Filling position incentives in matching markets

One of the main problems in the hospital-doctor matching is the maldistribution of doctor assignments across hospitals. Namely, many hospitals in rural areas are matched with far fewer doctors than what they need. The so called "Rural Hospital Theorem" (Roth (1984)) reveals that it is unavoidable under stable assignments. On the other hand, the counterpart of the problem in the school choice context|low enrollments at schools| has important consequences for schools as well. In the current study, we approach the problem from a different point of view and investigate whether hospitals can increase their filled positions by misreporting their preferences under well-known Boston, Top Trading Cycles, and stable rules. It turns out that while it is impossible under Boston and stable mechanisms, Top Trading Cycles rule is manipulable in that sense

On the "group non-bossiness" property

We extend the concept of non-bossiness to groups of agents and say that a mechanism is group non-bossy if no group of agents can change the assignment of someone else while theirs being unaffected by misreporting their preferences. First, we show that they are not equivalent properties. We, then, prove that group strategy-proofness is sufficient for group non-bossiness. While this result implies that the top trading cycles mechanism is group non-bossy, it also provides a characterization of the market structures in which the deferred acceptance algorithm is group non-bossy

Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism

Kojima and Ünver (2011) are the first to characterize the class of mechanisms coinciding with the Boston mechanism for some priority order. By mildly strengthening their central axiom, we are able to pin down the Boston mechanism outcome for every priority order. Our main result shows that a mechanism is outcome equivalent to the Boston mechanism at every priority if and only if it respects both preference rankings and priorities and satisfies individual rationality for schools. In environments where each student is acceptable to every school, respecting both preference rankings and priorities is enough to characterize the Boston mechanism

Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems

We address the question of whether schools can manipulate the student-optimal stable mechanism by creating fictitious students in school choice problems. To this end, we introduce two different manipulation concepts, where one of them is stronger. We first demonstrate that the student-optimal stable mechanism is not even weakly fictitious student-proof under general priority structures. Then, we investigate the same question under acyclic priority structures. We prove that, while the student-optimal stable mechanism is not strongly fictitious student-proof even under the acyclicity condition, weak fictitious student-proofness is achieved under acyclicity. This paper, hence, shows a way to avoid the welfare detrimental fictitious students creation (in the weak sense) in terms of priority structures

Urban Competition in a regional development Project with a sustainable perspective

During the development mentality Regional Development has been a vital subject in planing. Besides Regional Disparities have been and raiseing on together with the Regional development programs and projects. in this study, It will be compared three cities whose populations is among 500 000 and 1 Milion inhabitants with their population movements, economic development, Structural urban changes and social facilities in a sustainable perspective. Southeastern Anatolia Project in which the cities are located is the biggest regional development project ever carried out in Turkey, And Gaziantep by far the biggest city in the project has a leading role not only in industry but also in commercial facilities. Besides all the cities are taking migrations and so the problems like infrastructure and lack of housing etc. After analyzing the projects development and cities evolutions it will be compared cities capabilities and its effects not only to each other but also to their hinterland. Conclusion will focus on the effects of regional Developments and its Comprehensiveness.

Cooperation cannot be sustained in a discounted repeated prisoners' dilemma with patient short and long run players

This study presents a modified version of the repeated discounted prisoners' dilemma with long and short-run players. In our setting a short-run player does not observe the history that has occurred before he was born, and survives into next phases of the game with a probability given by the current action profile in the stage game. Thus, even though it is improbable, a short-run player may live and interact with the long-run player for infinitely long amounts of time. In this model we prove that under a mild incentive condition on the stage game payoffs, the cooperative outcome path is not subgame perfect no matter how patient the players are. Moreover with an additional technical assumption aimed to provide a tractable analysis, we also show that payoffs arbitrarily close to that of the cooperative outcome path, cannot be obtained in equilibrium even with patient players

The effects of using chicken grill oil instead of the sunflower oil on performance, blood parameters, cholestrerol, and fatty acid composition of egg volk in laying Japanese Qual (Coturnix coturnix japonica)

This study was carried out to determine the effect of using chicken grill oil instead of the sunflower oil in laying Japanese quail diets on egg production, feed intake, feed conversion ratio, egg quality, blood parameters, cholesterol and fatty acid composition of egg yolk. A total of 192, thirteen week old Japanese quail were allocated to four groups with six replicates containing eight quail each. The diets were isonitrogenous and isocaloric and included 20 % crude protein and 2900 kcal/kg ME. The diets contained 5% sunflower oil (SO1), 5% chicken grill oil (CO1), 7.5% sunflower oil (SO2), 7.5% chicken grill oil (CO2). Experimental diets and water were provided ad libitum throughout the 9 weeks. There were no significant differences in initial body weight among groups, but there were highly significant (p<0.001) differences in final body weight among groups: 296.62, 286.62, 308.24, 276.35 g for SO1, CO1, SO2 and CO2 respectively. Higher egg production (p<0.001) was obtained for quail fed the CO1 and the CO2 diet (5% and 7.5% chicken grill oil respectively) than for quail fed the SO1 or the SO2 (5% and 7.5% sunflower oil). The cholesterol content in blood serum (195.61, 197.12, 157.37 and 176.49 mg/dl respectively) was not statistically significant. At the end of the study cholesterol content of the egg yolk (49.70, 49.54, 45.55 and 44.06 mg/g egg yolk respectively) was lowest in (p<0.05) the laying quail fed the CO2 diet. All blood parameters including haemoglobin, heamotocrit, serum cholesterol and serum glucose were not affected by diets except serum triglyceride and serum protein p<0.01). Dietary chicken grill oil had no adverse effect on egg weight, cholesterol and fatty acid composition of the egg yolk and feed conversion ratio. Therefore, chicken grill oil can be use up to 7.5% of the laying quail diets

When manipulations are harm[less]ful?

We say that a mechanism is harmless if no student can ever misreport his preferences so that he does not hurt but someone else. We consider a large class of rules which includes the Boston, the agent-proposing deferred acceptance, and the school-proposing deferred acceptance mechanisms (sDA). In this large class, the sDA happens to the unique harmless mechanism. We next provide two axiomatic characterizations of the sDA. First, the sDA is the unique stable, non-bossy, and independent of irrelevant student mechanism. The last axiom is a weak variant of consistency. As harmlessness implies non bossiness, the sDA is also the unique stable, harmless, and independent of irrelevant student mechanism

Conflict within the Turkish foreign policy decision making mechanism:

This thesis presents an analysis of Turkish foreign policy decision making in a theoretical model and argues that Turkish foreign policy is a product of negotiation and compromises among various foreign policy making actors. Theoretical foundation is built on decision units framework advanced by Margaret G. Herman. It applies this framework to two cases and four decision occasions to investigate who made foreign policy decisions and how this influenced foreign policy of Turkey. The first case is foreign policy making of Turkey during the Gulf War (1991). In this case two decision occasions; closure of the oil pipelines and the US military deployment in Turkey are analyzed. The second case is Turkish foreign policy making during the US military intervention in Iraq (2003). For this case, the decision occasions of the US military deployment in Turkey and opening of the Turkish air space to the US are analyzed. After the analysis of four decision occasions, this thesis concludes that the type of decision require different foreign policy making processes and lead to different policy outcomes. The analysis showed that the foreign policy of Turkey is a product of the conflicting views and interests of the various decision making actors. The leadership plays an important role in the decision making. The actors find different ways to manage their differences in order to reach a final decision. This thesis presents an analysis of Turkish foreign policy decision making in a theoretical model and argues that Turkish foreign policy is a product of negotiation and compromises among various foreign policy making actors Theoretical foundation is built on "decision units'" framework advanced by Margaret G. who made foreign policy decisions and how this influenced foreign policy of Turkey. The fust case is foreign policy making of Turkey during the Gulf War (1991). In this case two decision occasions; closure of the oil pipelines and the US military deployment in Turkey are analyzed. The second case is Turkish foreign policy making during the US military intervention in Iraq (2003). For this case, the decision occasions of the US military. After the analysis of four decision occasions, this thesis concludes that the type of decision units has impact on the decision outcomes m four decision occasions. Different decision units require different foreign policy making processes and lead to different policy outcomes. The analysis showed that the foreign policy of Turkey is a product of the conflicting views and interests of the various decision making actors. The leadership plays an important role in the decision making. The actors find different ways to manage their differences in order to reach a final decision

A non-cooperation result in a repeated discounted prisoners' dilemma with long and short run players

This study presents a modified version of the repeated discounted prisoners' dilemma with long and short-run players. In our setting a short-run player does not observe the history that has occurred before he was born, and survives into next phases of the game with a probability given by the current action profile in the stage game. Thus, even though it is improbable, a short-run player may live and interact with the long-run player for infinitely long amounts of time. In this model we prove that under a mild incentive condition on the stage game payoffs, the cooperative outcome path is not subgame perfect no matter how patient the players are. Moreover with an additional technical assumption aimed to provide a tractable analysis, we also show that payoffs arbitrarily close to that of the cooperative outcome path, cannot be obtained in equilibrium even with patient players