The most dangerous impact of the Brexit process and of the Internal Market Bill on the Good Friday Agreement is that it may erode trust and security in Ireland/Northern Ireland and between both governments, write Etain Tannam and Mary C. Murphy. Responses to the Bill highlight that British and Irish governments, as well as unionists and nationalists, seem to have markedly different perceptions of what’s needed to sustain peace

Murphy, Mary C.

Tannam, Etain

English

LSE Research Online

The	Internal	Market	Bill	may	further	erode	trust	andsecurity	in	Ireland/Northern	IrelandThe	most	dangerous	impact	of	the	Brexit	process	and	of	the	Internal	Market	Bill	on	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	isthat	it	may	erode	trust	and	security	in	Ireland/Northern	Ireland	and	between	both	governments,	write	EtainTannam	and	Mary	C.	Murphy.	Responses	to	the	Bill	highlight	that	British	and	Irish	governments,	as	well	asunionists	and	nationalists,	seem	to	have	markedly	different	perceptions	of	what’s	needed	to	sustain	peace.The	Internal	Market	Bill	and	statement	by	the	Northern	Ireland	Secretary	of	State	that	the	UK	was	willing	to	breakinternational	law	was met with shock across Europe. No EU state is more affected by the terms of this proposedlegislation than Ireland and no region of the UK more than Northern Ireland. Contrary to the terms of the Protocol,the Internal Market Bill challenges the legal force of agreed rules on state aid and Northern Ireland customsarrangements. The government justifies this violation of international law by claiming that the measures protect theGood Friday Agreement by protecting Strand Three East-West cooperation.Responses	to	the	BillLSE Brexit: The Internal Market Bill may further erode trust and security in Ireland/Northern Ireland Page 1 of 4		Date originally posted: 2020-09-24Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/09/24/the-internal-market-bill-may-further-erode-trust-and-security-in-ireland-northern-ireland/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/The	SDLP,	Sinn	Féin	and	the	Alliance	Party	parties	argued	that	if	the	Withdrawal	Agreement	is	not	implementedthe	Good	Friday	Agreement	and	stability	are	seriously	undermined	and	that	trust	and	confidence	are	undermined	ifthe	UK	government	breaks	international	law.	Like	the	Irish	government,	their	view	is	that	if	the	agreement	is	notreached	and	there	are	no	‘sea	border’	customs	checks,	customs	posts	will	be	necessary	on	the	Irish	border	toprotect	the	EU’s	Single	Market.	The	argument,	supported	by	the	then	head	of	the	PSNI	in	2018,	is	that	customsposts	would	be	a	target	for	dissident	republicans	leading	eventually	to	the	securitisation	of	the	border	and	increasedviolence.	The	underlying	argument	is	that	the	border	represents	the	core	of	the	identity	conflict.	Its	securitisation	inthe	past	was	repeatedly	targeted	and	cultural	and	economic	connections	between	both	parts	of	the	island	wereweak.	The	unionist	and	UK	government’s	response	is	that	their	preference	against	a	sea	border	relates	to	StrandThree	of	the	Agreement	and	should	not	be	taken	more	lightly	than	nationalists’	preference	for	a	soft	Irish	border(Strand	Two).	They	argue	that	a	sea	border	undermines	Northern	Ireland’s	status	in	the	UK	and	its	significance	isequal	to,	if	not	greater	than	the	significance	of	the	Irish	border	for	nationalists.The	UK	government	and	unionists	perceive	the	Irish	assessment	to	be	an	over-reaction.	The	DUP,	harking	back	toearlier	unionist	rhetoric	during	the	conflict,	refers	to	Ireland	as	a	‘predatory	neighbour’		that	is	using	the	border	issueas	a	ploy	to	achieve	a	united	Ireland,	despite	the	fact	that	unification	has	never	been	an	election	issue	in	Ireland,even	in	the	last	election	in	February	2020	and	the	majority	are	delighted	by	the	status	quo-		the	soft	border	andpeace.		Fundamentally	there	is	a	perception	that	either	customs	posts	should	be	erected	at	the	Irish	border	and	willnot	be	destabilising,	or	that	the	EU	should	create	a	bespoke	arrangement,	relaxing	its	Single	Market	rules,	so	thatcustoms	posts	will	not	be	necessary.	For	Irish	observers	and	the	EU,	the	UK	is	either	playing	brinkmanship,	usingNorthern	Ireland	as	a	pawn	to	achieve	a	better	trade	deal,		or	alternatively	it	is	an	excuse	to	renege	on	theWithdrawal	Agreement.Although	unfettered	trade	and	a	soft	border	were	the	preferable	outcomes	for	the	Irish	government	in	protecting	theAgreement	and	the	Irish	economy,	the	DUP	and	the	UK	parliament’s	opposition	to	the	backstop	and	the	EU’semphasis	on	the	sanctity	of	the	Single	Market	ruled	out	that	outcome.	The	Irish	government	had	no	option	but	toprioritise	one	over	the	other.	Given	the	history	of	the	conflict	and	the	perceived	threat	of	a	recurrence	of	violenceand	given	that	the	Irish	border	is	on	its	territory,	it	is	not	surprising	that	it	prioritised	an	open	Irish	border,	calculatingthat	it	was	essential	in	protecting	the	Agreement.	For	the	Irish	government,	Brexit	and	its	management	by	the	UKgovernment	has	created	this	problem.	Aside	from	contrasting	assessments	of	the	risks	caused	by	a	hard	border	theannouncement	of	the	Internal	Market	Bill	has	a	negative	impact	on	all	three	strands	of	the	Agreement,	whatever	thedamage	limitation	exercise.As	regards	Strand	One,	although	the	Executive	collapsed	many	times	since	2001,	Brexit	aggravated	tensions,heightened	by	the	Internal	Market	Bill.	The	2019	UK	election	saw	an	increase	in	support	for	the	SDLP	and	Allianceparties	that	can	help	mediate	tensions	between	the	DUP	and	Sinn	Féin,	but	even	so,	the	DUP	and	Sinn	Féin	are	adominant	influence.	Underlying	the	sense	of	injustice	and	blame	game	that	has	characterised	responses	isincreased	mutual	distrust.	Although,	the	DUP	and	Sinn	Féin	have	managed	their	relationship	relatively	well	duringthe	COVID	pandemic,	albeit	with	some	incidents,	the	divisive	atmosphere	where	every	issue	becomes	partisan-linked	to	ideology	is	not	conducive	to	the	power-sharing	modus	operandi	of	the	Strand	One	institutions.	Itcomplicates	policymaking	in	the	Executive,	potentially	undermines	the	substantive	value	of	the	Executive	andAssembly,	and	at	worst,	poses	serious	challenges	to	the	stability	of	those	same	institutions.The	Internal	Market	Bill	has	also	been	criticised	for	engineering	a	recentralisation	of	power	and	for	diluting	some	ofthe	existing	competences	and	spending	powers	available	to	the	UK’s	devolved	areas,	further	fuelling	Scottishnationalism.	Tampering	with	Northern	Ireland’s	devolution	arrangements	represents	a	further	threat	to	a	fragilepolitical	equilibrium,	by	playing	(inadvertently	or	not)	to	the	DUP’s	historic	opposition	to	the	Agreement	and	itsinstitutions.The	Internal	Market	Bill	obviously	potentially	impacts	on	Strand	Two	of	the	Agreement.	Strand	Two	reflects	the	EU’sconcept	of	mutual	respect	for	identities	and	the	post-sovereign	concept	of	uniting	of	people	not	territory.		StrandTwo	also	provides	for	cross-border	cooperation	and	explicitly	mentions	the	common	EU	framework.	The	Protocolwas	grounded	in	a	commitment	‘to	maintain	the	necessary	conditions	for	continued	North-Southcooperation’	(Article	1.2).	Central	to	this	objective	was	the	maintenance	of	an	open	border	between	NorthernIreland	and	Ireland.	Apart	from	the	potential	risk	to	peace	if	UK	customs	posts	were	erected	on	the	border,	barrierswould	hinder	economic	and	cultural	cross-border	cooperation.LSE Brexit: The Internal Market Bill may further erode trust and security in Ireland/Northern Ireland Page 2 of 4		Date originally posted: 2020-09-24Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/09/24/the-internal-market-bill-may-further-erode-trust-and-security-in-ireland-northern-ireland/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/The	Bill	also	negatively	affects	cross-border	political	relations.	It	reveals	a	very	different	conception	of	the	Irishborder	between	unionists	and	the	Irish	government	and	highlights	the	significance	of	that	border	for	unionist	andnationalist	identity	in	mirror	image	ways,	the	DUP	claiming	that	the	Irish	government	seeks	to	preserve	the	openborder	so	as	to	achieve	a	united	Ireland.	Different	perceptions	of	the	Agreement	are	also	revealed.	Unionists	arguethat	the	Protocol	was	not	agreed	by	consent	and	therefore	undermines	the	Agreement	and	also	that	it	constitutes	achange	to	Northern	Ireland’s	constitutional	status.	The	spirit	of	the	Agreement	is	consensual,	however,	the	formalconsociational	consensual	rules	apply	only	to	Strand	1-		devolved	policy	areas.	UK	foreign	policy	and	therefore	theBrexit	negotiations	are	the	UK	government’s	legislative	responsibility.	Brexit	itself	occurred	without	the	consent	of	amajority	in	Northern	Ireland	for	the	same	reason,	once	the	referendum	delivered	a	Leave	majority	in	the	UK.	Asimilar	misunderstanding	is	that	the	constitutional	status	of	Northern	Ireland	is	unaffected	by	the	sea	border.Northern	Ireland’s	constitutional	status	is	enshrined	in	the	Agreement	and	can	only	change	if	a	majority	supportunification	in	a	referendum	vote	in	Northern	Ireland	and	Ireland.The	acrimony	around	these	issues	also	reveals	the	negative	impact	of	Brexit	and	the	Internal	Market	Bill	on	StrandThree	of	the	Agreement.	Strand	Three	provides	for	East-West	cooperation	between	the	constituent	parts	of	the	UKand	Ireland	(the	British-Irish	Council,	(BIC)	and	East-West	cooperation	between	British	and	Irish	governments	(theBritish-Irish	Intergovernmental	Conference	(BIIGC)).		The	Protocol	by	creating	customs	barriers	between	the	islandand	Britain	affects	economic	relations,	but	the	statement	that	the	UK	would	be	prepared	to	break	international	lawhas	created	a	far	larger	threat	by	damaging	trust	between	British	and	Irish	governments	in	analready	strained	relationship.	For	both	British	and	Irish	governments,	their	relationship	was	central	to	the	peaceprocess,	but	there	are	different	perceptions	of	its	centrality	now.		British-Irish	intergovernmental	cooperation	was	thecore	condition	for	the	peace	process	and	the	fundamental	key	to	the	success	of	the	Agreement	and	future	peaceand	stability.	Both	kinships	states	strategically	created	and	framed	the	incentives	for	party	cooperation	in	a	complexpackage	deal	which	sought	to	break	the	zero-sum	nature	of	sectarian	politics.	For	Irish	governments	that	process	isstill	necessary	in	the	current	period	and	in	the	post-Brexit	years.However,	Brexit	has	highlighted	that	intergovernmental	cooperation	was	not	as	embedded	as	previously	thoughtand	perceptions	of	the	Agreement’s	role	differed.	In	particular,	the	BIIGC	did	not	meet	in	advance	of	the	Brexitreferendum,	or	in	advance	of	Article	50	being	triggered,	despite	Irish	preferences	and	despite	a	House	ofLords	recommendation	for	close	cooperation.	Nor	was	there	informal	cooperation	until	it	became	clear	to	the	UKgovernment	that	the	EU	was	firm	in	prioritising	the	border	issue.Overall,	responses	to	the	Internal	Market	Bill	and	the	Bill	itself	highlight	that	British	and	Irish	governments,	as	wellas	unionists	and	nationalists,	seem	to	have	markedly	different	perceptions	of	the	Agreement.	Unionists	aresuspicious	of	intergovernmental	cooperation	and	particularly	of	the	BIIGC,	viewing	it	as	a	means	of	Irish	influenceleading	to	unification.	Nor	has	the	British	government	emphasised	it,	or	the	BIC.	Although	opposing	interpretationsof	the	Agreement	could	be	accommodated	until	the	Brexit	process,	increasingly	Brexit	illuminates	how	keyfoundational	principles	of	the	Agreement	can	be	vulnerable	when	a	profound	challenge	arises.	Intergovernmentalmanagement	of	these	tensions	is	essential,	but	intergovernmental	tension	has	increased	significantly	and	hasincreased	conflict	between	the	parties	in	Northern	Ireland,	where	the	knee-jerk	reaction	is	for	unionists	to	defendthe	UK	government	and	blame	the	Irish	government,	mirrored	by	nationalist	responses.	In	short,	the	damage	to	theBritish-Irish	relationship	spills	over	to	the	other	strands	of	the	Agreement.	As	the	preface	to	the	Agreement	states,the	three	strands	are	interdependent	and	the	functioning	of	the	Agreement	relies	on	all	three.The	most	dangerous	impact	of	the	Brexit	process	and	of	the	Internal	Market	Bill	on	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	isits	impact	on	trust	and	security	in	Northern	Ireland	and	between	the	two	governments.	The	origin	of	the	conflict	wasbased	very	much	on	insecure	identities.	Unionists	from	the	foundation	of	the	state	in	1921	feared	an	irrendentistIrish	state	that	would	achieve	unification.	Clearly,	since	Brexit	those	fears	have	been	re-ignited.However	the	success	of	the	moderate	Alliance	and	SDLP	parties	in	2019,	the	increase	in	the	numbers	who	saythey	are	neither	nationalist	nor	unionist	and	the	fact	that	a	majority	of	the	Northern	Irish	population	supports	theAgreement	gives	cause	for	some	optimism.	In	addition,	Irish	officials	will	seek	to	restore	stability	to	the	British-Irishrelationship.	They	will	try	to	de-dramatise	tensions,	lobby	US	politicians	intensively	to	seek	leverage,	continue	closeengagement	with	the	EU	and	simultaneously	seek	to	engage	diplomatically	with	the	UK.LSE Brexit: The Internal Market Bill may further erode trust and security in Ireland/Northern Ireland Page 3 of 4		Date originally posted: 2020-09-24Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/09/24/the-internal-market-bill-may-further-erode-trust-and-security-in-ireland-northern-ireland/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/Dealing	with	Brexit	was	never	going	to	be	easy.	The	past	4	years	have	in	fact	been	far	harder	than	many	envisagedfor	British	and	Irish	diplomats	alike.	Weary	diplomats	will	launch	a	concerted	attempt	to	minimise	damage,	but	in	acold	climate,	with	the	increased	knowledge	that	even	if	the	Internal	Market	Bill	was	a	case	of	brinkmanship,	the	rulebook	of	international	and	bilateral	relations	was	torn	up	on	September	eighth	and	that	will	be	difficult	to	forget.This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	ofEconomics.	Image	copyright:	(c)	Allan	LeonardLSE Brexit: The Internal Market Bill may further erode trust and security in Ireland/Northern Ireland Page 4 of 4		Date originally posted: 2020-09-24Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/09/24/the-internal-market-bill-may-further-erode-trust-and-security-in-ireland-northern-ireland/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/

The internal market bill may further erode trust and security in Ireland/Northern Ireland

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The internal market bill may further erode trust and security in Ireland/Northern Ireland

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