Detecting and defeating advanced man-in-the-middle attacks against TLS

Sobre los derechos de acceso: Permission to make digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-profi t or non-commercial purposes is granted providing that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the first page. Any other reproduction or transmission requires prior written permission by NATO CCD COE.TLS es un bloque esencial para la construcción de redes privadas. Un aspecto crítico para la seguridad de TLS es la autenticación y el intercambio de claves, que habitualmente se realiza mediante certificados. Un intercambio inseguro de claves puede conducir a un ataque de hombre en el medio (MITM). La confianza en los certificados se consigue habitualmente gracias a la utilización de una infraestructura de clave pública (PKI), que emplea autoridades de certificación (CA) de confianza para el establecimiento de cadenas de validez de certificados. En los últimos años, han surgido una serie de problemas relacionados con el uso del PKI: lo certificados pueden ser emitidos para cualquier entidad de Internet, con independencia de la posición de la CA en el árbol jerárquico. Esto implica que un ataque exitoso contra una CA tiene el potencial de permitir la generación de certificados válidos que posibilitarán la realización de ataques de hombre en el medio. No podemos descartar la posibilidad de usos malicioso de CA intermedias para llevar a cabo ataques dirigidos mediante la emisión de certificados ad-hoc, que serían extremadamente difíciles de detectar. La infraestructura PKI actual es susceptible a este tipo de ataques, por lo que se hace necesaria la creación de nuevos mecanismos para la detección y neutralización de los mismos. El IETF y otros organismos de estandarización han lanzado distintas iniciativas para posibilitar la detección de certificados falsificados. La mayoría de estas iniciativas intentan solucionar los problemas existentes mantenimiento el modelo PKI y agregando la técnica de 'certificate pinning', que asocia certificados concretos a servidores. Estas técnicas tienen limitaciones significativas, como la necesidad de un proceso de arranque seguro, o el establecimiento de la asociación para cada host de forma individual y uno por uno. Este trabajo proporciona una evolución desde el esquema de 'pinning' realizado en el host a un esquema de 'pinning' en la red, mediante la habilitación de mecanismos para la validación de certificados cuando atraviesan una red determinada. Los certificados se clasificarán como confiables o no como resultado del cruce de información obtenida de distintas fuentes. Esto resultaría en la detección temprana de certificados sospechosos y lanzaría mecanismos para rechazar el ataque, minimizar su impacto y recopilar información sobre los atacantes. Junto con lo anterior, se podría realizar un análisis más detallado y pormenorizado.TLS is an essential building block for virtual private networks. A critical aspect for the security of TLS dialogs is authentication and key exchange, usually performed by means of certificates. An insecure key exchange can lead to a man-in-the-middle attack (MITM). Trust in certificates is generally achieved using Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs), which employ trusted certificate authorities (CAs) to establish certificate validity chains. In the last years, a number of security concerns regarding PKI usage have arisen: certificates can be issued for entities in the Internet, regardless of its position in the CA hierarchy tree. This means that successful attacks on CAs have the potential to generate valid certificates enabling man-in-the-middle attacks. The possibility of malicious use of intermediate CAs to perform targeted attacks through ad-hoc certificates cannot be neglected and are extremely difficult to detect. Current PKI infrastructure for TLS is prone to MITM attacks, and new mechanisms for detection and avoidance of those attacks are needed. IETF and other standardization bodies have launched several initiatives to enable the detection of “forged” certificates. Most of these initiatives attempt to solve the existing problems by maintaining the current PKI model and using certificate pinning, which associates certificates and servers on use. These techniques have significant limitations, such as the need of a secure bootstrap procedure, or pinning requiring some host-by-host basis. This study proposes an evolution from pinning-in-the-host to pinning-in-the-net, by enabling mechanisms to validate certificates as they travel through a given network. Certificates would be classified as trusted or not trusted as a result of cross-information obtained from different sources. This would result in early detection of suspicious certificates and would trigger mechanisms to defeat the attack; minimize its impact; and gather information on the attackers. Additionally, a more detailed and thorough analysis could be performed

Geoeconomic variations in epidemiology, ventilation management, and outcomes in invasively ventilated intensive care unit patients without acute respiratory distress syndrome: a pooled analysis of four observational studies

Background: Geoeconomic variations in epidemiology, the practice of ventilation, and outcome in invasively ventilated intensive care unit (ICU) patients without acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) remain unexplored. In this analysis we aim to address these gaps using individual patient data of four large observational studies. Methods: In this pooled analysis we harmonised individual patient data from the ERICC, LUNG SAFE, PRoVENT, and PRoVENT-iMiC prospective observational studies, which were conducted from June, 2011, to December, 2018, in 534 ICUs in 54 countries. We used the 2016 World Bank classification to define two geoeconomic regions: middle-income countries (MICs) and high-income countries (HICs). ARDS was defined according to the Berlin criteria. Descriptive statistics were used to compare patients in MICs versus HICs. The primary outcome was the use of low tidal volume ventilation (LTVV) for the first 3 days of mechanical ventilation. Secondary outcomes were key ventilation parameters (tidal volume size, positive end-expiratory pressure, fraction of inspired oxygen, peak pressure, plateau pressure, driving pressure, and respiratory rate), patient characteristics, the risk for and actual development of acute respiratory distress syndrome after the first day of ventilation, duration of ventilation, ICU length of stay, and ICU mortality. Findings: Of the 7608 patients included in the original studies, this analysis included 3852 patients without ARDS, of whom 2345 were from MICs and 1507 were from HICs. Patients in MICs were younger, shorter and with a slightly lower body-mass index, more often had diabetes and active cancer, but less often chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and heart failure than patients from HICs. Sequential organ failure assessment scores were similar in MICs and HICs. Use of LTVV in MICs and HICs was comparable (42·4% vs 44·2%; absolute difference -1·69 [-9·58 to 6·11] p=0·67; data available in 3174 [82%] of 3852 patients). The median applied positive end expiratory pressure was lower in MICs than in HICs (5 [IQR 5-8] vs 6 [5-8] cm H2O; p=0·0011). ICU mortality was higher in MICs than in HICs (30·5% vs 19·9%; p=0·0004; adjusted effect 16·41% [95% CI 9·52-23·52]; p<0·0001) and was inversely associated with gross domestic product (adjusted odds ratio for a US$10 000 increase per capita 0·80 [95% CI 0·75-0·86]; p<0·0001). Interpretation: Despite similar disease severity and ventilation management, ICU mortality in patients without ARDS is higher in MICs than in HICs, with a strong association with country-level economic status

Guidelines for the use and interpretation of assays for monitoring autophagy (4th edition)

In 2008, we published the first set of guidelines for standardizing research in autophagy. Since then, this topic has received increasing attention, and many scientists have entered the field. Our knowledge base and relevant new technologies have also been expanding. Thus, it is important to formulate on a regular basis updated guidelines for monitoring autophagy in different organisms. Despite numerous reviews, there continues to be confusion regarding acceptable methods to evaluate autophagy, especially in multicellular eukaryotes. Here, we present a set of guidelines for investigators to select and interpret methods to examine autophagy and related processes, and for reviewers to provide realistic and reasonable critiques of reports that are focused on these processes. These guidelines are not meant to be a dogmatic set of rules, because the appropriateness of any assay largely depends on the question being asked and the system being used. Moreover, no individual assay is perfect for every situation, calling for the use of multiple techniques to properly monitor autophagy in each experimental setting. Finally, several core components of the autophagy machinery have been implicated in distinct autophagic processes (canonical and noncanonical autophagy), implying that genetic approaches to block autophagy should rely on targeting two or more autophagy-related genes that ideally participate in distinct steps of the pathway. Along similar lines, because multiple proteins involved in autophagy also regulate other cellular pathways including apoptosis, not all of them can be used as a specific marker for bona fide autophagic responses. Here, we critically discuss current methods of assessing autophagy and the information they can, or cannot, provide. Our ultimate goal is to encourage intellectual and technical innovation in the field