Capability, Objectivity and 'False Consciousness' : On Sen, Marx and J.S. Mill

Purpose The extent to which Amartya Sen’s capability approach is prefigured in Karl Marx’s views comes into sharper focus when one notes that Marx and Friedrich Engels explicitly argued that the transformation from capitalism to communism would involve the development of “a totality of capacities”. Sen also cites the notion of “false consciousness” in developing his view of objectivity and claims a Marxian pedigree for the notion of “objective illusion”. He suggests that public discussion can make evaluative judgements better informed and less parochial, so that they connect more closely with what people have reason to value. The author argues that this line of argument is also closely related to views John Stuart Mill advanced in his discussion of the “competent judges” and in his defence of liberty of thought and discussion. Design/methodology/approach The approach used is conceptual analysis and discussion of historical texts. Findings The chief findings are that Amartya Sen’s works on capability and objectivity have deeper affinities with some of Karl Marx’s and Friedrich Engels’ views than has been hitherto appreciated by scholars. However, some of the claims which Sen makes about objectivity and false consciousness are prefigured in the writings of J.S. Mill. Originality/value Because some of these affinities between the works of Sen, Marx and Mill have not previously been recognised, the paper’s elucidation of them is a new contribution to the literature. </jats:sec

2009,18: Well-being, preference formation and the danger of paternalism

Informed or rational desire, capability and prudential value list views of well-being - must accommodate human limitations, as well as address issues about adaptation and paternalism. They sometimes address adaptation by toughening the requirement(s) on those desires, satisfaction of which constitutes well-being. That exacerbates a concern that these accounts if adopted will encourage policies which override actual desires and enforce paternalistic restrictions. Sunstein, like Sen, invokes democratic deliberation to address the adaptation problem, and advocates autonomy promoting paternalistic restrictions. Sunstein and Thaler's 'libertarian paternalism' extends this flavour of argument to cover examples of irrationality from behavioural economics. Their variation of the informed desire account involves highly idealized preferences which cannot, in practical terms, guide a paternalistic social planner, but lead to a potentially large range of cases where paternalistic intervention might, in principle, be justified. I argue that the liberal paternalist policy agenda should as currently conceived be resisted

On Ethics and the Economics of Development

This paper examines the implications of some of the growing literature at the borderline of ethics and economics for development debates. It argues that this literature has already had considerable impact on development economics, particularly as a result of work on well-being and capabilities. Other areas where there has been considerable growth include population ethics and the area which explores the link between the contractarian tradition in moral philosophy and game theory. Work here has had less impact on development economics, and there is considerable scope for more work. Finally, both ethics and economics have been criticised for taking too abstract a view of human beings. Each has begun to take on this line of criticism and work which responds to it in various ways - such as by taking account of issues relating to identity, allowing for hard choices and fuzziness - is relevant to development