilateral trade setting, and a double auction setting where there are multiple buyers and sellers. We first identify a fixed price mechanism that achieves a gain from trade of at least 2/r times the optimum, where r is the probability that the seller's valuation does not exceed the buyer's valuation. This extends a previous result by McAfee. Subsequently, we improve this approximation factor in an asymptotic sense, by showing that a more sophisticated rule for setting the fixed price results in an expected gain from trade within a factor O(log(1/r)) of the optimal gain from trade. This is asymptotically the best approximation factor possible. Lastly, we extend our study of fixed price mechanisms to the double auction setting defined by a set of multiple i.i.d. unit demand buyers, and i.i.d. unit supply sellers. We present a fixed price mechanism that achieves a gain from trade that achieves for all epsilon > 0 a gain from trade of at least (1-epsilon) times the expected optimal gain from trade with probability 1 - 2/e^{#T epsilon^2 /2}, where #T is the expected number of trades resulting from the double auction

Biology helps you to win a game

We present a game of interacting agents which mimics the complex dynamics found in many natural and social systems. These agents modify their strategies periodically, depending on their performances using genetic crossover mechanisms, inspired by biology. We study the performances of the agents under different conditions, and how they adapt themselves. In addition the dynamics of the game is investigated.Comment: 4 pages including 6 figures. Uses REVTeX4. Submitted for Conference Proceedings of the "Unconventional Applications of Statistical Physics", Kolkat