35 research outputs found
Defining Original Presentism
It is surprisingly hard to define presentism. Traditional definitions
of the view, in terms of tensed existence statements, have
turned out not to to be capable of convincingly distinguishing
presentism from eternalism. Picking up on a recent proposal
by Tallant, I suggest that we need to locate the break between
eternalism and presentism on a much more fundamental level.
The problem is that presentists have tried to express their
view within a framework that is inherently eternalist. I call
that framework the Fregean nexus, as it is defined by Fregeâs
atemporal understanding of predication. In particular, I show
that the tense-logical understanding of tense which is treated
as common ground in the debate rests on this very same
Fregean nexus, and is thus inadequate for a proper definition
of presentism. I contrast the Fregean nexus with what I call
the original temporal nexus, which is based on an alternative,
inherently temporal form of predication. Finally, I propose
to define presentism in terms of the original temporal nexus,
yielding original presentism. According to original presentism,
temporal propositions are distinguished from atemporal ones not
by aspects of their content, as they are on views based on the
Fregean nexus, but by their formâin particular, by their form of
predication
Robots and us: towards an economics of the âGood Lifeâ
(Expected) adverse effects of the âICT Revolutionâ on work and opportunities for
individuals to use and develop their capacities give a new impetus to the debate on the
societal implications of technology and raise questions regarding the âresponsibilityâ of
research and innovation (RRI) and the possibility of achieving âinclusive and sustainable
societyâ. However, missing in this debate is an examination of a possible conflict
between the quest for âinclusive and sustainable societyâ and conventional economic
principles guiding capital allocation (including the funding of research and innovation).
We propose that such conflict can be resolved by re-examining the nature and purpose
of capital, and by recognising mainstream economicsâ utilitarian foundations as an
unduly restrictive subset of a wider Aristotelian understanding of choice
Causality and determination, powers and agency: Anscombean perspectives
Anscombeâs 1971 inaugural lecture at Cambridge, entitled âCausality and Determinationâ, has had a lasting influence on a remarkably broad range of philosophers and philosophical debates, touching on fundamental topics in philosophy of science, action theory, the free will debate, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. Especially where anti-reductionist or pluralist strands of philosophical thought are being seriously considered, one should not be surprised to find references to Anscombeâs lecture. Moreover, there appears to be a growing interest in Anscombeâs comprehensive philosophical outlook, as attested by the recent publication of a weighty collection of essays spanning that outlook in its full breadth in the prestigious Routledge Philosophical Minds series. Against this background it is apt that now, 50 years after the original lecture, a Topical Collection sees the light, circling around the most central themes from Anscombeâs lecture, with a particular emphasis on the question how these hang together, how they form part of the larger philosophical project that Anscombe obviously intended the lecture to highlight. This Introduction motivates the Topical Collection, and introduces the various contributions against that background
Dutch Pharmacogenetics Working Group (DPWG) guideline for the geneâdrug interaction of DPYD and fluoropyrimidines
Despite advances in the field of pharmacogenetics (PGx), clinical acceptance has remained limited. The Dutch Pharmacogenetics Working Group (DPWG) aims to facilitate PGx implementation by developing evidence-based pharmacogenetics guidelines to optimize pharmacotherapy. This guideline describes the starting dose optimization of three anti-cancer drugs (fluoropyrimidines: 5-fluorouracil, capecitabine and tegafur) to decrease the risk of severe, potentially fatal, toxicity (such as diarrhoea, hand-foot syndrome, mucositis or myelosuppression). Dihydropyrimidine dehydrogenase (DPD, encoded by the DPYD gene) enzyme deficiency increases risk of fluoropyrimidine-induced toxicity. The DPYD-gene activity score, determined by four DPYD variants, predicts DPD activity and can be used to optimize an individualâs starting dose. The gene activity score ranges from 0 (no DPD activity) to 2 (normal DPD activity). In case it is not possible to calculate the gene activity score based on DPYD genotype, we recommend to determine the DPD activity and adjust the initial dose based on available data. For patients initiating 5-fluorouracil or capecitabine: subjects with a gene activity score of 0 are recommended to avoid systemic and cutaneous 5-fluorouracil or capecitabine; subjects with a gene activity score of 1 or 1.5 are recommended to initiate therap
âAnimals run about the world in all sorts of pathsâ: varieties of indeterminism
In her seminal essay âCausality and Determinationâ, Elizabeth Anscombe very decidedly announced that âphysical indeterminismâ is âindispensable if we are to make anything of the claim to freedomâ. But it is clear from that same essay that she extends the scope of that claim beyond freedomâshe suggests that indeterminism is required already for animal self-movement (a position recently called âagency incompatibilismâ by Helen Steward). Building on Anscombeâs conception of causality and (in)determinism, I will suggest that it extends even further: life as such already requires physical indeterminism. Furthermore, I show that we can, on this basis, arrive at the idea of varieties of (in)determinism, along with a corresponding variety of incompatibilist theses. From this Anscombean vantage point, the free will discussion takes on a quite different outlook. The question whether free agency can coexist with determinism on the level of blind physical forces, which preoccupies the philosopher of free will, turns out to conflate a whole series of compatibility questions: not just whether life is compatible with physical determinism, but also whether animal self-movement is compatible with âbiological determinismâ, and whether free agency is compatible with âanimal determinismâ
Varieties of Power
Power enthusiasts are engaged in two projects: (1) developing a decent metaphysical account of powers, and (2) applying that account in order to make progress on various other philosophical issues, ranging from narrowly related topics such as causality to further removed ones such as free will, reasoning, or perception. I argue that an intermediate step may be taken, one that explores âvarieties of powerâ while still staying within the realm of (1), of âpureâ powers metaphysics. Taking this intermediate step provides a much more interesting basis for those involved in project (2), âappliedâ powers metaphysics. I articulate four such varieties of power by exploring various dimensions in which the explanatory profile of a power can be extended. I then briefly survey how these relate to various further metaphysical issues
When will individuals meet their personalized probabilities? A philosophical note on risk prediction
Risk prediction is one of the central goals of medicine. However, ultimate predictionâperfectly predicting whether individuals will actually get a diseaseâis still out of reach for virtually all conditions. One crucial assumption of ultimate personalized prediction is that individual risks in the relevant sense exist. In the present paper we argue that perfect prediction at the individual level will failâand we will do so by providing pragmatic, epistemic, conceptual, and ontological arguments
Varieties of Power
Power enthusiasts are engaged in two projects: (1) developing a decent metaphysical account of powers, and (2) applying that account in order to make progress on various other philosophical issues, ranging from narrowly related topics such as causality to further removed ones such as free will, reasoning, or perception. I argue that an intermediate step may be taken, one that explores âvarieties of powerâ while still staying within the realm of (1), of âpureâ powers metaphysics. Taking this intermediate step provides a much more interesting basis for those involved in project (2), âappliedâ powers metaphysics. I articulate four such varieties of power by exploring various dimensions in which the explanatory profile of a power can be extended. I then briefly survey how these relate to various further metaphysical issues
âAnimals run about the world in all sorts of pathsâ: varieties of indeterminism
In her seminal essay âCausality and Determinationâ, Elizabeth Anscombe very decidedly announced that âphysical indeterminismâ is âindispensable if we are to make anything of the claim to freedomâ. But it is clear from that same essay that she extends the scope of that claim beyond freedomâshe suggests that indeterminism is required already for animal self-movement (a position recently called âagency incompatibilismâ by Helen Steward). Building on Anscombeâs conception of causality and (in)determinism, I will suggest that it extends even further: life as such already requires physical indeterminism. Furthermore, I show that we can, on this basis, arrive at the idea of varieties of (in)determinism, along with a corresponding variety of incompatibilist theses. From this Anscombean vantage point, the free will discussion takes on a quite different outlook. The question whether free agency can coexist with determinism on the level of blind physical forces, which preoccupies the philosopher of free will, turns out to conflate a whole series of compatibility questions: not just whether life is compatible with physical determinism, but also whether animal self-movement is compatible with âbiological determinismâ, and whether free agency is compatible with âanimal determinismâ