Northern Ireland and the EU Referendum: the outcome, options and opportunities

The result of the UK EU referendum in June 2016 produced a surprising result. Contrary to expectations, the Leave side won, although the margin of the victory was small. Fifty-two per cent of the UK electorate chose to leave with 48% opting to remain. The outcome of the referendum has revealed the existence of marked political, ideological, socio-economic, demographic and geographic divisions across the UK. The latter division may be the most significant. In contrast to other parts of the UK, Scotland, Northern Ireland and London voted to Remain. At 56%, the margin of the Remain victory is a few percentage points lower in Northern Ireland than in these other regions. Arguably however, the implications of the overall Leave vote are more profound for Northern Ireland than for any other part of the UK, and by extension the result is similarly problematic for the Republic of Ireland. The Northern Ireland electorate expressed a majority vote to Remain which is at odds with the overall UK vote. The breakdown of the Northern Ireland vote suggests some overlap between unionist and nationalist voters in terms of a preference for the UK to stay in the EU. Critically however, the two parties to the Northern Ireland Executive, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin, do not share the same view on the Brexit issue. In this context, the capacity of the Northern Ireland administration to contribute to UK exit negotiations and to agitate effectively for Northern Ireland’s best interests remain under-developed. In the aftermath of the referendum, Northern Ireland is potentially vulnerable, both economically and politically, to an exit process which may not take account of the intricacies and sensitivities of the Northern Ireland situation. This article examines the EU referendum campaign and result in Northern Ireland. It documents the reaction and response in the aftermath of the vote, and analyses the immediate priorities for Northern Ireland in defending and promoting the best interests of the region without destabilising a delicate political and economic situation

The EU referendum in Northern Ireland: closing borders, re-opening border debates

The UK decision to leave the European Union (EU) following a referendum in June 2016 fundamentally alters the country's relationship with the EU, with its European neighbours, with the rest of the world and potentially with its own constituent units. It is clear that different parts of the UK will be impacted differently by this decision and by the unfolding exit terms and process. In this context, Northern Ireland is considered to be particularly vulnerable. This article examines the referendum campaign in Northern Ireland by detailing input from the Northern Ireland administration, political parties, civil society and external figures. The article suggests that the overall referendum campaign in Northern Ireland was hamstrung by the opposing positions taken by key political protagonists, particularly Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). This produced a challenging context for the referendum debate in Northern Ireland. The post-referendum period has also been marked by persistent differences in relation to how best to approach specific Northern Ireland issues and challenges. A continued absence of clear positions and a lack of contingency planning underline a poor level of preparedness for future political developments

Alien Registration- Murphy, Mary C. (Portland, Cumberland County)

https://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/21954/thumbnail.jp

Far from having viewed Brexit as an opportunity for constitutional transformation, Sinn Féin has instead viewed it as a threat to be managed

Jonathan Evershed and Mary C. Murphy examine how Sinn Féin responded to Brexit. They argue that its pursuit of ‘Special Status’ for Northern Ireland represented an attempt to mitigate Brexit’s risks, rather than to leverage its opportunities. This approach came with political costs for the party, whose recent electoral surge has arguably been in spite of rather than because of it

The internal market bill may further erode trust and security in Ireland/Northern Ireland

The most dangerous impact of the Brexit process and of the Internal Market Bill on the Good Friday Agreement is that it may erode trust and security in Ireland/Northern Ireland and between both governments, write Etain Tannam and Mary C. Murphy. Responses to the Bill highlight that British and Irish governments, as well as unionists and nationalists, seem to have markedly different perceptions of what’s needed to sustain peace

The backstop is dividing Northern Ireland. We urgently need new talks

Brexit has become highly politicised in Northern Ireland. A damaging chasm is opening up between the two political blocs, and between the British and Irish governments, on the EU backstop. Mary C Murphy (University College Cork) argues that a compromise formula is possible, but the lack of devolved government means new efforts - and new forums - will be needed to break the stalemate

Social identity and academic belonging: creating environments to minimize the achievement gap among African American and Latino students

Stereotype threat is a highly evident phenomenon that has been used to explain why minority groups underperform in academics compared to Caucasians (Steele, 1997; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). This study examined whether an induced feeling of belonging (via information about potential), either in the academic or social domain, can attenuate the effects of stereotype threat on the academic performance of African Americans and Latinos. Results suggest that minority students who are told they have either academic potential or are not told any information about potential (i.e., control condition) perform similarly on an IQ test. However, when minority students are told they have social potential, a marginally significant decrease in performance is evident when compared to the academic potential and control conditions. At the same time, the performance of Caucasian students is not affected by information about potential

Reactive oxygen species induce virus-independent MAVS-oligomerization in systemic lupus erythematosus

The increased expression of genes induced by type I interferon (IFN) is characteristic of viral infections and systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE). We showed that mitochondrial antiviral signaling (MAVS) protein, which normally forms a complex with retinoic acid gene I (RIG-I)–like helicases during viral infection, was activated by oxidative stress independently of RIG-I helicases. We found that chemically generated oxidative stress stimulated the formation of MAVS oligomers, which led to mitochondrial hyperpolarization and decreased adenosine triphosphate production and spare respiratory capacity, responses that were not observed in similarly treated cells lacking MAVS. Peripheral blood lymphocytes of SLE patients also showed spontaneous MAVS oligomerization that correlated with the increased secretion of type I IFN and mitochondrial oxidative stress. Furthermore, inhibition of mitochondrial reactive oxygen species (ROS) by the mitochondria-targeted antioxidant MitoQ prevented MAVS oligomerization and type I IFN production. ROS-dependent MAVS oligomerization and type I IFN production were reduced in cells expressing the MAVS-C79F variant, which occurs in 30% of sub-Saharan Africans and is linked with reduced type I IFN secretion and milder disease in SLE patients. Patients expressing the MAVS-C79F variant also had reduced amounts of oligomerized MAVS in their plasma compared to healthy controls. Together, our findings suggest that oxidative stress–induced MAVS oligomerization in SLE patients may contribute to the type I IFN signature that is characteristic of this syndrome