97 research outputs found
In Defense of Weak Scientism: A Reply to Brown
In âWhatâs So Bad about Scientism?â (Mizrahi 2017), I argue that Weak Scientism, the view that âOf all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge is the best knowledgeâ (Mizrahi 2017, 354; emphasis in original) is a defensible position. That is to say, Weak Scientism âcan be successfully defended against objectionsâ (Mizrahi 2017, 354). In his response to Mizrahi (2017), Christopher Brown (2017) provides more objections against Weak Scientism, and thus another opportunity for me to show that Weak Scientism is a defensible position, which is what I will do in this reply. In fact, I think that I have already addressed Brownâs (2017) objections in Mizrahi (2017), so I will simply highlight these arguments here
What Isnât Obvious about âobviousâ: A Data-driven Approach to Philosophy of Logic
It is often said that âevery logical truth is obviousâ (Quine 1970: 82), that the âaxioms and rules of logic are true in an obvious wayâ (Murawski 2014: 87), or that âlogic is a theory of the obviousâ (Sher 1999: 207). In this chapter, I set out to test empirically how the idea that logic is obvious is reflected in the scholarly work of logicians and philosophers of logic. My approach is data-driven. That is to say, I propose that systematically searching for patterns of usage in databases of scholarly works, such as JSTOR, can provide new insights into the ways in which the idea that logic is obvious is reflected in logical and philosophical practice, i.e., in the arguments that logicians and philosophers of logic actually make in their published work
The (Lack of) Evidence for the Kuhnian Image of Science
In their reviews of The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation? (2018), both Markus Arnold (2018) and Amanda Bryant (2018) complain that the contributors who criticize Kuhnâs theory of scientific change have misconstrued his philosophy of science and they praise those who seek to defend the Kuhnian image of science. In what follows, then, I would like to address their claims about misconstruing Kuhnâs theory of scientific change. But my focus here, as in the book, will be the evidence (or lack thereof) for the Kuhnian image of science. I will begin with Arnoldâs review and then move on to Bryantâs review
How to Play the âPlaying Godâ Card
When the phrase âplaying Godâ is used in debates concerning the use of new technologies, such as cloning or genetic engineering, it is usually interpreted as a warning not to interfere with Godâs creation or nature. I think that this interpretation of âplaying Godâ arguments as a call to non-interference with nature is too narrow. In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation of âplaying Godâ arguments. Taking an argumentation theory approach, I provide an argumentation scheme and accompanying critical questions that capture the moral concerns expressed by âplaying Godâ arguments. If I am right, then âplaying Godâ arguments should be understood, not as a warning to leave Godâs creation or nature alone, but rather as an invitation to think carefully about all the ways in which the use of new technologies could go seriously wrong
You Will Respect My Authoritah!? A Reply to Botting
In a paper and a reply to critics published in _Informal Logic_, I argue that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. To appeal to expert opinion is to take an expertâs judgment that _p_ is the case as evidence for _p_. Such appeals to expert opinion are weak, I argue, because the fact that an expert judges that _p_ does not make it significantly more likely that _p_ is true or probable, as evidence from empirical studies on expert performance suggests. Unlike other critics of this argument, who take issue with the empirical evidence on expert performance, David Botting says that he wants to take issue with the premise that reliability is a necessary condition for the strength of appeals to expert opinion. I respond to Bottingâs objections and argue that they miss their intended target. I also argue that his attempt to show that arguments from expert opinion are strong is unsuccessful
Why Scientific Knowledge Is Still the Best
In his latest attack, even though he claims to be a practitioner of âclose readingâ (Wills 2018b, 34), it appears that Wills still has not bothered to read the paper in which I defend the thesis he seeks to attack (Mizrahi 2017a), or any of the papers in my exchange with Brown (Mizrahi 2017b; 2018a), as evidenced by the fact that he does not cite them at all. This explains why Wills completely misunderstands Weak Scientism and the arguments for the quantitative superiority (in terms of research output and research impact) as well as qualitative superiority (in terms of explanatory, predictive, and instrumental success) of scientific knowledge over non-scientific knowledge
Is Truth the Gold Standard of Inquiry? A Comment on Elginâs Argument Against Veritism
In True enough,, Elgin argues against veritism, which is the view that truth is the paramount epistemic objective. Elginâs argument against veritism proceeds from considering the role that models, idealizations, and thought experiments play in science to the conclusion that veritism is unacceptable. In this commentary, I argue that Elginâs argument fails as an argument against veritism. I sketch a refutation by logical analogy of Elginâs argument. Just as one can aim at gold medals and still find approximations to gold, such as silver and bronze medals, to be acceptable and honest achievements in competitive sports, one can aim at full truths as the paramount epistemic objective and still find approximations to truth, such as models and idealizations, to be acceptable and honest achievements in scientific inquiry
- âŠ